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Abstract
While the empirical literature on host-country institutional determinants of foreign direct investment
(FDI) has grown voluminous, researchers often fail to agree upon the net effect of institutions on FDI.
This black box of incongruousness is assessed by theoretically and empirically acknowledging FDI and
multinational enterprise (MNE) heterogeneity. Two contributions are made to the field of research.
The theoretical contribution consists of a basic framework developed for generating expectations
around the institutional determinants of FDI at a disaggregated level. Therein, institutional mechanisms
are unbundled into four categories: personal freedoms; political governance; economic interaction; eco-
nomic regulation. The four categories account for seven institutional concepts: human rights protection;
labor standards upholding, political preference aggregation; control of corruption; property rights pro-
tection; contract enforceability; quality of banks and credit. Second, FDI is disaggregated on the basis
of the three sectors of economic activity: natural resources; manufacturing; services. Third, expectations
as to the relative salience of the seven institutional concepts across FDI from the different sectors are
formulated. The variations in expectations are formed as a function of sector-specific idiosyncrasies in
production and host-country integration by MNEs. This I label The Varieties of FDI framework.
The empirical contribution is an analysis of FDI and MNE heterogeneity, using data on Norwegian
outward FDI across sectors from 1998 to 2006. To investigate if working with aggregate numbers con-
ceal unaccounted for diversity, FDI from the three sectors are regressed on a set of baseline variables,
and benchmarked up against estimates from regressing total FDI on the same variables. Next, the ex-
pectations developed in the theoretical framework are assessed in sector-specific models. I find that the
institutional determinants of FDI in different sectors are highly diverse, except for control of corruption
which seems to impede FDI in all sectors. Control of corruption is also the only robust determinant
of natural resources FDI. For manufacturers, on average found most attentive to policy climates, robust
relationships are found between indicators of political governance, economic interaction, and economic
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a
regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in the
possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law, and in
which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the
payment of debts from all those who are able to pay. Commerce and manufactures, in short,
can seldom flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the
justice of government.
– Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1791, 546).1
Conflict over politics is static – it is about what happens today. Rational actors also care
about the future. This is where political institutions – which are durable and, consequently,
have the capacity to influence political actions and political equilibria in the future – come
in.
– Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democ-
racy (2006a, 173).
Few would disagree with Adam Smith’s claim of how private business growth depends on property rights
protection and the fairness of political government. Nor with Acemoglu and Robinson’s highlighting of
how actors in the marketplace care about the future of their business and whether the political sphere is
tuned to support their strives. Both stances are arguably even more relevant to investors producing goods
in unsure foreign markets. However, as the ensuing pages both theoretically and empirically inquire into,
the argument can be made that how institutional structures are weighted by multinational producers is
liable to differ depending on what type of foreign production they engage in. As such, this endeavor
commences with a contemporary anecdote portraying the complexity of the issue at hand.
1Quoted from the 2010 reprint.
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2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
In the twilight hours of the Myanmar (formerly Burma) military regime, Asian extractive enterprises
started showing interest in accessing the country’s natural resources.2 Ever since General Ne Win in
1962 took control of Myanmar through a coup, the government has retained power by use of military
force. With the country in 2008 still exhibiting key traits of an autocracy, extensive direct investments
in extraction and processing of Myanmar’s vast reserves of oil, natural gas, timber, and hydropower,
gemstones, and cash crops were conducted. The industrial identities of these investing firms mirrored
the general structure of Myanmar’s economy at the time – between forty and fifty percent of domestic
production was in primary sector activity (Htun et al., 2011, 154). For foreign investors, Myanmar had
long been, and still was, considered a highly uncertain destination for direct investments due to unstable
financial markets, inconsistent policy measures, an uncooperative polity, and endemic corruption.3
Very recently however, Myanmar has made a significant turn from military administration to quasi-
civil government, publicly manifested after the 2010 national elections held under the umbrella of a new
constitution. Since elections, the government has embarked on a series of reforms, hopefully culminat-
ing in a more mixed structure of the economy. Chaperoning political reform are national efforts toward
clarifying economic policy and securing rule of law and economic regulation.4 Since the start of the
democratic reformation, Myanmar officials have repeatedly called attention to the country’s underdevel-
oped manufacturing and service sectors. By attempting to craft a sound institutional framework, they are
hoping to catch the attention of foreign investors willing to move capital into these industries.5
In February 2012, as part of an official delegation consisting of amongst others the Norwegian Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, Sigve Brekke, a senior executive from the Norwegian telecom giant Telenor,
already heavily invested in the South-East Asian region, visited Myanmar. After roundtable discussions
with representatives from the Myanmar Investment Commission, Brekke was asked by Norwegian media
whether his company would be interested in committing to the Burmese telecom market. His reply went:
“All international actors like Telenor need a set of laws and rules. We need regulations and investment
protection. All these aspects are still lacking in Myanmar”.6
1.1 Varieties of FDI and institutional determinants
This then begs the question: Why do multinational resource extractors dare venture into Myanmar’s
precarious market, while telecommunications investors and manufacturers so far have refrained from
investing? This disparateness of multinational investor behavior is often assumed by researchers, even
commented on in-depth by some. But very rarely is divergent behavior the object of thorough empirical
assessment. The question of what drives the foreign investment decision frequently assume foreign direct
2“The Scramble For A Piece of Burma”, Time Magazine, March 19, 2009.
3“Beware the bubble talk of a business friendly Myanmar”, Financial Times, February 21, 2012.
4“Na˚r Burma blir Myanmar”, Morgenbladet, March 23, 2012.
5“Myanmar officials call for more FDI”, Myanmar Times, October 31, 2011.
6See Norwegian TV2, February 2012: http://www.tv2.no/nyheter/utenriks/telenor-lukter-paa-investeringer-i-myanmar-
3693470.html. Author’s own translation.
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investment (FDI), and its enactor, the multinational enterprise (MNE), to be homogenous entities.
Coupled with this assumption, political and economic institutions have in the last couple of decades
gained increased attention as drivers of societal and economic change.7 Both from a general point of
view (see e.g. North, 1990; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006a), but also as regards investment in particular
(see e.g. Feng, 2003; Cohen, 2007; Dunning and Lundan, 2008) the importance of the governance struc-
tures of our society has been investigated. The idea is that institutions affect the costs to both transact
and produce, and the more sound and predictable policy climates national institutions create, the more
capital will be attracted into production of goods or services there. The vast array of empirical studies
on the link between foreign direct investments and host-country institutional setup has however proved
incapable to agree on the most basic of relationships. Conclusions over whether policy climates associ-
ated with regime type, control of corruption, or human rights protection pull or impede the entrance of
foreign investors are divergent. This thesis concerns itself with how a proper embrace of FDI and MNE
complexity might aide the lack of empirical conciliation. The research question accordingly reads:
Research question: Does the relationship between foreign direct investment and institu-
tional concepts differ across varieties of foreign production?
Let me illustrate the matter by juxtaposing the two industries from the Myanmar anecdote. Envisage
an MNE setting up large scale petroleum extraction in a foreign economy. The initial capital transfer in
building extractive facilities is tremendous. Heavy and specialized machinery needs construction and set-
up costs are sunk from the get-go. In the case of turmoil or forced productive shut down, natural resource
MNEs will most likely have problems liquefying their equity in the sense that oil rigs are not moved in a
day, nor are they likely to be applicable in other extraction locations without extensive conversion.
Petroleum extraction has come to involve advanced technology both in seismic surveying and in the
extraction and refining processes of petroleum over the years. The development of necessary technolo-
gies has come about through considerable research and development efforts, but also this know-how is
very specific to individual extraction locations. Working in oil extraction is no longer a blue collar job,
and as such the likelihood of petroleum MNEs employing locally when drilling abroad has fallen, de-
pending on education levels in the host-country. Moreover, global scarcity of energy resources has made
value-added from petroleum extraction very high. So high in fact that many governments depend on
realizing their petroleum rents to balance national accounts.8 A further trait of petroleum industries is
that they are usually located far away from the general population, either offshore or in the hinterlands.
As such, extraction locations often function as non-integrated stand-alone production enclaves.
Consider next a telecommunications MNE, supplying telephone and internet services abroad. The
7See for example the collection of essays in Rhodes, Binder and Rockman (2008).
8Some have labelled such countries ”rentier states”, deriving substantial portions of their national budgets from natural
resource extraction carried out by external agents, thwarting the rise of strong domestic productive sectors (see e.g. Beblawi,
1990, 87-8).
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initial capital transfers are also here likely to be substantial. There are costs associated with the set-
ting up of business such as acquiring licenses and company registration fees, and rental fees associated
with acquiring office space. Getting business involves obtaining knowledge on the target market and
implementation of marketing efforts on the basis of such, also representing considerable disbursements.
However, a smaller share of the total equity should be sunk than for petroleum extraction. Leasing
contracts can be terminated, and marketing knowledge is often applicable elsewhere.
Most telecom services involve contracting. In turn, negotiations with the use of third party enforce-
ment that oversees and secure the validity of contracts are frequently applied. Access to multiple sources
of trustworthy credit is also important in these industries, as day-to-day running expenses often are con-
siderable. In general, the exposure to the host-country market is large and governed by various contracts,
including those giving access to credit. The fact that services are produced for individual consumers and
corporations necessitate close customer contact. Therefore main offices are often located in urban areas,
near the clients. The labor force of the subsidiary, perhaps after an initial ”learning period” where experts
from the principal trains local personnel, should in the long run be recruited locally. This both to maintain
grip on host-market mores, but also to reduce transportation fees associated with using expatriates.
Now consider the institutional preferences these two MNEs are likely to exhibit. Petroleum extractors
should care more for protection of physical properties than would telecom providers, having considerable
capital sunk in physical holdings. The service provided by the telecom MNE is on the other hand more
prone to patent right violation, as technical solutions are more easily emulated and put to use than oil
extraction technology. To a much larger degree than petroleum extraction, telecom business is based
on contracts and will thus rely heavily on the day-to-day enforcement of such. Similarly, the telecom
MNE should be more sensitive to strikes and labor force instability than would the petroleum MNE, as
its workforce more likely is hired locally. Telecom providers would also be more sensitive to societal
instability than petroleum MNEs, as their main offices are situated where most social upheavals take
place: in urban areas. As regards the host-country dependence on the MNE, especially technology-scarce
developing nations are more likely to rely on foreign resource extractors than on telecommunications
providers, the former contributing substantially more to their Exchequers (at least directly and in the
short run). Petroleum extractors might therefore experience less of the negative externalities arising from
malfunctioning institutions than does the telecom provider, as hosts may go at lengths to create enclaves
in which resource extraction is shielded from potentially dilapidated and derelict policy climates.
In short, there is reason to believe that MNEs investing in different sectors will respond differently
to host-country institutions and policy climates. Assuming MNE homogeneity might obscure this varied
set of relations between institutions and FDI. The purpose of this thesis is in first instance to shed light
on whether there might be something in this claim of empirical simplicity. Are there differences in the
institutional drivers of investors across varieties of FDI? Secondly, it offers an inquiry into how different
mechanisms tying institutional concepts to FDI decisions function across the varieties of FDI.
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1.2 Outline of the thesis
Chapter 2 represents the conceptual and theoretical fundament of this thesis. As a point of departure
the developmental potential in FDI is touched upon. It is highlighted how gains may depend on which
sector of activity FDI is conducted in. Next, foreign direct investment and multinational enterprises are
discussed as analytical concepts. Then, the eclectic paradigm of Dunning (see e.g. 1977, 1981, 1988,
1993) is presented as the basic theoretical framework for developing expectations. In discussing what
Dunning labels the “locational determinants” of FDI, I draw upon the understanding of formal institutions
in new institutional economics (see e.g. North, 1981, 1990, 2005; Williamson, 1985, 2000).
The remainder of Chapter 2 develop what I label The Varieties of FDI framework. As a starting
point, institutional concepts are unbundled with reference to the burgeoning literature on the renewed
role of the state in economic upgrading in the 21st century (see e.g. Rondinelli and Cheema, 2003;
Grosse, 2005). Next, the mechanisms through which outcomes of the institutional configurations affect
investors is discussed. To be able to predict how the particular mechanisms differ in their affect across
the varieties of FDI, a scheme mapping key traits of different types of foreign production is presented.
The disaggregation of FDI is conducted on the basis of the three traditional sectors of economic activity:
natural resources (primary); manufacturing (secondary); services (tertiary). The traits assessed for each
sector are: relative size; sunkenness; expected profit margin; degree of local labor market integration;
closeness of contact with end users; relative complexity of operations. A set of theoretical expectations
based on the traits of the three varieties of FDI is lastly put forth.
Chapter 3 presents the research design fitted to assess the expectations developed in chapter 2. First,
it makes the case for why a statistical analysis is appropriate at this level of investigation. Next, a general
discussion of the dependent variable, FDI, is followed by a presentation of the Norwegian investment
data. The potential for generalization from these data is debated by touching on potential biases inherent
to Norwegian FDI behavior. Then, operationalizations of the explanatory factors discussed in Chapter
2 are carried out by drawing on the vast array of indices measuring institutions and institutional perfor-
mance. Thereunder a set of macroeconomic and cultural factors thought to affect the FDI decision is also
conceptualized. At last, the statistical model most apt to analyze the data is defined, followed by some
short discussions of important statistical issues.
Chapter 4 is the analysis of the expectations developed in Chapter 2, based on the research design
developed in Chapter 3. It consists of three main parts. First, a comparative discussion of the results
from four sets of baseline models estimated for all three sectors of FDI as well as total FDI numbers
is conducted. This is to assess whether there are differences in how policy climates drives FDI across
sectors, and to what extent the results from the model regressing the totality of FDI diverges from the
sector-divided results. Next, sector-specific models are run to assess The Varieties of FDI expectations.
These models incorporate sector-specific controls. At last, a series of robustness checks are presented
and considered. Results are substantiated and summarized towards the end of the chapter.
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1.3 Review of the findings
The empirical analysis of the expectations formulated in The Varieties of FDI framework first of all
support the claim that effects diverge across economic sectors. Baseline models indicate that not only are
estimations based on total FDI numbers more sensitive to model specification, they also seem misleading
as to how effects function at a lower level of aggregation.
The expectations developed in the theoretical framework were corroborated in some instances, and
disapproves in other. There were two major tendencies in the estimates. First, manufacturing producers
on the balance seemed more attentive to policy environments associated with sound institutions than both
natural resource extractors and service suppliers. Second, control of corruption seemed to affect investors
from all sectors positively, the results robust to most checks. As for the specific relationships found:
natural resource extractors seem impervious to everything but corruption control; manufacturers were
found to value most indicators of political governance, economic interaction, and economic regulation;
service suppliers were at the most robust level only found to be attracted by host-country environments
controlling corruption and protecting human rights.
The general conclusion is that disaggregating FDI is advantageous as opposed to estimating effects
on total FDI numbers as it yields more relevant information. Future research should investigate this
heterogeneity further, both with data from other source-countries than Norway, but also at lower levels
of disaggregation such as individual industries.
Chapter 2
Literature, concepts and theory
Economists ”should” concentrate their attention on a particular form of human activity,
and upon the various institutional arrangements that arise as a result of this form of activity.
Man’s behavior in the market relationship, reflecting the propensity to truck and to barter,
and the manifold variations in structure that this relationship can take; these are the proper
subjects for the economist’s study.
– James M. Buchanan, What Should Ecnomists Do? (1964, 214)
By neglecting the institutional foundations of market structure, the conventional tools of
economic analysis are rendered impotent before many strategic management problems.
– David J. Teece, Economic Analysis and Strategic Management, (1984, 91)
We have at least the mental equipment to foster our long-term selfish interests rather than
merely our short-term selfish interests. [...] We have the power to defy the selfish genes of
our birth and, if necessary, the selfish memes of our indoctrination.
– Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, (1976, 200)
The intention of this section is to clarify key concepts and contribute to theory development. Focus is on
what Buchanan and Teece both emphasize: the institutional underpinnings of economic bargaining and
the variations of market relations arising from such. First, the potential developmental impacts of FDI
are briefly discussed. Secondly, foreign direct investment and its enactor, the multinational enterprise,
are discussed as analytical concepts. Next John H. Dunning’s (see e.g. 1977; 1981; 1988; 1993) eclectic
paradigm for foreign production is discussed, and thereunder the importance of institutions as drivers
of FDI. The understanding of institutions is derived from that in new institutional economics (see e.g.
North, 1981, 1990, 2005; Williamson, 1985, 2000). Finally, the framework I label The Varieties of
FDI is presented. To formulate theoretical expectations, relevant institutional concepts are unbundled,
connective mechanisms are discussed, FDI is disaggregated on the basis of economic sector of activity,
and sectors are stylized on the back of their divergent properties. These properties are in turn interacted
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with the connective mechanisms to form a matrix of assumptions as to how MNEs are likely to diverge
in their fostering of long-term selfishness, as put so eloquently by Richard Dawkins.
2.1 The relevance of the puzzle: FDI and development
There is in the institutions and growth literature a fairly strong consensus on the importance of institu-
tions for economic growth. Rodrik (2000, 4) states that it is no longer a question of “’do institutions
matter?’ but ’which institutions matter and how does one acquire them?’”1 Writings on the relationship
between institutions and growth very much underline the importance of private initiatives: ”All instances
of successful development are ultimately the collective result of individual decisions by entrepreneurs to
invest in risky new ventures and try out new things” (Rodrik, 2000, 3). The main way through which
institutions spur private investment is through affecting transaction and production costs (North, 1990).
FDI however is only one of many types of private incentives that play a role in stimulating aggregate
investment rates. Although domestic investment still accounts for most of the investment in develop-
ing and transition economies (see e.g. UNCTAD, 2010, 2011a), FDI might complement the picture.
No single type of investment can alone meet developing countries investment needs. Attracting FDI
may increase the leverage, sustainability and potentially the effect of private investment on economic
development. However, inquiries into the FDI-economic growth relationship are less settled than those
examining the link between institutions and growth.2 One explanation might be that FDI-incurred growth
depend on host-country trade policy (see e.g. Bhagwati, 1978). Empirically, some find that homegrown
capital outperforms foreign capital in creating growth (Firebaugh, 1992), some suggest that there is no
reason to believe one dollar worth of FDI contributes more (or less) to an economy’s productive activity
than any one dollar of domestic investment (Rodrik, 1999a, 37). The most extreme again hold that a
lack of FDI contributes to the decline of economies (Amirahmadi and Wu, 1994). What seems to be
generally accepted is that FDI has a significant growth potential in a subset of countries in the devel-
oping world, although often dependent on complementary initiatives such as host-country investments
in human and physical infrastructure (see e.g. Blomstro¨m, Lipsey and Zejan, 1994; Balasubramanyam,
Salisu and Sapsford, 1996; Borensztein, Gregorio and Lee, 1998).3
FDI might influence host-country development through other channels than formation of capital. A
number of studies have for example shown that MNEs pay higher wages than domestic firms, especially
when the relationship is a developed country MNE investing in a developing country (see e.g. Haddad
and Harrison, 1993; Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey, 1996). Others suggest that the presence of MNEs also
1Insightful accounts of the link between institutions and growth are those of Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) on
institutions as deeper determinants of growth, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) on the legacy of early day institution-
building, Hall and Jones (1999) on social infrastructure, Knack and Keefer (1995) on social capital and bureaucratic quality,
Knutsen (2011) on the economic effects of political regimes, and Rodrik (1999b) on institutions and conflict management. Lin
and Nugent (1995) provide an excellent review of literature on institutions and economic development.
2For an excellent survey of the empirical literature on FDI and development, see Lipsey (2004).
3A related discussion is that of absorptive capacity, concerning whether host-countries need a minimum level of technolog-
ical capacity to benefit from MNEs stock of knowledge or not (see e.g. Lapan and Bardhan, 1973).
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raises wages in domestic firms (see e.g. Feliciano and Lipsey, 1999; Lipsey and Sjo¨holm, 2004),4 and
that MNEs might raise average wage levels in host-economies (see e.g. Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey,
1996; Figlio and Blonigen, 2000). As for productivity gains, comparative investigations of MNEs’ and
domestic firms’ productivity levels almost always find that MNEs produce more efficiently than domestic
firms (see e.g. Chuang and Lin, 1999; Kokko, Zejan and Tansini, 2001), and that technology producing
the superior productivity might spill over to host-country parallel sectors (see e.g. Blomstro¨m and Wolff,
1994; Javorcik, 2004b).5 MNE presence might also introduce new industries in the host-economy, either
through greenfield initiatives or through tighter linking of the host-country to the global marketplace.
The general idea is that MNEs bring with them knowledge of demand in the world market, and how the
host country might find its place in chains of global production (see e.g. Lipsey, 1998).6
Intriguing to an analysis of FDI determinants assuming MNE heterogeneity is the diversity of de-
velopment impacts different types of FDI might have. The below disaggregation of FDI is conducted
on the basis of economic sector of activity. Natural resource extraction, especially petroleum activity,
has often been associated with carpetbagger MNEs controlling income streams of developing countries.
Although developing country governments have increased their share of the resource royalties after the
Organization of Petroleum Export Countries was established, MNEs still control most of the volume
and pace of drilling. The low integration of natural resource MNEs in host-countries result in minimal
local linkages through which non-economic spillovers might occur. Local procurement is also scarce in
resource extraction. Moreover, processing and refining oil or gemstones is capital- and skill-intensive,
both factors scarcely supplied in developing countries. The chief indirect gains from FDI, the upswings
in industrialization and increased productivity, are thus less associated with natural resource investments
than other forms of production. The benefit from MNEs is often constrained to the provision of (often
much-needed) foreign capital (Cohen, 2007, 78-9).
Manufacturing and services industries on the other hand are assumed to be more beneficial to hosts
due to their generally high local integration. The former normally brings with it more local procurement
and employment, although criticism has been raised concerning these industries potential for crowding
out domestic business, exploiting cheap labor, polluting, and monopolizing sectors of the market. Host-
governments still seem to find manufacturing MNEs appealing due to their greater inclination to reinvest
profits, expand operations, and increase local hiring after the initial FDI though (Cohen, 2007, 80-1).
Until recently, services FDI have not been assumed to have the same positive effect on host-countries
as manufacturing, depicted by host-governments’ restrictive policies towards service MNEs. The eco-
nomic reasoning is that services FDI was not seen capable of providing advanced technologies, export
opportunities, or links with local firms. This perception has slowly changed with increased acknowl-
4But see Go¨rg and Greenaway (2001).
5But see Blomstro¨m, Kokko and Globerman (2001).
6See also the collection of essays in Moran, Graham and Blomstro¨m (2005) and Alschuler (1998) for more (critical) dis-
cussions around whether and how FDI promote development, and Blomstro¨m and Kokko (1998) for a comprehensive review
of the mechanisms through which FDI has been investigated to impact development.
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edgment of FDI in services as a way of acquiring broader forms of technology such as organizational
expertise, managerial know-how, information processing systems and so forth (UNCTAD, 2004, 124).
The essence is that there are different types of gains available from having different types of foreign
producers in ones economy. One particularly interesting assertion in the prolongation of the “infant
industry” argument, is that by knowing where your economy lacks capital or know-how, information on
what institutions attract what types FDI may be used to entice foreign investments in those sectors not
receiving infant protection.7 Industry policies aimed at strengthening selective sectors in the economy is
paramount to create sustainable industrial upturns, Chang (2003, 263-9) argues. The policy-implication
is that policy measures should target opening of sectors where technology or knowledge is missing – to
reap the gains from FDI, understanding how the diversity of MNEs behave might therefore be paramount.
2.2 FDI and the MNE
All producers face the fundamental decision of whether to “make or buy” – a choice between conducting
activities in-house or contracting activities out to another firm (UNCTAD, 2011b, 124). If activity is kept
within the boundaries of the firm, production is internalized. If not, it is externalized. Internalization
conducted on a global scale is what this section is concerned with.
2.2.1 Foreign direct investment
Foreign direct investment is a special case of internalization, involving the purchase or setting up of
physical production facilities in a foreign country. When conducting FDI, a firm decides to maintain
production in-house while stretching the bounds of their organization across borders. There are other
potential forms of international economic interaction as well. Arm’s-length trade in assets is one. An-
other, one that has gained attention in the aftermath of the 2008 financial meltdown, is foreign portfolio
investment (FPI).8 FPI is usually conducted with a short time horizon and is often speculative.
FDI differs from FPI and arm’s-length trade in at least four respects (see e.g. Dunning and Dil-
yard, 1999; Dunning and Lundan, 2008). First, FDI involves the consign of non-financial assets such
as technology, organizational expertise, entrepreneurship, incentive structures, values and cultural norms
between the MNE and the subsidiary. Second, FDI does not involve a direct change in ownership of the
asset acquired, it is rather a transfer of control. While arm’s-length trade and FPI are organized through
the market, FDI is administered by and within investment hierarchies. Third, in conducting FDI, MNEs
control the deployment of a bundle assets transferred, rather than individuals or small firms normally
resorting to simple trade. FDI is thus more complex than especially trade in the sense that multiple trans-
fers are enacted simultaneously when investing.9 Fourth, FDI is not only prompted by higher foreign
7The “infant industry” argument justifies government intervention through trade protection or subsidies in key industries as
a first-best policy measures to make them competitive in the global marketplace (see e.g. Kemp, 1960; Mayer, 1984).
8FPI entails entering foreign economies through purchases on stock and bond markets, or by acquiring other financial
devices or derivatives in foreign public and private sectors or in general money markets (Dunning and Dilyard, 1999, 4-6).
9It should be noted that FPI might be even more nebulous than FDI, as witnessed through the sales of loan bundles in the
bloating of the pre-2008 housing bubble. However, such investments are usually carried out by financial entities such as hedge
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interest rates, the main driver behind FPI and trade. FDI is motivated by the opportunity to improve
performance relative to competitors’ or the former entity in control of the investment objective.
In essence, FDI is about influencing production. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) both recommend a ten per cent stake
for identifying FDI.10 The formal recognition of FDI is that it “reflect[s] the objective of establishing a
lasting interest by a resident enterprise in one economy (direct investor) in an enterprise (direct invest-
ment enterprise) that is resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor. The lasting interest
implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the direct investment
enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise” (OECD, 2008, 48).
After the initial FDI, the stock change through equity adjunct or debt instruments.11 Calculating FDI
is manifested in OECDs general methodology, and includes the “initial equity transaction that meets the
10% threshold and all subsequent financial transactions and positions between the direct investor and the
direct investment enterprise, as well as qualifying FDI transactions and positions between incorporated
and unincorporated fellow enterprises” (2008, 27).
The most analytically noteworthy properties of FDI are persistence and stability. MNEs search for
some degree of lasting strategic control over the investment object. The high degree of commitment in
FDI makes MNEs more vulnerable to political and economic changes in host-countries as they cannot
as easily as a FPI investor withdraw investments in the face of unexpected change. MNEs have to “live
with” host-country policy environments. Institutions should therefore matter more.
2.2.2 The multinational enterprise
This study mainly concerns itself with two sets of actors. On the one side there are host-countries, sup-
plying institutions and public policy. On the other side there is the multinational enterprise.12 MNEs
are multinational by virtue of owning controlling shares in productive activity in more than one econ-
omy – they are multinational through conducting FDI. The United Nations Committee for Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) defines an MNE as “an enterprise, irrespective of its country of origin and its
ownership, including private, public or mixed, comprising entities in two or more countries, regardless of
funds, not firms engaged in physical production.
10There are deviations to this norm. Germany (twenty percent), France (twenty percent), and New Zealand (twenty-five
percent) classify FDI by MNEs in or out of their economies based on other thresholds (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, 766). The
differences in how data is collected nationally are important to be aware of as global FDI data are based on national reporting.
The 10 per cent threshold is meant to capture the moment when ownership in terms of voting power allows for real influence.
Some claim that ownership only a tenth of share holdings in some cases do not lead to significant influence. On the other hand,
it is not a given that the board voting share equals the ownership share (OECD, 2008, 23).
11Equity includes shares, capital reserves, capital contributions beyond the inceptive transfer, and reinvested earnings. The
debt component encompass a broad range of instruments such as bonds, debentures, commercial papers, trade credit and loans
between subsidiary and principal (OECD, 2008, 60).
12The multinational nomenclature of Dunning (1993) is used throughout this thesis. However, the United Nations Centre on
Transnational Corporations in 1974 adopted the concept of firm transnationality at the request of a group of Latin-American
countries. They wished to distinguish investments stemming from outside the region from those of their continental peers. In
time, transnationality has come to be associated with the model of Bartlett and Ghoshal (2002), prescribing to an understanding
of transnationality that implies a fully integrated and multidimensional corporate strategy.
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the legal form and fields of activity of these entities, which operates under a system of decision-making,
permitting coherent policies and a common strategy through one or more decision-making centres, in
which the entities are so linked, by ownership or otherwise, that one or more of them may be able to ex-
ercise significant influence over the activities of others and, in particular, to share knowledge, resources
and responsibilities with the others” (UNCTAD 1994, cited in Bellak 1998, 228).
However, theoretical perceptions of firms are multifarious.13 In microeconomics and international
business literature, firms are usually assumed to function as profit-maximizing unitary rational actors, ca-
pable of calculating risk probabilities and conducting strategic choices (see e.g. Dunning, 1958; Becker,
1976; Moe, 1984). Behavioral theories of the firm postulate actions as outcomes of a bundle of routines
enacted by individuals filling roles within an organization.14 Environmental complexity and boundaries
of human cognition requires informational shortcuts and routine based systems of behavior. Change is
considered an incremental response to external shocks and new routines are internalized when the threat
is reduced to an acceptable level (see e.g. Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982).15
The complexity of firm organization, functioning, and motivation has important implications for
analysis. There are diametrical differences in firm configuration both vertically (between firms of varying
sizes) and horizontally (between firms from different industries and regions). As The Varieties of FDI
framework expand on, these specific characteristics should create divergences in investment behavior.
Economic gains are still acknowledged as the main driver of international expansion however. The
willingness to invest abroad in the first place is a signal of production expansion or cost controlling.
These are motives that are inherently economic. Recognizing a broader sense of firm motivation entails
viewing profit-maximization in complex global markets as driven by uncertainty.
The main correction to the traditional view of MNEs as unitary rational actors lies in the contradis-
tinction between risk and uncertainty, not in the economic motivation of firms per se. While risk implies
a known probability distribution of possible outcomes, uncertainty suggest no knowledge of probabilities
(see the seminal work of Knight, 1921).16 In essence, uncertainty is a function of cognitive limitations
and gives rise to transaction costs as firms spend more resources on measuring the values of what is
being exchanged (see especially Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1985, 2000; North, 1990).17 Institutions and
transaction costs are discussed later in Section 2.3.2. The point is that that the cognitive limitations un-
derlined by behaviorists are very much real, especially when investing abroad. Uncertainty arising from
13See Hart (2010) for an elaboration on this discussion.
14See also Cyert and March’s (1963, 27) concept of “coalitions” within organizations.
15See also Kahneman’s (2011) distinction between fast and instinctive, and slow and logical systems of behavior.
16In latter years, risk and uncertainty has come to be treated as synonyms (see e.g. Alvarez and Barney, 2005; Liesch, Welch
and Buckley, 2011) and in other instances undergone semantic alterations (see e.g. Davidson, 1991; Manski, 1996).
17A distinction between external an internal uncertainty is sometimes made. External uncertainty results from volatility and
unpredictability, expressed trough political instability, currency changes, labour disputes and infrastructural strains in foreign
markets. Internal uncertainty in contrast, arises when a firm lacks necessary market-related knowledge upon entering a spe-
cific overseas market, stemming from for example lack of experience in investing abroad or cultural distance (Anderson and
Gatignon, 1986; Erramilli and D’Souza, 1995; Mascharenas, 1982). The host country institutional constructs that form the
basis for the below modeling of FDI, effectively corresponds with the external concept of uncertainty.
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these limitations should in turn yield MNE profit-maximizing strategies that are more multifaceted than
assumed in microeconomic theory and international business literature.
Traditionally non-economic factors can in this context be perceived to affect profit calculuses of
firms. The growing interest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) is illustrative (see e.g. Vogel, 2005).
Managers and executive boards, still motivated by profit, might be induced to behave socially responsible
as “spotlight regimes” driven by amongst others non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and global
media impel market sanctions against firms caugth misbehaving (see e.g. Spar, 1998; van Tulder and
van der Zwart, 2006). For example, research has linked CSR-strategies to better impact mitigation in
the wake of the 2008 economic meltdown (van Tulder, 2011, 254-5). The profit-potential in social
responsibleness is incorporated in The Varieties of FDI framework.
2.3 Theory on FDI decision-making
There are very few, if any, theories of FDI that are all-encompassing.18 At the one extreme are political
economists in the marxist tradition, viewing internalization of the firm as an inevitable outcome of the
capitalist system and as a means to increase firm monopoly power relative to states (see e.g. Baran and
Sweezy, 1968). At the opposite end of the spectrum are business analysts, seeking to identify the micro-
level factors that affect investment processes (see e.g. Aharoni, 1966). Some macro-economic trade
theorists have occupied themselves with how FDI is a response to differences in relative factor supplies
between countries (see e.g. Helpman, 1984; Markusen, 1984). Others have focused on transport costs
and trade barriers as drivers of FDI relative to trade (see e.g. Brainard, 1993; Krugman, 1983; Markusen
and Venables, 1998, 2000). However, none of these form an operationally testable theory that can explain
all FDI. In fact, this would be a very complicated task, but there is one theory, or rather a paradigm, that
at least identify clusters of variables explaining MNEs’ FDI behavior. This is the eclectic paradigm of
international production, generally considered to be the preeminent framework for analyzing FDI.
2.3.1 The eclectic paradigm
Dunning’s (see e.g. 1977; 1981; 1988; 1993) eclectic paradigm (or the OLI paradigm), was initially
formed as a rationalist explanation of international internalization of production (see e.g. Dunning,
1958).19 It offers a general framework for explaining both the extent and patterns of foreign-owned
production. As a theory it stands at the intersection between macroeconomic trade theory and microeco-
nomic theories of the firm. The rise of spatially dispersed production is a function of two types of market
imperfections, the paradigm proposes. Structural market failures that discriminate between firms in their
ability to gain or sustain control over geographically dispersed activities, and intrinsic failures of inter-
18For a comprehensive review of theory on FDI, see Dunning and Lundan (2008, 70-115).
19For a comprehensive review of the evolution of the OLI paradigm, see Dunning (2001), and for an elaboration on its prop-
erties, see Dunning and Lundan (2008, 93-111). Whether it actually represents a paradigm in Kuhn’s seminal understanding of
such as ”universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions for a community
of researchers” (1962, x) could be discussed.
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mediate product markets to transact goods and services at a lower net cost than than firms themselves
might produce within internal investment hierarchies. The paradigm in short identifies how ownership-
related factors, locational specifics and internalization advantages separately or in combination affect the
geography of investment decisions made by MNEs. There must be something gained within one ore
more of these categories for firms to venture abroad.
The logic of the OLI-advantages
FDI may be conducted to supply both foreign and domestic markets. The willingness to supply either
from a foreign location hinges on the MNEs ability to acquire “Fisherian assets” not available at fa-
vorable terms to other enterprises in the economy at hand.20 This ability is what the paradigm labels
ownership (O) advantages. O-advantages involve: properties and/or intangible assets (Oa-advantages)
such as technology and brand names; advantages of common governance (Ot-advantages) associated
with organizing the Oa-advantages; institutional assets (Oi-advantages) in the sense of institutions inter-
nal to the firm such as corporate governance. O-advantages are specific to the firm.
“Fisherian assets” mights alternatively be embedded in specific locations, but available to all firms.
These are what the paradigm labels locational (L) advantages. The L-advantages relate to factors mak-
ing certain locations more attractive for investment than others. Dunning originally formulated his the-
ory with an emphasis on Ricardian-type endowments (or “natural assets”) such as market size, market
growth, labour pool characteristics, et cetera. Later however, locational factors has come to encompass
“created assets” such as national institutional environments.21 Typical L-specific advantages are: trans-
action and communication costs; barriers to trade; infrastructure; political, ideological, cultural, language
and business differences; economic systems; government strategies; legal and regulatory systems.
It is in the difference between international and domestic market failure that MNEs distinguish them-
selves from multi-activity uninational firms. The former contrive benefits from failures between national
markets in the global marketplace, while the latter from failures within national markets. Remember,
market failure might be either structural or intrinsic. Structural market failures give rise to value capture
(or monopoly rents) resulting from entry barriers erected by constituent firms.22 Intrinsic market failure
reflects the inability of the market qua market to optimally organize transactions. There are three reasons
why this might occur: buyers and sellers enter the market with asymmetrical information (facilitating
opportunism); the market itself does not manage to take account of benefits and costs external to the
transaction itself that arise from that specific transaction (exploitation of differences in exchange rates
and national fiscal policies might follow); there is insufficient demand for specific products for producers
to be able to capture economies of scale and scope arising from geographical dispersion.
These market deficiencies cause the need for diversification of MNEs’ value-adding activity. In doing
20Assets in a “Fisherian” sense are asset such as resources and capabilities apt to generate a future income streams, repre-
senting a broader view of such than most economic theories of foreign production (Johnson, 1968, 17).
21See Narula and Dunning (2000) for the distinction between “natural” and “created assets”.
22Entry barriers may be erected indirectly through lobbying or directly through acquisition of competitor firms.
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so, ownership and organization of productive activity is realigned. Common governance of production
might lower transaction or production costs, and ensure maximum gain from firms’ O-advantages. Such
advantages arising from firms attempting to circumvent or exploit market failures are labelled internal-
ization (I) advantages in the paradigm. They include: attempted avoidance of search and negotiation
costs; avoidance of moral hazard and adverse selection; self-protection against non-contract enforceabil-
ity; measures stemming from buyer uncertainty about nature and value of production inputs; protection
of intermediate products properties; capturing economies of interdependent activities; compensation for
absence of future markets; the control of supplies and conditions of inputs sales.
In short, the OLI-advantages are: O-specific advantages pertaining to the ”whys” of FDI, they are
distinct to the firm; L-specific advantages concerned with the ”where” of FDI, they are particular to
countries; and I-specific advantages explaining the ”hows” of FDI, defining the mode of entry.
Does institutions have a place in this framework? There are indeed several reasons why political and
economic organization of the society should (and in time has come to) have a place in the Dunning’s
paradigm. The dynamics of the global FDI growth constitute the basis for some of these arguments.
The past three decades, the composition and significance of competitiveness-enhancing assets specific
to FDI has changed.23 The dramatic reduction in global transportation and, especially, communication
costs (see e.g. Keohane and Nye, 1998), has lead to faster spread of market information and shorter
time-lags in reacting to opportunities. Tangible resources and intangible capabilities available to MNEs
have become more knowledge and information intensive (Dunning, 2004, 13). The increasingly complex
structure and dispersion of MNEs warrant a focus on the factors affecting their perception of uncertainty
– more specifically, a focus on what factors affect their decisions to commit to new markets. With more
actors venturing abroad, competitive margins become smaller, and uncertainty-valuation may to a larger
extent define potential profitability of investment ex post. Institutions at the national level may affect
such profitability evaluations, and might therefore be an important determinant of FDI.
Dunning’s own thinking has evolved from exploration of relational capital of the firm to attempts
toward incorporating formal macro-level institutional factors into his paradigm (Dunning and Lundan,
2008, 130-1). Acknowledging the facilitating role of institutions is in essence to consider characteristics
associated with wider structures of the society. It also encapsulates how maintenance or expansion of the
initial FDI is affected by changes in relevant policy environments. All three aspects of the OLI-paradigm
interact to explain the location decision of MNEs. The L-component is however of most interest to
my study since it is the only component by definition specific to the host-country. The L-component is
also very complex. It subsumes within it the industry-specific attractiveness of its domestic market. As
such, the location decision and the industry of the MNE are closely interconnected and relative to specific
host-country contexts (see e.g. Mudambi and Mudambi, 2002; McCann and Mudambi, 2004). That being
said, the roles of institutions within the three advantage components of the paradigm are explored below.
23As noted early by for example de Smidt and Wever (1990).
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Before that however, the understanding of institutions in new institutional economics (North, 1981, 1990,
2005; Williamson, 1985, 2000) is presented. Thereunder the issues of transaction and production costs,
path-dependency, inertia, interdependency, and complementarity are touched upon.
2.3.2 Institutions in new institutional economics
Institutions are important to economic activity and affect the changing patterns of economic develop-
ment. This is the basic claim of new institutional economics (NIE), pioneered by Douglass C. North
(see e.g. 1981, 1990, 2005). NIE in turn draws heavily on transaction cost economics, with its roots
in Ronald Coase’s assertions on the price mechanism (1937), and the costs of transacting in the market
(1960).24 On the one side, institutions might be informal, imposing constraints on actors through sanc-
tions, taboos, customs, traditions, and other codes of conduct. On the other side they might be formal,
constraining the choice set of actors through constitutional bounds, laws, and rights.25 They are defined
as “the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction [...] [and] structure incentives in hu-
man exchange, whether political, social, or economic” (North, 1990, 3). Institutions define the interface
between human beings by creating order – they “reduce uncertainty in exchange” (North, 1991, 97). By
affecting transaction and production costs, institutions affect the profitability of production.
Formal institutions are in essence “created assets” devised incrementally through political activity, as
opposed to “natural assets” such as raw materials and labor stocks naturally endowed and geographically
defined in scope (Narula and Dunning, 2000). They might be related to the political order of society,
or to the governance of economic actors.26 Note however that both formal or informal institutions are
“essential parts of an effective institutional matrix” (North, 1991, 98), a matrix in which economic per-
formance is decided on the back of functional interdependence. The interplay of different institutions is
elaborated on below.
One of North’s (1990) main ideas is that institutions as drivers of FDI should be clearly demarcated
from organizations such as MNEs. Institutions are structures devised through political action, whereas
MNEs are organized entities created to take advantage of those structures. Institutions, together with
their enforcement, set the rules of the game. MNEs are but one of many players adhering to them.27 The
degree to which the institutions reduce uncertainty in exchange impact the MNEs potential for value-
added activity. The keywords are transaction and production costs.
24The concept of transaction costs became widely known as Williamson called attention to frequency, specificity, uncertainty,
limited rationality, and opportunistic behavior as main determinants of transaction costs (1989, 142-4).
25From hereon, the wording “institutions” refers to those of a formal nature operating at the national level. Note however
that in the following empirical analysis, the institutional constructs assessed are not measures of institutions per se, but rather
traces of institutional performance. These are sometimes referred to as “institutional concepts”.
26Sometimes referred to as political institutions and economic institutions. The former manifested through democratic elec-
tions, constraints on the incumbent’s power, the upholding of human rights and labor standards and so forth, and the latter
through institutions protecting property rights, making contracts enforceable, controlling corruption, governing credit markets
and so on. See Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) for the typology of political and economic institutions.
27In reality however, MNEs may also affect host-country institutions. Endogeneity is discussed in Section 3.6.3.
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Transaction and production costs
The most elementary task of business is to engage in production to create value. In value realization, firms
engage in transactions with suppliers and demanders. These transactions are bound to occur outside the
company’s internalized value chain at some point.28 These interfaces with external actors necessitates
coordination. Coordination in turn is costly. As these transaction costs rise, the potential for external
modalities accomplishing the transaction rise accordingly. “It is not transport costs but the costs of
transacting that are the key obstacles that prevent economies from realizing well-being” (North, 1987,
420).29 In the coordination of interfaces between actors, institutions prevail.
The chief way in which institutions affect economic change is twofold: they narrow or widen the
choice set of economic actors, and they affect the efficacy of inputs used in production (North, 1990, 5).
Neoclassical economics usually skirts the issue of transaction costs, assuming that using the market is
costless and frictionless. Investigations into market failure and relational contracting has suggested that
this not necessarily is the case (see e.g. Williamson, 1985, 2000).30 Technically, transaction costs encom-
pass the costs of control in an economy. They arise when individuals attempt to acquire new ownership
rights, or defend their assets against transgression, theft, and other forms of opportunistic behavior in
economic exchange (Eggertsson, 2005, 27). As such, they permeate all action in the marketplace.
It the prolongation of the standard transaction cost argument, it could be argued that institutions are
especially important for MNEs. It takes substantial amounts of resources to identify, agree and enforce
covenants between parties to an exchange. Lack of in-depth market understanding increases these costs
furthermore. In the absence of formal institutions, MNEs would have to protect property rights and
enforce contracts themselves. They might also have to oversee that production is in compliance with
company line labor standards, and that general human rights are not violated. Self-enforcement would
incur levies spent on the policing of ownership and agreements, in addition to uncertainty premiums
“reflecting the degree of imperfection in the measurement and enforcement of the terms of the exchange”
(North, 1990, 62). If there were to be formal institutions in place, the costs of these activities would be
transferred to the national level, reducing transaction costs for MNEs.31
Second, institutions affect the production costs. The contention is that transforming inputs of labor,
capital, and land into goods and services depend on technology. Level of technological development is in
turn affected by institutions, amongst others through the protection of technological assets in industries
intensive in research and development.32 Institutions are in other words also a crucial determinant of
28See Porter (1985, 36-52) for the concept of value chains in economic activity.
29The assertion is exemplified by the decline of the Roman Empire. The costs to transporting goods was the same after
the Empire fell, but the unified political system and enforcement of rules over a large area had disappeared. The result was a
dramatic drop in economic exchange between actors within the former Empire (North, 1987).
30The ”problem of social cost” Coase (1960) holds, is that such are very much real – interaction is not costless.
31North summarizes it nicely: “Institutions in the aggregate define and determine the size of the discount, and the transaction
costs that the buyer and seller incur reflect the institutional framework” (1990, 62).
32Allred and Park (2007) hold that protection of technological know-how through patent rights has a positive effect on R&D
in developed countries, whereas the relationship in developing countries is unclear.
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production costs, and the potential gains available through productivity increases (North, 1990, 64).
The direct implications of the two arguments is that institutional constraints affect the sets of oppor-
tunities that are available to individuals seeking to engage in economic interaction in any given society.
If we accept that human nature is one of cognitive limitation, the constraining effect of institutions be-
come even more salient.33 Two sets of institutional properties are particularly relevant to a study of
FDI decision-making. First, once directionally instated institutions tend to follow the path of develop-
ment on which it has ventured, highly persistent to change. Second, the emergence and development of
institutions tend to depend on the complementary presence of other institutions.
Path dependency and institutional inertia
Understanding the interlinked concepts of institutional path-dependency and inertia are important when
assessing the relationship between institutions and FDI, as both phenomena contribute to creating little
intra-country variation in the institutional constructs assessed.34 Institutional path-dependency means
“that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high” (Levi, 1997,
28). The tendency can be depicted in the economic terminology of “increasing returns”, where the “prob-
ability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down that path” (Pierson, 2000,
252).35 In essence, path-dependency is about how the direction of institutional development is unpre-
dictable, inflexible, non-ergodic, and potentially inefficient. These features in turn arise as institution
building involves large set-up costs, thoroughgoing learning effects, complex coordination effects, and a
great deal of adaptive expectations (see e.g. Eggertsson, 2005; North, 2005).
Institutional inertia is the story of the pace of institutional development, and has been observed
over time in many countries (see e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006b; North, 2005). The idea is that
institutions instated and consolidated at the national level tend to remain in place for a long time, highly
resistant to change. Once a path-dependent process is established, ”positive feedback may lead to a single
equilibrium. This equilibrium will in turn be resistant to change” (Pierson, 2000, 263). One can identify
at least three mechanisms contributing to institutional inertia. First, establishing institutions is pricey
(Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998, 1382). Once funds or efforts are sunk in a particular set of institutions,
they are expensive to revert. Second, when political agents commit resources to complement the existing
set of institutions, they will be more inclined to support that particular set-up than later challenges.
Political actors in essence bind themselves by vesting their interest in certain institutions (Pierson, 2000,
262).36 Third, to protect themselves from future changes induced by new political rule, incumbent
political powers may create rules making established arrangements hard to change (Moe, 1990, 125). For
33Also Adam Smith in ”The Theory of Moral Sentiments” (1767) assumed humans to be constrained by cognitive limitations.
34See Pierson (2000) for an elaborate discussion of the way in which the two concepts are interlinked.
35See Arthur (1994) for the an elaboration on the ”increasing returns” argument.
36This move has a political rationale. The literature shows that actors often do better in both the short term and the long
run if they remove certain policy options from their future repertoire (North and Weingast, 1989). Repeated complementary
commitments to the existing institutional infrastructure in turn makes adverse change difficult (Acemoglu, 1995, 18).
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MNEs moreover, institutional inertia means that host-country institutions represent “immobile factors”
(Mudambi and Navarra, 2002, 637) they have to live with. Forced change through the flexing of economic
power only affect the existing institutional order in the long run. One would therefore expect that FDI
strategies are shaped and tuned to the constraints of institutional structures.
Interdependency and complementarity
A substantial literature has portrayed how institutional change tend to come about as a function of com-
plex interdependence and complementarity (see e.g. Katzenstein, 1985; North, 2005; Hall and Soskice,
2001; Amable, 2003; Pierson, 2004; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005). In spite of increased
international economic interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 2000), it is often noted how industrialized
societies exhibit starkly different complexes of institutions. The idea is that different institutions have
co-evolved over long periods of time, the occurrence of certaines depending on the presence of others.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005, 389-96) provide an integrated theory of the interplay be-
tween political and economic institutions.37 First, economic institutions matter for economic perfor-
mance through shaping the incentives of key actors in society – as such, they affect both economic
performance and distribution of resources. However, economic institutions are endogenous, determined
as a collective choice in society based on their economic consequences. The conflict of interest in this
choice is likely to be determined by the distribution of political power. Whichever part has more political
power will be able to establish its preferred economic institutions. The dissemination of political power
in society is also endogenous. At this point it is necessary to distinguish between de jure and de facto
political power. The former emanates from the formal political institutions in society, whereas the latter
is determined by the distribution of resources. Distribution of resources, as we remember, is determined
by the economic institutions. If a group is not allocated power institutionally it might use its de facto
power (its economic resources) to revolt or oppose those in possession of de jure power. Therefore, the
outcome of economic institutions also play a role in determining political institutions.38
This interconnectedness complicates conceptual distinction between institutional concepts. The
chance is that policy climates associated with a certain set of institutions is dependent on the presence of
other institutions. Distinguishing between different institutional concepts is still fruitful in conjunction
with The Varieties of FDI framework, but subsequent investigations should try to embrace the interactive
elements present in institutional matrices. With that in mind, a reassessment of the traditional Ricardian-
type L-factors in the eclectic paradigm is next.
2.3.3 The eclectic paradigm institutionally revisited
Although the O-components of the eclectic paradigm are specific to the firm, host-country L-advantages
may interact with them (especially Oi- and Oa-advantages). The general argument is that host-countries,
37Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005, 389-91) define economic institutions as property rights structures and presence
and perfection of markets, while political institutions include government form and constraints on executives.
38See the historical example bestowed by North and Weingast (1989) especially.
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through sound regulatory environments, can enhance the O-advantages of MNEs by helping them pre-
serving their intangible assets.39 But, there are different effects running through the different O-components.
First, composition and strength of Oi-advantages are highly contextual in that MNEs’ ability to gain from
the institutions internal to their organization depends on the environment in which they operate (Dunning
and Lundan, 2008, 101).40 Above, it was discussed how it may be perceived as profit-maximizing to ex-
ercise CSR for firms in certain industries. This “business case” for CSR has especially been raised in the
context of child labor abolition (see e.g. Kolk and van Tulder, 2002, 2004).41 Typically, national regula-
tion of labor standards are aspects MNEs subjugated to CSR reporting will consider before conducting
FDI.42 The lack of such standards might erode the Oi-advantages MNEs have in responsible production
by complicating production under the standards they have committed to.43 Second, institutions play
important roles as L-factors through their effect on the Oa-advantages of firms, their resources (Dun-
ning and Lundan, 2008, 101).44 In a world where Oa-advantages become more available and globally
transferable, L-specific institutions are vital. They influence whether the Oa-advantages are success-
fully absorbed by the local subsidiary, and whether the know-how of the MNE is confined to investees.
Protection of Oa-advantages might have important ramifications for the productivity of MNEs.
The physical linkages between L-components and Oa-adavantages are best expressed in the context
of NIE. One of North’s (1990, 62-64) main arguments is that institutions affect MNEs’ cost-equation
through defining transaction and production costs. Moreover, an interesting contention in the prolon-
gation of the traditional NIE argument is the claim that for foreign investors the effect of institutions
go beyond the direct influence on transaction and production costs, especially when FDI is in emerging
markets (see e.g. Henisz, 2000; Henisz and Williamson, 1999). When property rights are unprotected,
foreign investors face both a direct and an indirect hazard. The former is manifested through national-
ization or expropriation risk, whereas the latter is reflected through local firms being favored due to their
better access to, and understanding of, the national political domain.
Which institutions is it that matter? Insights from East-Asian newly industrialized economies and
Central and Eastern European transition economies indicate that there are certain institutions associated
39Such as for example monopolistic advantage over local competitors.
40Relevant Oi-advantages are: the value-added governance; their codes of conduct; and, their incentive systems.
41See Margolis and Walsh (2003) for the general business case for CSR, and Porter and van der Linde (1995); Berry and
Rondinelli (1998); Reinhardt (1999) for other business cases in support of pollution prevention. But, see Vogel (2005) for
critical discussions on the limitations of the CSR business case.
42Actual reporting is enhanced by the upturn in monitoring and reporting initiatives on CSR (see e.g. Gjølberg, 2009).
43This problem might be exacerbated if the firm employs subcontractors in their production. When in direct control of
production, the firm, regardless of the societal respect for standards in general, at least have some control of how production is
carried out. With subcontractors, this control function diminishes, and increases the potentials for market sanctions Spar (1998).
A telling example is the 2008 disclosure of how the Norwegian MNE Telenor’s subsidiary in Bangladesh, GrameenPhone, used
a subcontractor who was found to deploy child labor. Telenor themselves claimed they had investigated the labor standards of
the subcontractor, but when a Danish journalist looked into the matter, it was revealed how extensive child labor was in use.
Telenor faced severe public criticism for the unveilings. See: http://e24.no/utenriks/barn-bygger-for-telenor/2421221.)
44Relevant resources could be: product innovations; marketing systems; non-codifiable knowledge; and, general ability to
reduce costs of inter-firm transactions (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, 101).
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with successful restructuring of economies (see e.g. Rondinelli and Behrman, 2000; Kogut and Spicer,
2002; Rondinelli, 2005), institutions that are all related to the transaction and production costs of firms.
If these authors are right in averring that the differences in the configuration of institutional restructur-
ing is critical to explain differential economic development paths, and pari passu may be an important
determinant of FDI, it follows that the effect of these institutions should be examined as drivers of FDI.
Institutional concepts are unpacked below. In short, the eclectic paradigm is expanded by acknowledging
host-country institutional concpets to be L-factors. Institutions affect the ability of firms to interact, and
therefore affect the relative transaction and production costs. Moreover, MNEs often need institutions to
realize their core functions and firm-specific advantages.
2.4 The Varieties of FDI framework
What follows is my theoretical contribution. There is a burgeoning empirical literature on the institutions-
FDI link, but efforts have been inconclusive as to how the institutional mechanisms function. In devel-
oping a theoretical framework allowing for MNE heterogeneity, I highlight the level of aggregation in
previous studies as one possible reason for the mixed empirical results. I believe that previous efforts
have failed to “avoid simplicity [and] embrace complexity”, as Cohen (2007) puts it. Barba-Navaretti,
Venables and Frank, underlining the same issue, posit that “most theoretical frameworks are still based on
the simplifying assumption of homogenous agents, and theories encompassing heterogeneity are still in
their infancy” (2004, 281). My objective is accordingly to nurture the complexity of FDI by distinguish-
ing between the economic sectors of MNEs. After a short discussion of the empirical incongruousness,
an unpacking of institutional concepts is followed by discussions of their connective mechanisms to FDI.
Next the traits of the three economic sectors of activity are stylized to form expectations as to how the
institutional mechanisms are likely to vary in their effects on The Varieties of FDI.
2.4.1 The (lack of a coherent) empirical link
When Kobrin in 1976 investigated the “environmental determinants” of FDI, he stated that “the extent
to which the environment affects the foreign direct investment [...] decision has proved difficult to in-
vestigate empirically. [...] it is often difficult – if not impossible – to identify the separate effects of
political, social, cultural, legal, and economic variables in the investment decision” (1976, 29). This, to
the extent that the problem concerns the inherent complementarity of institutions, is still an issue to be
tackled. However, in tandem with data and software developments, a voluminous empirical literature on
the institutional determinants of FDI has developed.
The growth in studies has not however lead to convergent understandings of mechanisms at play.
Scholars routinely fail to agree on basic relationships. This is perhaps most evident as regards different
understandings of regime type characteristics’ effect on FDI. Four often cited studies find a positive link
between democracy and FDI: Busse (2004), for a sample of sixty-nine developing and emerging market
economies from 1972 to 2000; Rodrik (1996), for U.S. manufacturing FDI to forty countries in the
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period 1982-9; Harms and Ursprung (2002) for a sample of sixty-two emerging market and developing
economies; Jensen (2006), through combining a sample of at most one hundred and fourteen countries
between 1970-98 with an ample supply of interviews. In two contrasting studies however, democracy is
found to affect FDI negatively: Resnick (2001) analyzes FDI flows to nineteen developing countries in
Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean between 1971-93; Tuman and Emmert (2004) when studying
U.S. FDI flows to a sample of fifteen Latin American countries between 1976-96. Other findings again
land somewhere in the middle: Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youssef (2001) consider thirty-six developing
host-countries from Africa, Asia and Latin-America in the period 1980-94; and Li and Resnick (2003),
for a sample of fifty-three developing host-countries.
Conflicting findings are also flourishing as regards corruption’s effect on FDI. Some find no link
between corruption and FDI, for example: Wheeler and Mody (1992), assessing forty-two countries
for the period 1982-8; Hines Jr. (1995), for U.S. firms’ FDI in the years 1977 and 1982; Alesina and
Weder (1999), for FDI data from seven to eight source-countries to forty or so host-countries. Some
actually find FDI to be stimulated by corruption, see especially: Egger and Winner (2005), for seventy-
three developed and less developed countries in the time period 1995-99. Others again find corruption
to impede FDI: Wei (2000) for FDI from twelve source-countries to forty-five host countries in 1993;
Lambsdorff (2003), for fifty-four countries in the period 1975-90; Egger and Winner (2006), for a sample
of twenty-five source-countries and fifty-nine developed and less developed recipient countries.
Conflicting findings could have been listed for other concepts as well. The informed reader would
probably note that there could be many potential reasons for the schism between studies. Various sample
selection biases in either source- or host-country samples constitute some, econometric specification and
modeling others. The unaccounted for cleavages along which MNEs exhibit heterogeneity is the expla-
nation assessed here. Examining samples with un-modeled variance within may make results sensitive to
model specification. After unpacking the relevant institutional concepts, this heterogeneity is assessed.
2.4.2 Unpacking institutions
While there are a number of conceptual and empirical challenges a disaggregated assessment of insti-
tutions has to overcome (see Section 3.6.1 especially), there are also important functional variations
between different institutional concepts. These variations MNEs increasingly can and might be will-
ing to exploit.45 Research on the link between institutions and FDI often seems to assess institutional
concepts based on ad-hoc application of available indices.46 To remedy this arbitrariness, institutions
are unpacked in the conjuncture of the abovementioned investigations into the state’s role in economic
upgrading and the empirical literature examining institutions’ effect on FDI.
45MNEs expanding their production into new markets more often than before turn to commercial risk ratings and rankings
that distinguish between different institutional risk categories when deciding on where to invest (Rondinelli, 2005, 398). A
World Bank survey in 2003 found ”a marked shift toward integrated management of FDI related risks” (2003, 21). See also the
short discussion of the political risk assessment and political risk insurance in Section 3.1.
46See for example Daude and Stein (2007) and Busse and Hefeker (2007).
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Key insights from the literature on new role of states in a globalized world underline that certain pol-
icy areas are more important than others in achieving national economic upgrading. Experiences from
East Asian and Central and Eastern European economies show that successful economic restructuring
is often associated with a convergent set of government strategies.47 Shortly summarized, they are: (1)
increase social cohesion; (2) support equality in opportunity and provide safety nets; (3) secure ubiqui-
tous participation in the political system; (4) improve government efficiency; (5) create transparency and
accountability in government; (6) secure property and contract rights; (7) create effective oversight of
financial institutions and functioning credit markets; (8) strengthen legal institutions.48
Surveying the empirical literature on institutions and FDI, one may identify distinct institutional
concepts coinciding with these objectives. To provide an analytically fruitful categorization of these, the
traditional political and economic institution dichotomy is expanded. The former is split in personal free-
doms and political governance to separate the rights protection from the system of political preference
aggregation and governance. The latter is split in institutions facilitating economic interaction between
actors in the marketplace, and the economic regulation of financial institutions such as banks.
Personal freedoms (see Figure 2.1) thus consists of human rights and labor standards. Protection of
these are important aspects in the creation of social cohesion and equality in opportunity (objectives 1
and 2). Aspects appertaining to political governance, democratic preference aggregation and control of
corruption, capture host governments’ ability to secure ubiquitous participation in the political system,
the government’s efficiency, and its transparency and accountability (3, 4, and 5). The economic interac-
tion concepts, protection of property rights and enforceability of contracts, have been directly assessed in
relation to FDI. As has those of economic regulation such as institutions expediting movement of money
and the quality of banks and credit. These are parallel to the latter three objectives (6, 7, and 8).49
2.4.3 Institutional mechanisms
The institutional mechanisms are now considered. Some of these mechanisms affect FDI directly and
some in a more indirect way. Connections runnig through economic growth or political instability, which
in turn is assumed to affect FDI, are examples of the latter. It is not within the scope of this thesis to
distinguish between direct and indirect effects analytically, but future studies should examine this.
Personal freedoms: human rights and labor standards protection
Human rights and the upholding of labor standards are concepts closely interlinked. Conventional wis-
dom on their relation to FDI mirrors some of the duality expressed with respect to the theories on regime
47Summarized from: Rondinelli and Behrman (2000), Kogut and Spicer (2002), and Rondinelli (2003, 2005).
48Dunning (15-25 2005), in an assessment of Eastern European transition economies, actually underline that these structures
all tend to be important for the locational-decision of MNEs as well.
49For an empirical examples examining the concepts and their link to FDI see for example: Blanton and Blanton (2007) for
human rights; Kucera (2002) for labor standards; Li and Resnick (2003) for political preference aggregation; Wei (2000) for
corruption; Asiedu, Jin and Nandwa (2009) for property rights protection; Egger and Winner (2003) for contract enforeceability;
Bevan, Estrin and Meyer (2004) for banks and credit.

























Figure 2.1: Causal model: institutions unpacked and foreign direct investment
type and FDI, as discussed below. Dependency theory (see e.g. Cardoso and Faletto, 1969; dos Santos,
1970) conventionally posits that low-standard countries are havens for foreign investors, based on a clas-
sic “race to the bottom” assumption (see also Chan and Ross, 2003). However, other perceptions prevail
withal. Consider first the relationship between human rights and FDI. It is ambiguous to say the least, but
there are increasing arguments for why investors act contradictory to the ”race to the bottom” conven-
tion. At the most fundamental level human rights are the rights to be a human – they are ordinary legal
rights in most countries (Donnelly, 2003, 11). The enforcement of them however vary widely. There are
at least two reasons for why FDI decisions may be affected by a human rights protecting environment.
One regards the increasing audience costs arising from global “spotlight regimes” monitoring production
practices (Spar, 1998, 9). Being caught red-handed violating human rights in production increases the
chance of consumer sanctions in local and global marketplaces. Decreased communication and trans-
portation costs globally (see e.g. Keohane and Nye, 1998), help increase the reach of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and thereby the salience of the ”spotlight regime” (ee e.g. Starr, 2000; Letnes,
2002).50 In turn, awareness around MNEs locational choices amongst consumers has increased, levying
the standards by which MNEs need abide (Busse, 2004, 60).51
The second effect of human rights protection runs through political violence. MNEs operating in
abusive regimes run an increased risk of experiencing attacks and sabotage on their facilities by repressed
50Local activists with limited funding can now, thanks to developments in communications technology, build international
coalitions and spread information on human rights abuse faster and with more influence (see e.g. Ronfeldt and Thorup, 1995).
51This effect is probably most prominent when the MNE comes form a Western country, standard-bearers at the forefront of
the international responsibility march. High-profile examples of companies experiencing market sanctions due to complicity
with abusive governments include Nike in Indonesia, Unocol in Myanmar and Texaco in Ecuador (see e.g. Ottaway, 2001).
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groups seeking national or international attention.52 Such turmoil might decrease the security of MNEs’
employees (Blanton and Blanton, 2009, 472). Insecurity created by the chance of upheaval in turn impose
uncertainty premiums and most likely extra security fees on MNEs wishing to invest there.
Labor standards and inbound FDI are connected by some of the same mechanisms.53 First of all,
the “spotlight mechanism” might also work punitive if violations of labor standards are divulged (Spar,
1998).54 Second, freedom of association allows founding of workers’ organizations such as unions,
giving workers independence from employers and the state. Allowing for organization and negotiation
of legally binding collective bargaining agreements is the foundation of stable and long-term labor peace,
decreasing the chances of strikes. When conflict is shifted from the workplace to the political level, stable
bargaining equilibrium should result in fewer industrial disputes (Robertson and Teitelbaum, 2011, 669).
Third, higher labor standards may affect the opportunity and quality of labor, and in turn productivity.
As international production involves more and more manufacturing and services relative to resource
extraction, expectations and requirements of labor quality change (Spar, 1999, 64). Labor standards are
not equivalent to higher productivity, but the ability of a country’s citizenry to attain the skills necessary
for effective production is more likely in an environment where labor rights are respected.55 Citizens in
secure employment should be more willing to contribute their time and ideas towards firm productivity.56
It should be noted that both human rights protection and labor standards upholding on FDI may
also affect FDI negatively. The main argument would run through their effect on the costs of labor.
Higher protection of for example workers’ right to form unions may increase their leverage in collective
wage bargaining, and in turn increase their wage-demands and the costs of production (Robertson and
Teitelbaum, 2011, see e.g.). The scale and scope profits MNEs intended to reap by venturing abroad may
be lost with too high wage levels, and as such their willingness to invest decrease.
Political governance: preference aggregation and corruption
Substantial research exists on the effect of regime type on FDI allocation, although both findings and
theory is ambiguous.57 I consider the minimalist interpretation of democracy in discussing the effect of
regime type so to distinguish these effects from those of the human rights and labor standard situations.
52Examples are abundant. In Nigeria for example, Shell experienced kidnappings and repeated sabotage as a consequence of
marginalized groups in the oil-rich region protesting against the government (see e.g. Haufler, 2002). In Sudan, Chevron was
forced to abandon production in two oil-fields due to the killings of several employees (see e.g. Schulz, 2001).
53Labor standards typically include freedom of association, collective bargaining, prohibition of forced labor, elimination of
exploitative child labor, and nondiscrimination in the workplace (Krueger, 1996, 1).
54Spar’s (1998) argument does not explicitly distinguish human rights from labor standards.
55Moreover, evidence shows that higher labor standards may lead to more rapid economic growth which in turn has been
shown to attract FDI (Kucera, 2002, 34). This has especially been shown to be true of reductions in child labor deployment, a
key violation of international labor standards (Galli, 2001). The use of child labor deter future levels of human capital as these
children lose out on the opportunity of becoming more productive in the future (Emerson and Souza, 2011).
56An example of this search for high-quality labor is Intel’s decision to build a semiconductor test and assembly plant in
Costa Rica. The locational decision was based on Costa Rica’s human rights track record, as well as the country’s ability to
produce skilled labor (see e.g. Spar, 1998).
57The empirical ambiguity was discussed above. For theoretical contradictions, see O’Donnell (1988) versus Olson (1993).
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That leaves me with aspects pertaining directly to the system of preference aggregation in society and
the control of corruption. The latter concept is by many thought of as an economic malfunctioning of the
state, and it could well have been discussed as a part of the economic interaction category. It is discussed
in the context of political governance simply because it also can be seen as a fallacy of lower-level
constraining of public officials, inherently a political wrongdoing.
National systems of preference aggregation perceivably affect MNEs through at least two channels.58
First, political competition affects the level of social tension in society because the degree to which
real competition for political power exists define the interaction between workers, employers, and the
state (see Robertson and Teitelbaum, 2011, 668-9). In regimes with no public political competition,
social tensions are dealt with by suppression. Introducing a degree of competition for political power
effectively shifts some of the power from the state to the electorate as the incumbent has to consider
the popular opinion.59 When political competition increases further, political parties gain autonomy
from the state and social organizations become potential political power factors. In turn, more political
openness forces political parties to embrace working class voters to win elections.60 In essence, political
competition forces the incumbent and political parties to integrate the working class’ interests in their
political considerations, and by so conflict is dealt with at the political level.61 The adverse case, social
instability “diverts resources that would otherwise have gone into productive long-term investments into
forms of wealth that are more easily protected, or even into capital flight to more stable environments”,
according to Olson (1982, 165). Political instability, to be sure, is especially undesirable to MNEs and
might contribute to divert their capital elsewhere.
Second, national leaders’ room to act opportunistically also affect MNEs’ locational decisions. By
way of minimizing potential government appropriation of private property, uncertainty on investment
decreases (Li, 2009, 1103-11). Arguments moreover suggest that democratically elected governments
on average protect property rights better than authoritarian ones (see e.g. Olson, 1993; Knutsen, 2011).
The idea is that the state offers to protect individuals’ property in exchange for taxes. Protection however
is not self-enforcing and in certain instances the state might have incentives not to honor this social
contract (for example when in war). “Therefore, the provision of effective property rights protection
relies on a constrained state” (Li and Resnick, 2003, 186). Increasing the number of political veto
players fetters opportunistic behavior by leaders.62 While it could be argued that a benevolent autocrat
with a long time-horizon might also defend citizens’ property rights (see e.g. Olson, 1993; Clague et al.,
1996), their credibility diminishes the more they feel accountable to the ruling elite and the less they
58Key subcomponents of democratic systems of preference aggregation are: the processes whereby executive and legislature
is elected by popular vote, the lawful and actual existence of multiple parties within the legislature, the absence of advantages
in favor of the incumbent, and the constraints on the incumbent (Przeworski et al., 2000; Przeworski, 2010). See more in the
operationalization in Section 3.3. See also Dahl (1971, 2000) and his concept of representative democracy.
59As witnessed in for example the competitive authoritarian regime in Mexico (see e.g. Magaloni, 2006).
60See the emergence of socialist labor parties in Europe competiting for workers’ votes (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986).
61See also Feng (2003, 93-109) for empirical corroborations of various measures of democracy enhancing political instability.
62As argued by North and Weingast (1989). See also Stasavage (2002).
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mind the preferences of the general population. Therefore, constraints on the executive may reduce the
perceived uncertainty of MNEs surrounding their property and affect the decision on where to invest.
Specific arguments as to why poor protection of property rights affect investors are presented below.
Note however, also democratic institutions might impede inbound FDI. Taxes for example have been
argued to be higher in democracies as the median winning coalition member will be poorer than the
average autocrat. Moreover, tax monitoring and collection is arguably more rigid in democracies (Boix,
2003, 23-5). A number of studies in turn show that lower taxes on profits repatriation affect both the
timing of repatriate decision and mode of repatriation by MNEs (see e.g. Altshuler, Newlon and Slemrod,
1993; Hines Jr., 1994; Mutti and Grubert, 1996; Altshuler, Grubert and Newlon, 2000). While this
suggests that taxing can affect the profitability of MNEs, it is not necessarily evidence that overall FDI
will decline. But, higher taxation might well have a negative effect on FDI.
Corruption is a specific feature of the political regime tightly inter-vowed with the degree to which
constraints are put on the executive power (see e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Although an early
strand of literature supported a “helping hand”-notion of corruption, underlining how such could posi-
tively affect productivity by allowing investors to leapfrog excessive red tape (see especially Leff, 1964;
Huntington, 1968), most later theory find corruption to be detrimental to growth and productivity – a
”grabbing hand” (Nye, 1967; Rose-Ackerman, 1975; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).63 The standard eco-
nomic definition of corruption denotes the use of “public office for private gains” (Bardhan, 1997, 1321),
but corruption might also be political, whereby increased political power is the ill-gotten gain.64
There are at least three ways the degree to which policy climates controlling corruption might affect
inbound FDI. The most obvious effect of corruption on FDI is the distinct cost premium it represents.
Having to pay bribes when attempting to obtain investment licenses is obviously a disincentive to invest-
ment. Similarly, losses on corruption-based investments are not deductible the same way taxable income
is in some countries (Bardhan, 1997, 1327-8). As such, corruption is more distortionary than formal
taxation. An aggravating factor is the secrecy of corruption. MNEs are often legally sanctioned when
found guilty of complicity in corruption. The efforts to avoid detection and punishment might be even
more costly than the bribe itself, and low control corruption may thus impede FDI.
Secondly, an indirect effect of corruption on FDI runs through general growth and productivity.
Besides distorting taxable income, corruption has been known to reduce growth through reducing the
incentive for domestic investment (see e.g. Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Rodrik, 1996), and to
reduce the profitability of productive investments relative to rent-seeking investments, effectively stifling
productivity growth (see e.g. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).65 ”[C]orruption as a tax on ex post
63Theobald (1990, 130) vividly puts it: “the political ascendance of naked self-interest intensifies social inequalities, en-
courages social fragmentation and internecine conflict and propels a corrupt society into an unremitting cycle of institutional
anarchy and violence”.
64See more in: Gray and Kaufmann (1998) and Lambsdorff (2001).
65Rent-seeking investments seek to capitalize on the scarcity value of a good or service rather than entrepreneurship and the
production of new goods (Krueger, 1974, 291).
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profits may in general stifle entry of new goods or technology which require an initial fixed cost invest-
ment” (Bardhan, 1997, 1328). Corruption may have a negative impact on the productivity of capital.
Third, corruption also tend to breed ineffective and unstable governments (see Rose-Ackerman, 1975;
Lambsdorff, 2003, respectively). The strive for the fruits of corruption might make governments inca-
pable of carrying out their declared programs, reducing their popular support. This in turn may un-
dermine government stability and in turn deter foreign investment as MNEs have to interact with these
de-stabilized host-governments (see e.g. Olson, 1982; Brunetti and Weder, 1998).
Economic interaction: property rights and contracts
“Freedom to exchange [...] is meaningless if individuals do not have secure rights to property, including
the fruits of their labor”, Gwartney, Lawson and Hall (2011, 6) hold.66 Uncompensated property losses
are by and far the worst possible scenario for an MNE conducting FDI. Indeed, property rights protection
systems are frequently cited to be the key conduit of economic progress is (see e.g. North, 1990; Knack
and Keefer, 1995). The essence of the argument is that a dearth of property rights security discourage
not only investment, but also specialization.
Systems of property rights protection may affect inbound FDI in at least three ways. First, property
rights protection are costly to police and enforce. If MNEs are made to conduct these functions them-
selves, a substantial premium will be deducted from their net gain calculus. The presence of national
systems protecting property rights define the size of this discount, and therefore also whether MNEs
finds it attractive to invest or not (North, 1990, 62). Second, property rights systems also affect MNEs
inclination towards specializing through affecting the costs of production. Technology level deployed
by MNEs depend on whether such is protected on the one side, and allowed to blossom on the other.
Institutional arrangements protecting the exclusive right to use ones technology may affect the quality of
technology available to MNEs, and thereby potential growth in the initial FDI.67
Third, much of the literature on property rights and development consider the particular case of ex-
propriation (see e.g. North and Weingast, 1989; Barro, 1996; Weimer, 1997).68 The special pervasiveness
of government-induced divestment or expropriation is that it leaves MNEs without any protective rights
in the host country – the protector becomes the aggressor. One would therefore expect uncertainty arising
from potential expropriation or forced divestment to affect the MNEs locational decision profoundly.
66Property rights systems is “a method of assigning to particular individuals [or firms] the ’authority’ to select, for specific
goods, any use from an unprohibited class of uses” (Eggertsson, 1990, 33). See also North (1990, 1991) and Eggertsson (2005).
67In this context, certain scholars have examined the importance of protecting intellectual property rights (IPRs) in particular
(see e.g. Oxley, 1999; Yang and Maskus, 2001; Javorcik, 2004a). Due to the complete lack of broad ranging measures of
IPR, this concept is not assessed here. It would however have been interesting to asses the distinct effects of protection of
physical and intellectual property rights. Efforts to quantify the protection of intellectual property rights are underway however
(Dedigama, 2008). See information on the International Property Rights Index here: www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org.
68Expropriation is the forced transfer of output and physical assets from firms to governments (Kobrin, 1980, 67-9). While
the actual occurrence of full-scale expropriation is now quite rare (see e.g. Kobrin, 1984; Minor, 1994), forced divestment or
partial expropriation is still quite pervasive in the developing world (ee e.g. Asiedu, Jin and Nandwa, 2009). Forced divestment
is most likely to be a policy tool to achieve some long-run political objective (Kobrin, 1980, 67), and is therefore closely knit
with the functional distribution of power. See also Schnitzer’s (1999, 1115) idea of “creeping expropriation”.
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Next, as regards contract viability, North (1990, 54) underlines “the inability of societies to develop
effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts” as a key obstacle to economic success.69 As property rights,
the contracting environment has important implications for economic growth (see e.g. Acemoglu and
Johnson, 2005), and empirical studies have shown that contract viability also affect FDI positively (see
e.g. Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashamova, 1998; Egger and Winner, 2003; Ahlquist and Prakash, 2010).
Contracts are germane to most economic activity, governing the interface between actors and through
reducing uncertainty. They can be between either two or more private actors or between private actors
and governments (see e.g. North, 1981; North and Weingast, 1989; Olson, 2000).70 The enforceability
of private contracts depends crucially on the legal system of a country, which is the basis for settling the
terms of business transactions and resolving commercial disputes.
The foremost way in which contract viability affect MNEs’ decision on where to invest is mani-
fested through the contractual webs of all business. Without contract enforceability, substantial costs
are imposed on private actors. These transaction costs erode MNEs’ potential profits, and make FDI
less attractive. Business-to-business contracts are crafted to avoid opportunistic exploitation of inter-
firm uncertainty. Without structures facilitating the upholding of agreements, commercial actors have
fewer incentives to commit to long-term investments. FDI is conducted with long time-horizons, and
therefore low enforceability of contracts can be expected to seriously impede to the investment decision.
Moreover, MNEs tend to have fewer non-governmental means to enforce contracts than their domestic
counterparts. Local firms might police their agreements through informal business networks and corre-
sponding sanctions. MNEs however are less likely to be embedded in such networks or structures, and
thus depend even more on governments to secure their contracts (Ahlquist and Prakash, 2010, 183).
Economic regulation: quality of banks and credit markets
Well developed financial systems and credit markets are integral to the establishment of foreign capital
and closely related to the viability of contracts (see e.g. La Porta et al., 1998; Clague et al., 1999). The
provision of credit is essentially a non-simultaneous transaction where the creditor provides capital in
expectation of a later return. With high levels of insecurity, this transaction might prove costly.
Banks and credit markets serve multiple functions for foreign investors. There are at least three
ways in which these structures may affect FDI. First, the ability of investors to move money in acts of
investment, reinvestment, or principal-to-subsidiary transfers is a crucial factor in their quest for capital
accumulation (Coan and Kugler, 2008, 405). To ensure the longevity of an investment, host-governments
69”Contracts specify the rights and obligations of the transacting parties and enable impersonal exchange over space and
time” (Ahlquist and Prakash, 2010, 185). They are rarely self-enforcing, and government is needed to secure reciprocal trust.
70Enforceability of contracts with governments relate to the probability of opportunistic behavior. Governments may breach
their obligations for rational or irrational reasons. For example, in the advent of government change, new governments, for
ideological reasons, may not consider themselves committed to the agreements of the previous one. Furthermore, failure to
honor contracts with foreign firms may also result from xenophobic nationalism, exploited by the government or the opposition
for political reasons. Opportunism is discussed in the context of political preference aggregation, and is therefore not included
her.
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need see to that agreements such as long-terms loans taken up in local credit markets, are followed up
(see e.g. Olson, 1993). Research has shown that in the absence of a financial infrastructure facilitating
economic transfer, MNEs recourse to internal capital markets, undermining the existing systems of ex-
change and reducing the chances of increases in the initial FDI stock (Desai, Foley and Hines Jr., 2004,
2451). In addition, moving credit within internal international investment hierarchies expose the MNE
to exchange rate risk (Bevan, Estrin and Meyer, 2004, 48).
Second, there are payment systems. Where channels are lacking through which firms can transfer
payment to their employees or suppliers, costs are likely to arise as the MNE needs to find alternative
ways of conveyance (Bevan, Estrin and Meyer, 2004, 48-9). Last, in an economy with ample access
to sound credit, local customers are also more likely to have spending power. This in turn raises local
demand for MNE goods and create flourishing markets (Bevan, Estrin and Meyer, 2004, 48-9). Credit
can be seen as the oil of market exchange. The absence of sound money undermines the gains from FDI.
Table 2.1: Institutional mechanisms summed up
Institutional concepts Mechanisms/effects
Human rights protection (1) Spotlight regime
(2) Decreasing political violence
Labor standards upholding (1) Spotlight regime
(2) Labor peace
(3) Productivity gains
Political preference aggregation (1) Politicizing conflict
(2) Impeding opportunism
Control of corruption (1) Cost premium
(2) Productivity growth
(3) Political stability
Property rights protection (1) Cost premium
(2) Increasing specialization,
(3) Impeding expropriation
Contract enforceability (1) Cost premium
Quality of credit (1) Facilitating movement of money
(2) Supplying payment systems
(3) Increasing local demand
All mechanisms are discussed in the text.
Institutional mechanisms summed up
The institutional mechanisms are summed up in Table 2.1. Before moving on, it can not be underlined
enough: these mechanisms, as institutions themselves, are not independent of each other. There are
a number of studies showing that status on one institutional parameter may affect the status on oth-
ers. Democracy, for example, has been found to provide better property rights systems than autocracies
(Knutsen, 2011). Another is the link between contract viability and credit quality. Credit transactions
depend on third-party enforcement of the lending contracts, and in societies where lending agreements
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are repeatedly abrogated, capital markets are often limited (see e.g. La Porta et al., 1998; Clague et al.,
1999). On a more general note, remember Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson’s (2005) integrated theory
of the interplay between political and economic institutions. Their argument in essence imply that there
may be a circular reciprocity between the different categories of institutional concepts discussed above.
The inherent interdependence of these effects is not solved simply through discussing them in sep-
arate. The problem when assessing the effect of institutions is not categorizing them, but separating
the individual effects of different constructs. Statistical multicollinearity is discussed in Section 3.6.1,
and solved by examining different institutional constructs separately. When discussing estimated effects
however, the potentially tandem occurrence of certain results should be viewed as an indication that
differing concepts sometimes capture the same effects.
2.4.4 Disaggregating FDI
The main endeavor of this thesis is to provide a richer understanding of the institutional determinants
of FDI by distinguishing between varieties of FDI. In spite of all the empirical incoherence presented
above, empirical assessments endemically lack acknowledgments of FDI complexity.71 Differentiations
of FDI have been made on the basis of multiple criteria, perhaps most prominently according to whether
natural resource availability, efficiency gains or access to new markets motivates the investment (see e.g.
Dunning, 1998; Caves, 2007).72 Although insightful in its scope, contrasting of FDI as a function of
investment motive has obvious flaws complicating empirical assessment. The most pressing problem
of the motive distinction is that the categories are not mutually exclusive. It is not unthinkable that a
garment producer looking to set up a textile factory could be motivated by both the efficiency gains of
cheap labor, as well as the access to a new consumer market. Another problem with the motive-based
disaggregation is that MNEs’ motivation may well change with experience in new markets. Increased
scope of production may for example alter the motives driving FDI (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, 68).
Investigating the relative salience of any variable across categories that are not mutually exclusive is
problematic as certain firms would be represented multiple times.73
A more objective taxonomy is distinguishing between economic sectors of activity. Economists of-
ten divide business into three such categories, and MNEs “within each of these sectors share a number
of common traits and effects that tend not to be found in companies operating in other sectors” (Cohen,
2007, 78). Using sector as a differentiator then is simply a question of separating FDI based on MNEs’
areas of activity. Thus, to test the relative importance of the different institutional outputs presented
above, I chose to split MNEs according to whether they operate in natural resource extraction, manu-
facturing production or services supply. Given the present level data quality, this distinction arguably
71Honorable exceptions being Busse (2004); Schulz (2007); Blanton and Blanton (2009); Ali, Fiess and MacDonald (2010).
72See Cohen (2007, 62-92) for a review of other sources to FDI heterogeneity.
73More fundamentally, separating between types of FDI based on their motive entails building in assumptions on subjective
motives of investors, which is problematic when those assumptions in turn create distinctions on which an assumed relationship
between FDI and institutions is formulated.
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preserves the most useful variation in the data while being the most sound approach theoretically.74
According to UNCTAD,75 investments in extractive industries typically encompass: petroleum ex-
traction; mining; quarrying; aquaculture; agriculture; forestry. Manufacturing industries consist of single
component or assembly industries in areas such as: food; textile; leather; pulp and paper; chemicals; rub-
ber and plastic; metal fabricates; machinery and equipment; electrical and optical equipment; transport
equipment; furniture; recycling of waste. Services consist of: financial services; business activities such
as real estate, rentals, and research and development; transport, including telecommunications and postal
services; wholesale and retail trade.
Table 2.2: Bivariate correlations between Norwegian sectors of FDI
Variables TFDI NRFDI MFDI SFDI
TFDI 1.000
NRFDI 0.711 1.000
MFDI 0.819 0.540 1.000
SFDI 0.805 0.322 0.411 1.000
NRFDI = natural resource FDI; MFDI = manufacturing
FDI; SFDI = services FDI. Data from Statistics Norway.
See Section 3.2 for volumes.
A preliminary inquiry into the heterogeneity of FDI is depicted in Table 2.2. By assessing bivariate
correlations between FDI from different economic sectors one observes that investors on the balance
seem to differ substantially in where they place their equity. For reasons expatiated on below it would be
natural to assume natural resource investors to diverge more from manufacturers and service suppliers
in their investment behavior, than manufacturing and services would differ from each other. But, as
the correlations show, not only does natural resource FDI, at 0.540 and 0.322 respectively, show low
correlations with manufacturing and services, but the correlation between services and manufacturing is
at a mere 0.411. This unexplained complexity is what the following theory hopes to capture.
2.4.5 Sectoral traits
To form coherent expectations about how institutional concepts across economic sectors might help elu-
cidate the unexplained FDI heterogeneity in Table 2.2, sectoral traits are identified. Since this is a fairly
novel field of empirical assessment, as well as a holistic vantage point, the assumptions are built on fairly
commonsensical perceptions of MNE attributes. The key differentiators between the varieties of FDI
are argued to be: size of FDI; relative sunkenness; marginal value added of MNEs’ operations; MNEs’
74Dunning’s (1998) tripartite distinction of FDI on motive is more or less aligned with two of the sectoral categories. While
almost all extractive FDI is resource-seeking, FDI in services is usually market-seeking due to the virtual non-tradeability of
services (UNCTAD, 2004; Kolstad and Villanger, 2008). Manufacturing FDI on the other hand might be both market- and
efficiency-seeking, depending on the good produced. In the assumptions formulated below, insights from the distinction on
motive are used as regards the two former sectors.
75See: http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3149&lang=1
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relative urban presence; integration in local labor markets; closeness with which producers are in contact
with end users; complexity of operations. Some sectors are difficult to score within certain categories,
for example due to further within-sector heterogeneity. Therefore you will sometimes experience that
discussions of traits’ relative importance in certain sectors do not fully juxtaposed all three sectors in
each of the following seven paragraphs. Traits are summarized in Table 2.3.
Size of FDI is an important trait to understand as it is often linked to the potential for scale and scope
gains, as well as indicating the potential loss on investment that MNEs might be exposed to in the case
of fallacy.76 Although there has been a rise in small and medium sized MNEs since the late 1990’s
(see e.g. Liesch and Knight, 1999), it should still be safe to claim that the average FDI is larger than
the average national investment. The simple reason is that setting up foreign production involves more
fixed costs than national investments, for example through: pre-investment monitoring; market surveying
costs; setting up of foreign affiliate management channels from home-country offices. Investing abroad
is relatively costly, and as such, FDI would need to be fairly sizable to be deemed profitable ex ante.
Although this trait is classified high for all sectors, the initial equity transfer should be highest for the
extractive activity.77 The costs incurred by seismic surveying of petroleum dwellings and setting up of
land-based or offshore extraction facilities are extensive. Additionally, specific transport infrastructure
such as pipelines or liquefying facilities needs construction. As regards FDI in manufacturing, the initial
costs are likely to be lower than for extractive industries, varying with whether investments are in green-
fields or in mergers and acquisitions. If production facilities are set up from the ground they should be
higher than if existing production facilities are merged into MNE production networks.
The sunkenness of FDI matters for the locational decision as it says something about the commitment
to a new market. As a trait it should vary significantly across sectors. Natural resource FDI is expected to
be most sunk in the sense that the physical facilities involved in such operations are largely immobile and
site-specific (Schulz, 2007, 12). The extent to which these facilities are constructed for certain locations,
dependent on water depth, ground structure and so forth, make them less applicable in other locations.
The sunkenness of investments in manufacturing and services depend on whether production facilities are
owned or leased. Either way, given that facilities are wholly-owned by the MNE, production buildings
and office space should be easier to sell off than extractive facilities.
The size of the profit margin on which MNEs produce is important as it indicates to which degree
it can cope with petty losses or short-term production halts. FDI in natural resources should exhibit the
highest degree of marginal value added (Vivoda, 2011, 1). The “structural shift” on the demand side
has created price booms not only in petroleum, but also metallic minerals. Illustratively, UNCTAD in
2007 stated that petroleum and metal “[p]rices are likely to remain high” (2007, 90).78 Generally high
76The effect of traditional Ricardian type L-factors has for example been found to differ among large and small and medium
sized Japanese MNEs investing in Asia for example (see e.g. Kinoshita, 1998).
77“The extraction of mineral resources is largely dominated by large-scale, capital-intensive investments [...] characterized
by a high degree of uncertainty and long gestation periods” UNCTAD (2007, 91) note.
78After oil prices begun to decline in real terms after the findings of new petroleum reserves in non-OPEC countries such as
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sales prices imply a marginal value added so high that losses might be compensated fairly quickly (see
e.g. Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio, 2005). FDI in manufacturing, to the degree that such are conducted
to realize efficiency gains is most likely to produce closest to the margin.79 Offshoring production of
goods is often a sign of discontent with the costs of producing at home. As regards FDI in services, the
picture is likely to vary according to whether FDI is in industries like wholesale and retail trade, or more
in-demand services such as finance, insurance, and telecommunications.
Whether MNEs exhibit high urban presence or not might define whether the encumbrance of social
and political instability affect production. FDI in services is imply suppling a service through a direct
relationship with a customer. Due to the virtual non-tradability of such, they need be “physically present
in the place where their product is consumed” (Cohen, 2007, 82).80 The dependence on close customer
contact should contribute to these businesses locating their facilities in or around financial centers, which
is where the consumers of their products are. FDI in natural resource extraction is likely to be most se-
cluded geographically. Indeed, “[m]ost mines, oil wells, plantations, and so on are largely self-contained
enclaves (sometimes fenced in communities) located away from main population centers” (Cohen, 2007,
79). The physical presence of manufacturing MNEs however is more equivocal. To the degree that they
seek the efficiency gains of scale and scope, they will need to locate where labor is available. However,
in many countries manufacturing production is conducted in export-processing zones (EPZ), in essence
artificial production enclaves sometimes located far away from urban centers.81
The MNEs’ host-country labor market integration define whether they need to consider local labor
relations or not. Manufacturing is most likely to employ local labor. Whether the product manufactured
needs high or low skilled labor should matter little, it would be of little economic logic to offshore
production and transport the whole national labor pool employed to produce overseas. Indeed, Cohen
(2007, 80) notes how host-countries tend to find manufacturing FDI particularly appealing because of
the group’s ability to create local employment and increase operations as earnings are reinvested. FDI
in natural resource extraction should on the balance be very poorly integrated in the host-country’s labor
market, exhibiting a ”silo mentality” (MacDonald and McLaughlin, 2003, 235). Moreover, they source
very few inputs from local suppliers (Schulz, 2007, 10). As regards services it is difficult to say, but
it should be safe to assume commercial services such as hotels, restaurants and retailers to hire more
locally than petroleum extractors.
Norway, Mexico and the Soviet Union in the mid 1980’s, they have been on average growing steadily since the agreement to
reduce supply was signed in 1998 between OPEC and non-OPEC countries. Metal prices, having been in a long decline since
the early 1970’s du to reduced intensity in use of metals in many countries (see e.g. Tilton, 1990), prices began to rise sharply
in 2004 (UNCTAD, 2007, 88-9).
79This will of course vary somewhat depending on the manufacturing industry. Producers of certain up-market goods for
example will probably have substantially higher profit margins than simpler assembly industries.
80There are however signs that services are becoming more tradable, see UNCTAD (2004, 148-9). Non-tradability means
that “most services are non-storable and hence need to be produced when and where they are consumed” (UNCTAD, 2004,
97).
81EPZ production is fairly common in countries like the Dominican Republic (Schrank, 2008), Mexico (Graham and Wada,
2000) and Mauritius (Johansson, 1994; Rodrik, 1999a, 2000), to mention some.
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Whether MNEs (either at home or in the host-country) have close contact with end users of their
product or not might have important ramifications for how they craft their business profiles. Both man-
ufacturers and service suppliers are likely to be fairly exposed to their product consumers. For those
manufacturers that function as intermediate product suppliers, the degree to which NGOs and other so-
cial hawks increasingly scrutinize MNEs global value chains may force end product assemblers to treat
their intermediates as if they are in direct contact with the customer themselves (see e.g. Starr, 2000).
Extractors of natural resources, because such almost exclusively are sold on global resource markets,
because world demand for energy resources is so high, and because different firms extract and refine the
resources, will most likely have little contact with their end product users (UNCTAD, 2007, 90-1).
The complexity of foreign operations define the amount of nodes where MNEs come in contact with
local actors. Both FDI in natural resources and services are fairly complex in their own specific man-
ners. As regards extractive investments, such have come to deploy more and more high-tech solutions in
their extraction procedures. Petroleum extraction, for example, follows from advanced seismic monitor-
ing procedures, and pumping, liquefying and refining of oil and gas are complex procedures. Different
extraction routines (onshore or offshore) calls for site-specific knowledge. The site-specificity should
increase as new types of unconventional resources are discovered. The global demand for natural re-
sources is also likely to remain so high that market-facilitating structures should be provided (UNCTAD,
2007, 90-1). FDI in services is intricate in the form of contractual complexity, and increasingly so (see
e.g. UNCTAD, 2004). Delivering a service good implies agreeing on what to be delivered, when, and
to what price. FDI in manufacturing may be complex also, for example full scale manufacturing of for
example electrical and optical equipment or computers. The increasing diversification of value chains
makes manufacturing production the sector most likely to procure intermediate products in their opera-
tions locally, yielding a different kind of operational complexity.82
Table 2.3: Relative importance of traits across sectors
The Varieties of FDI
Nat. resource FDI Manufacturing FDI Services FDI
Size of FDI High High High
Sunkenness of FDI High Varied Low
Size of profit margin High Low Varied
Urban presence Low Varied High
Local labor market integration Low High Varied
Closeness of end user contact Low High High
Complexity of operations Varied High High
82For a discussion of value chain complexity, see Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005).
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2.4.6 Effects interacted
These traits should affect how different types of MNEs weight institutional contexts in host-countries.
Table 2.4 sums up the arguments for how MNE idiosyncrasies and institutional concepts are thought
to interact. The number in each cell represents one particular argument defining an interface. Each
argument is described in the following text, connoted with numbers corresponding to those in the Table.
Table 2.4: Effects interacted on the back of traits and institutional mechanisms
Size of Sunkenness Marginal Urban Local labor End user Complexity
FDI of FDI value added presence market integ. contact of operations
Human rights X (3) X (14)
protection
Labor standards X (6) X (9) X (12) X (15)
upholding
Democraticness of X(1) X (4) X (10)
preference aggregation
Control of X (7) X (18)
corruption
Property rights X(2) X (5) X (11)
protection
Contract X (16) X (19)
enforceability
Quality of X (8) X (13) X (17) X (20)
banks and credit
All investors deeply care for protection of their property, this is one of the main tenets of North’s
NIE (1981; 1990; 2005). But as investments grow in size the potential loss a case of ownership rights
violation or expropriation might incur should rise, simply because the real loss on investment is bigger.
The general argument is that the larger the investment, the more MNEs can be expected to value good
protection of property rights (argument 2 in Table 2.4). In the same vein, you would expect MNEs to
value political climates where the incumbent is constrained so that opportunistic acts of expropriation or
forced divestment becomes nonviable (argument 1).
The relative sunkenness of FDI may affect MNEs’ valuation of two of the institutional concepts. With
immobilized equity, MNEs become more vulnerable to sabotage and violent attacks on production facil-
ities that might arise in human rights abusive regimes (argument 3). Correspondingly, one might expect
investors with stock-still positions to worry relatively more about the direct effects of non-democratic
political regimes. With fewer escape routes they become more vulnerable to government opportunism
such as expropriation or divestment measures, as well as undesirable side-effects of conflict in general
(argument 4). This argument should also apply to the protection of property rights (argment 5).
The relative size of the profit margin should interact with three of the institutional concepts. Low
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calculated profit margins may increase the salience of labor standards upholding, because higher stan-
dards is expected to decrease the chances of labor unrest and increase productivity (argument 6). Control
of corruption should also be important if production is close to the margin. The cost premium brides
and side-payments represent is more likely to yield negative profits if production is already close to the
margin (argument 7).83 At last, producing on the margin often means having limited capital reserves – in
turn making the smoothness of money movement up and down value chains, and between suppliers and
demanders, important.84 Moreover, it may make continuous access to sound credit important. There-
fore, well-functioning financial infrastructure should be a locational factor attracting producers operating
close to the margin (argument 8).
Whether MNEs are located in or near urban centers or not should be important in relation to three
of the institutional concepts. First, the contagiousness of strikes and the general social instability result-
ing from such is more of an issue when situated in or around cities, where most upheavals take place
(argument 9). In the same manner, democratic regimes’ way of dealing with conflict at the political
level, decrease the chance for rampant instability driven by dissatisfied urban dwellers (argument 10).
As for property rights protection, there should be more potential violators in cities, and with low public
enforcement of property rights, private policing might become expensive (argument 11).
The degree to which MNEs utilize local labor, interact with two institutional concepts. The most
obvious regards the protection of workers’ rights. With large shares of locally hired workers, labor peace
becomes salient to ensure continuity in production. Moreover, labor standards upholding might enhance
the productivity of the labor stock and thereby future profit margins (argument 12). The ability of firms
to move money (pay salaries) to its employees is also vital when hiring locally. Without stable and well-
functioning channels through which the employer can pay employees, intra-firm trust may erode and
with it important productivity gains.85 Moreover, attracting the best workers become more difficult when
payment channels are not moored in a sound financial infrastructure. Well-functioning and regulated
banks and systems of credit is should thus be more important when hiring locally (argument 13).
With close end user contact, a number of institutional concepts might become important locational
factors. First of all, Spar’s (1998) “spotlight effect” only work if consumers have an interface in which
they can sanction producers. With close demander contact, whether in local or global markets, MNEs
should therefore worry more about human rights and labor standards (argument 14 and 15). Selling
often involves committing to a contractual relation of some kind. For those MNEs that conduct such
contractual sales in local markets, the enforceability of contracts should be important (argument 16).
Similarly, those dependent on sales in local markets would profit from a vibrant local demand. Local
demand should be spurred by stable access to credit and a sound currency (argument 17).
83However, if the government knows that MNEs are abundant in capital, the asked-for bribes might be much higher.
84Producing close to the margin does not always imply meager capital reserves of course. There is a vital difference between
affiliates’ profits and principals’. Large principals with broad portfolios should depend less on individual affiliates’ profit
margins for liquidity. Since most FDI data are not at the affiliate-level, this is however a very difficult issue to control for.
85Trust has been found important for productivity in inter-firm relations and in small firm networks (see e.g. Sako, 2006).
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The last trait, operational complexity, should be important in relation to three institutional concepts.
Complex operations increase the amount of nodes where officials may demand bribes to grant for exam-
ple operational licenses or transport permits. Thus, MNEs with highly complex operations should worry
relatively more about host-country control of corruption (argument 16). Property rights theory holds that
contract enforcement should matter relatively more for sectors that produce complex goods (Nicolini,
2007, 1).86 Highly complex MNE operations in the sense that production require a large number of in-
termediate products or production where customer relations are contractually complex, should therefore
consider host-country contracting environment an important locational factor (argument 17). At last,
complexity of operations may create more individual capital transactions between MNEs and suppliers
of intermediate products. These transactions should in turn depend on functioning payments systems,
and as such the quality of financial infrastructure may be an important locational factor (argument 18).
2.4.7 The Varieties of FDI expectations
Based on the specific traits of the interactions sketched out above, expectations on the relative importance
of the different institutional constructs may be formulated. Table 2.5 sums up the expected relationships,
with the numbers in parentheses pertaining to the argument(s) discussed in the previous section. Shortly
summarized, arguments are developed as to why both manufacturing and service supplying MNEs are
attentive to all seven institutional concepts, while only three concepts are expected to matter for natural
resource investors. This can be interpreted in line with the notion that natural resource extraction is more
“different” from manufacturing and services than manufacturing and services are from each other.
Table 2.5: Expected relationships between FDI across sectors and institutional concepts
Personal freedoms Political governance Economic interaction Economic regulation
Human rights Labor standards Political pref. Control of Prop. rights Contract Quality
protection upholding aggregation corruption protection enforceab. of credit
NRFDI + (3) + (1,4) + (2,5)
MFDI + (14) + (6,12,15) + (1) + (7, 18) + (2) + (14,17) + (8,13,17,20)
SFDI + (14) + (9,15) + (1,10) + (18) + (1,9) + (14,17) + (15,18)
NRFDI = natural resource FDI; MFDI = manufacturing FDI; SFDI = services FDI.
Natural resource FDI
The traits of natural resource extraction that accounts for the theoretical expectations are the size of FDI
and its relative sunkenness. The former should indicate importance for property rights protection as size
of investment increases potential losses on investment (argument 2 in Table 2.4), and for the manner
with which political preferences are aggregated. Democratic leaders remember, are less likely to act
opportunistically (North and Weingast, 1989) (argument 1).
86See Costinot (2005), Levchenko (2007), and Nunn (2007) for empirical corroborations of the contracts and complexity
argument from research into trade patterns.
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The degree to which natural resource investments are sunk should matter for the consideration of
the human rights environment, the system of political preference aggregation, and the general protection
of property rights. Protection of human rights should create less political violence and instability that
expose sunk costs in facilities to potential attacks and sabotage (argument 3).87 As regards the system of
preference aggregation, the same argument as posited above holds. An unconstrained autocrat is more
viable to expropriate than a constrained one (see e.g. North and Weingast, 1989). With expensive sunk-in
physical equipment, natural resource extractive MNEs should therefore contemplate the political regime
with more scrutiny before investing (argument 4).88 This holds for property rights in general also – the
more sunk costs are, the more protection of such should be considered ex ante (argument 5).
The expectations formulated for natural resource FDI should be taken with a certain degree of caution
for two reasons. First, the degree to which conducting FDI is actually a real choice between potential
locations vary extensively across sectors. MNEs investing in natural resource extraction should in that
sense be most constrained in their locational choice (Cohen, 2007, 66). Decisions on where to locate
FDI are in the first instance determined by the presence of sought-after resources. Coupled with a large
profit margin and the high future demand for resources (UNCTAD, 2007, 90-1), resource MNEs might
accept more uncertainty when choosing where to invest than MNEs in other industries.
The second limitation to the natural resource FDI expectations is that host-governments often are
more dependent upon MNEs to realize their resource dwellings than they are upon other foreign expertise
in other sectors. Yergin (1991, 423-33) notes how the host-government has exclusive sovereignty of any
oil beneath its soil, but that the oil has no value unless it is discovered, produced, and marketed.89
Especially in the developing world, host-countries have often been dependent upon MNEs to generate
petroleum-related currency to their Exchequer (see e.g. Vivoda, 2011). Indeed, even though “extractive
industries account for a small share of global FDI, they constitute the bulk of inward FDI in a number
of low-income countries” (UNCTAD, 2007, 125). Therefore hosts may sometimes make more effort
to protect these investments from derelict policy climates. Extractive MNEs might be unaffected by
institutional malfunctioning affecting the rest of the business community (Cohen, 2007, 78).
Manufacturing FDI
Manufacturing FDI’s weighting of host country institutions should theoretically hinge upon: size; gen-
erally low marginal value added; high integration in local labor markets; high degree of contact with end
87In Nigeria for example, ethnic rivalry resulted in a spate of armed attacks and invasions of oil installations in the Niger
Delta, causing evacuation of foreign staff by oil MNEs present, and temporary halts in production (Jakobsen, 2012, 11).
88Indeed, Hajzler (2010b, 2) states that the uncertainty stemming from potential expropriation or divestment “is particularly
acute in resource-based sectors.” Although full-scale expropriation is a rare phenomena there are contemporary examples of
official overtakings of MNE’s resource production in industries like mining and petroleum in Bolivia, Ecuador, Russia and
Venezuela. Consider for example Bolivia’s Evo Morales’ government expropriation of Brazilian Petrobas’ natural gas fields.
See: ”Now it’s the people’s gas”, The Economist, May 4, 2006. Consider also Argentinas decision to expropriate and nationalize
51 percent of YPF, a former stat-owned oil company sold to Spanish Repsol in 1999. See: ”Argentina to Seize Control of Oil
Company”, New York Times, April 16, 2012, and ”Feed me, Seymour”, The Economist, April 16, 2012.
89Except for in the the U.S. where beneath-soil resources is the property of the land owner (see e.g. Mommer, 2002).
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users; the complexity of intermediate products necessary in production. The institutional concepts that
are assumed to affect manufacturing FDI are thus: human rights protection; labor standards upholding;
control of corruption, property rights protection; contract enforcement; quality of banks and credit. The
human rights link runs through manufacturing MNEs’ relatively high degree of contact with end product
users, and the potential “spotlight effect” of consumer sanctions (Spar, 1998) (argument 14).90 Feeding
into the argument is the relatively low marginal value added of the manufacturing sector. Consumer
sanctions might hurt producers more when profit margins are meager.
Next, manufacturing MNEs should consider labor standards upholding both because of the profit
margin on which it produces, but also because of its relatively high integration in local labor markets.
The former of the two traits, besides emulating the spotlight effect (argument 15), pertain to the idea
that well-protected worker’s rights increase productivity, for example through the abolition of child labor
(see e.g. Emerson and Souza, 2011), and thereby increasess the marginal profit of manufacturers seeking
scale and scope gains (argument 6). The effect stemming from the latter trait is fairly straightforward.
Higher labor standards are assumed to create less labor unrest (see e.g. Robertson and Teitelbaum, 2011),
and in turn more smooth production (argument 12).
Systems of preference aggregation and property rights should be important for manufacturers for the
same reasons as it is for natural resource extractors: because investing abroad is costly relative to national
investment. The losses if expropriated would thus be more substantial. (argument 1). The same pertains
to the general protection of property rights from theft or violation on non-state actors (argument 2).
Control of corruption is assumed to be important for manufacturers because the cost premium asso-
ciated with the “grabbing hand”-notion (see e.g. Nye, 1967; Rose-Ackerman, 1975; Shleifer and Vishny,
1993). Corruption might affect the productivity of capital negatively through stifling the entry of new
goods (Bardhan, 1997, 1328), as well as lowering productivity on capital, a vital facet to on-the-margin
production (argument 7). Moreover, the processual complexity of manufacturing operations, especially
assembly industries, might create more nodes in which public officials may demand brides and side-
payments, another reason for why corruption control matters more for manufacturers (argument 18).
Policy climates enabling the enforceability of contracts should pull manufacturing MNEs due the
complexity of their supply chain networks. The argument from this complexity trait is in line with the
notion in the property rights literature: The more relations with intermediate product producers MNEs
engage in, the more salient becomes the contracting environment (Nicolini, 2007, 1). As manufactur-
ing production often consist of assembly industries, they should value on institutions specifying and
enforcing the rights and obligations in contracted transactions (argument 17). To the degree that manu-
facturers have direct relations with their end product users, these relations are also likely to be governed
by contracts at some level. The closeness of consumer contact should therefore also signal that contract
90An excellent example of a successful spotlight regime was the 2001 highlighting of the German lingerie producer Triumph
International’s production facilities in Myanmar. After having been accused of pillaring up the country’s authoritarian regime
Triumph decided to adhere to the accusing NGOs’ demands of withdrawing from Myanmar (Jakobsen, 2012, 13).
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enforceability matter to manufacturers (argument 14).
At last, manufacturing MNEs are expected to value sound host-country financial systems and qual-
ity of credit. The argument has four parts: First, producing on the margin necessitates undisturbed and
functional flow of money so that margins on the balance are kept positive and production not halted un-
necessarily (argument 8). Second, deploying local labor makes functioning payments systems important
to maintain good relations with laborers and unions (argument 13). Third, to the degree that manufactur-
ers are market-seeking they depend on local demand. They should therefore favor markets where local
customers have spending power (argument 17). Fourth, with complex economic ties in local markets,
manufacturing MNEs would be expected to depend on functioning payments systems to secure stable
sourcing of inputs, as well as in-time realization of payments (argument 20).
One general note that should be made is that manufacturing industries are often those that are accused
of driving the “races to the bottom” in host-country labor markets. As such, arguments assuming that
human rights and labor standards should matter to manufacturers might create dubiety in some circles,
perhaps especially amongst anti-globalists.91 Bill Jordan, former General Secretary of the International
Confederation of Free Trade Union was once quoted saying: “intense competition between countries to
attract foreign investment is under-mining respect for the labor standards [...] And it is particularly in
labour-intensive industries that the competition is most vicious” (Chan and Ross, 2003, 1023).
Services FDI
The expectations of services MNE’s weighting of host-country policy environments depend on the sec-
tor’s following traits: size; high urban presence; high degree of end user contact; relatively high con-
tractual complexity in operations. The institutional concepts though to affect FDI in services industries
are: human rights protection; upholding of worker’s rights; system of preference aggregation; control of
corruption; property rights protection; viability of contracts; quality of banks and credit.
The link between human rights protection and services FDI should function pretty much in the same
manner as it does in regards to manufacturing FDI, through Spar’s (1998) “spotlight mechanism” (ar-
gument 14). What differentiates services form manufacturing in this context is that the former would
experience the “spotlight sanction” in the host-market if anywhere, due to its non-tradability (Kolstad
and Villanger, 2008). The argument however still stands to reason – it is not unthinkable that local
consumers might punish human rights abusive production.
As regards labor standards upholding, two arguments indicate that such should matter for services
MNEs. The “spotlight effect” (argument 15), and the fact that services MNEs should locate in or around
urban centers, exposing them to the infectiousness of strikes or other forms of labor unrest that might
arise from violation of labor standards (see e.g. Robertson and Teitelbaum, 2011). Thus, protection of
worker’s rights through standards upholding should affect services MNEs positively (argument 9).
Services MNEs’ weighting of host-countries preference aggregation systems could should favor
91See for example the argumentation in Neumayer and de Soysa (2006).
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democratic institutions mainly because of their urban presence. Being located where turmoil unfolds
increases the chance of becoming targets for rampant outbreaks of destruction. Democratic systems of
government are more likely to handle conflict at the political level rather than letting it unfold in the city
streets (Robertson and Teitelbaum, 2011) (argument 10). Moreover, general size of investment should
make autocrats, with more leeway to act opportunistic, less likely to receive services FDI (argument 1).
Host country control of corruption should matter for service suppliers due to the high degree of
contractual complexity in such operations, increasing the nodes where public officials may demand side
payments and so forth (argument 18).92 Property rights systems should matter for service suppliers as
theirs, like all MNEs’, are costly investments (argument 1), but also as their high urban presence make
them more prone to property violations and theft (argument 11).
Host-country contracting environment should matter for services MNEs given the contractual nature
of their operations. Services are in essence intangibles that in most cases imply agreeing on mutual
obligations surrounding one party’s conduction of an activity for another – good examples being banks
lending money to local business or consultancy companies offering their expertise to private or public
customers. If host-countries do not police these agreements, MNEs will face extensive costs (argument
16). With increasing complexity, the importance of contracts increase further as they are likely to become
more numerous (argument 19).
At last, the soundness of banks and credit should matter for foreign service production for two of the
same reasons as manufacturing FDI. The market-seeking nature of services MNE (Dunning and Lundan,
2008, 70-1) creates a dependence on local demand. Local demand in turn should be accelerated when
demanders have access to credit. Thus the soundness of credit regulation should affect service MNEs
positively (argument 17). Similarly, services operations would depend on functioning payment systems
to realize the gains from sales in host-markets (Bevan, Estrin and Meyer, 2004, 48) (argument 20).
2.5 Summary
This section started off by exploring the potential developmental effects of attracting FDI, and how gains
might hinge upon what type of FDI is attracted. Next, the analytical perceptions of FDI and MNEs were
defined, before Dunning’s (see e.g. 1977; 1981; 1988; 1993) eclectic paradigm for explaining foreign
production was discussed. Thereunder, formal institutions were defined in line with the new institutional
economics understanding of such (see e.g. North, 1981, 1990, 2005), and discussed in terms of how
institutions develop, and affect the transaction and production costs of business (see e.g. Coase, 1960;
Williamson, 1985, 2000; North, 1987; Eggertsson, 2005). Host-country institutions was then discussed
as potential locational factors in Dunning’s paradigm.
92An good example is the ongoing corruption scandal around the issuing of licenses to operate on the Indian mobile market.
Due to allegations of bribery in the process of allocating 122 mobile licenses. Norwegian telecom MNE Telenor might end up
losing its entire initial investment in subsidiary Uninor of over 14.4 billion NOK. See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
india-16848844, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-16906220 and http://www.na24.no/nyheter/article3327309.ece.
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The remains of the chapter was devoted to developing The Varieties of FDI framework for formulat-
ing divergent expectations of institutional determinacy across variations of investors. It was discussed
how the lack of a coherent empirical link between institutions and FDI may be due to unaccounted for
MNE heterogeneity. Concepts associated with institutions were unpacked in conjuncture with research
into the state’s role in a globalized world (see e.g. Rondinelli and Cheema, 2003; Grosse, 2005) to ex-
pand on the political and economic institutions dichotomy of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005).
These concepts’ potential effects on FDI in general was discussed in turn, before the same effects were
differentiated on the basis of distinguishing between FDI from different economic sectors. Theoretical
expectations followed as a natural consequence of interacting sectoral traits and institutional mecha-
nisms. Each expectation was based on one or more theoretical arguments as to why one particular trait
of one particular sector should make the effect of institutional concepts likely to impact on location
decisions made by MNEs from that sector.
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Chapter 3
Research design
What we see depends mainly on what we look for.
– Sir John Lubbock, English proverb
Success is a science; if you have the conditions, you get the result.
– Oscar Wilde, The Complete Works of Oscar Wilde. Volume 15, (1910, 153)
This chapter first makes the case for why a quantitative investigation is a good way of testing The Varieties
of FDI expectations developed in Chapter 2. Second, FDI data in general and potential sources to bias
in Norwegian FDI is discussed. Next, the seven institutional concepts are are operationalized using
available indices of institutional performance. To fortify the empirical analysis, a set of control variables
previously shown to affect FDI are also conceptualized. At last, various statistical issues are touched
upon, after explaining the choice of econometric model. Success in science depend on the conditions at
base – when you know how to look for answers you increase your chance of observing reality.
3.1 Quantitative reasoning and proxying
One way to justify a large-N quantitative study is to take a theory that has gained support in qualitative
case studies or comparative small-N studies and test its applicability on a larger group of cases. The aim
is to increase generalizability and reduce the risk of inferring based on subject selection bias (Geddes,
2003, 89-129). Another justification is to exploratively examine an issue-area that is under-researched as
a vantage point for further reconnoitering on the matter. As indicated earlier, empirical embraces of FDI
complexity are scarce. In that vein, this study is exploratory in the sense that it provides information on
how a fairly wide set of institutional concepts differ as locational factors across types of FDI.1 Within
these sectors there is still substantial heterogeneity and the importance of further breaking them down into
specific industries should not be understated.2 Although much has happened since Kobrin (1976, 1980)
1However, not exploratory without theoretical mooring. The Varieties of FDI expectations are still to be tested.
2See discussion in Chapter 5.
45
46 CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN
and Root and Ahmed (1979) conducted their insightful but statistically constrained analyses, streamlining
of FDI data collection is still in its infancy (see e.g. Bellak and Cantwell, 2004; Dunning and Lundan,
2008).3 The investment data used in this analysis, obtained directly from Statistics Norway (SSB), allows
me to disentangle FDI and as such represents a rare chance to examine the MNE heterogeneity.
Moving from theoretical concepts to indicators is arduous because theoretical concepts in social
sciences often are unobservable – especially so as regards policy climates (Jackman, 2008, 119). Certain
statistical measures of institutional concepts are more tangible than others, for example lawful structures
stipulated by constitutions or formal policy documents. However, the below operationalizations strive
to capture the policy outcomes of institutional set-ups. These intangibles are susceptible to variations in
subjective understandings of expert coders, and as such may offer reduced validity.
There are however good reasons for why de facto indicators are preferred.4 The main argument is
the belief that MNEs to a larger extent than before integrate political risk analysis in their investment de-
cisions (see e.g. World Bank, 2003; Rondinelli, 2005).5 In the wake of early day confrontations between
MNEs and host-governments such as the Cuban, Iranian, and Nicaraguan revolutions, a political risk
assessment industry grew forth. Therein, scholars have dealt with multiple definitional and conceptual
issues in the field of political risk analysis (Jakobsen, 2012, 29).6 Further integration of uncertainty stem-
ming from politico-economic climate in business management is evidenced by the political risk insurance
industry, providing both direct mediation and risk alleviation through confidential contracting (see e.g.
West, 1996).7 Important bodies in this concern are the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, an
entity of the World Bank (see e.g. Shihata, 1988; West and Tarazona, 1998; Baker, 1999), the and the
U.S. government-affiliated Overseas Private Investment Corporation.8
Due to the conceptual impalpability, indicators should be understood as the empirical traces of insti-
tutional functionality, not functionality per se. Operationalizing complex concepts is a trade-off between
specifying the specific and embracing reality, and the below measures exhibit various degrees of speci-
ficity. Operationalizations are conducted on the basis of a wide survey of statistical measures available.
Some indicators initially considered potentially good proxies could not be obtained for cost considera-
tions.9 As for whether the measures applied capture the latent concepts they are meant to, their validity
3Computer and statistical software developments have played important roles in this behavioral turn (Lewis-Beck, 2008).
4De facto indicators means measures of actual policy climates, in essence the performance of institutions as measured by
the environments for production and economic exchange they create.
5PriceWaterhouseCoopers for example has, together with the Eurasia Group, ”brought together a team of experts to build
a Political Risk Assessment diagnostic and monitoring methodology that enables companies to isolate and assess the con-
tribution of political risk to their overall risk profile, manage these risks, and identify and capitalize on unexploited op-
portunities”. See: http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/political-risk-consulting-services/integrating-poitical-risk-into-enterprise-risk-
management.jhtml. In Norway, Norwegian Risk Consulting International provide risk assessments and consulting services
for companies looking to invest in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and South America. See: http://www.nrci.no/default.aspx.
6See for example Robock (1971), Boddewyn and Cracco (1972), Green and Smith (1972), Green (1974), and Simon (1982).
7See the number of books written on the industry: Moran (1998, 2001, 2004), Moran and West (2005), and Jensen (2008).
8See: http://www.miga.org/, and http://www.opic.gov/ respectively.
9See for example the country-level global forecasting data from the Economist Intelligence Unit’s database:
http://www.eiu.com/site info.asp?info name=eiu ultimate portfolio global economic indicators&page=noads, or the risk in-
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is discussed under each operationalization.
One last consideration as concerns proxying institutional concepts is that constructs linked to the-
ory might represent multiple underlying theoretical concepts. This delineation problem is difficult both
conceptually and operationally, making it hard to draw determinate conclusions from individual perfor-
mances of variables. Multicollinearity is discussed below, but in essence the problem is that some proxies
capture aspects attempted captured by other indicators.10 Such problems are by no means reasons to give
up investigating the institutions-FDI relationship, but rather signal that one must be cautious about draw-
ing bombastic inferences from proxies capturing multiple aspects of institutional functionality.
3.2 Dependent variable: FDI stocks
Dependent variables in this thesis are Norwegian outbound FDI stocks, accounted for sector-by-sector
and in totali. Data is analyzed at the host-country-year level, but underlying numbers are based on firm-
level reports on FDI collected through annual surveys for the financial years 1998 through 2006.11 The
data structure is monadic with one source-country, resulting in aggregate annual pairwise movements of
FDI between Norway and the countries for which Norwegian MNEs report their foreign assets.12
Table 3.1: Industry-by-industry Norwegian FDI stocks (1998-2006)
Sector Industry 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Natural resources Agriculture and fisheries 0.2 0.2 2.0 2.1 1.8 2.5 2.9 3.4 3.6
Natural resources Crude oil and natural gas extraction 87.3 96.0 104.1 103.9 105.1 131.1 147.0 211.3 227.9
Manufacturing Manufacturing 90.3 133.4 156.6 231.9 232.4 245.4 224.3 228.6 231.1
Services Energy and construction 0.6 14.9 33.9 22.9 29.3 30.1 31.1 36.5 38.1
Services Commercial, hotels and restaurants 9.3 13.9 13.1 17.2 12.5 14.6 14.9 17.6 13.0
Services Shipping and pipelines 6.9 20.0 23.5 24.8 22.9 22.1 21.6 28.7 42.5
Services Transportation and communications 2.6 4.8 20.1 25.1 21.6 22.4 33.8 56.8 117.0
Services Financial services and insurances 2.2 13.8 9.8 16.1 29.7 30.6 12.0 18.3 15.7
Services Business services and property 33.1 35.6 35.6 35.8 32.8 37.0 40.6 37.9 50.6
Services Other services 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.8
- Miscellaneous 2.9 2.9 0.7 0.5 0 0.1 3.6 4.6 0
Total 235.8 336.0 399.0 481.1 488.7 536.7 532.4 644.1 749.6
Numbers are the aggregates from Statistics Norway’s confidential firm-level data. FDI in billion NOK.
Table 3.1 displays developments in the dataset at industry group level.13 These groups are in turn
aggregated to sectors based on UNCTAD’s standard classification of economic activity.14 The aggrega-
dices from IHS Global Risk Services: http://www.ihs.com/products/global-insight/country-analysis/global-risk.aspx.
10As is the case of the investment profile and the property rights indices, discussed in Section 3.3.
11The reasons observations cannot be stretched further than 2006 is that SSB, in line with OECD recommendations, in 2006
made changes to their reporting methodology (Knutsen, Rygh and Hveem, 2011, 15). The author actually obtained the data
from messieurs Helge Hveem, Carl-Henrik Knutsen and Asmund Rygh, see previous investigations in: Hveem, Knutsen and
Rygh (2008a,b,c); Hveem (2009) and (Knutsen, Rygh and Hveem, 2011).
12See Table A.1 in Appendix A for the full country sample. 194 countries are reported for throughout.
13These figures deviate slightly from the aggregates at SSB’s website, see Hveem, Knutsen and Rygh (2008b, 15) for why.
14See: http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3149&lang=1.
48 CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN
tion is fairly straightforward: agriculture, fisheries and crude oil and natural gas extraction are classified
as natural resources FDI, manufacturing FDI classifies itself, whilst services FDI is made up of energy,
construction, commercial services, shipping, pipelines, communications, financial services, insurances,
business services, and property.15 Miscellaneous industries are excluded from the analysis.
3.2.1 Measuring FDI stocks
FDI data come in either flows or stocks. Flows are usually measured annually, and “consist of the net
sales of shares and loans to the parent company plus the parent firm’s share of the affiliate’s reinvested
earnings plus total net intercompany loans provided by the parent company” (Bellak, 1998, 235),16 while
stocks “are the value of the share of the subsidiaries’ capital and reserves attributable to the parent enter-
prise, plus the net indebtedness of the associate or subsidiary to the parent firm” (Bellak, 1998, 236). In
essence, flows are annual movements of FDI, while stocks are accumulated FDI positions.
While most empirical assessments of FDI determinants still use flows to measure FDI, arguments
have been raised in their disfavor.17 The main contention is that flows are held to be more volatile
than stocks (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, 15-6), an that stocks better capture country’s medium-to-long-
term FDI equilibriums and dynamic differences across these values (Coan and Kugler, 2008, 408-9).
In addition, stocks account for capital raised in local credit markets and is thereby a more appropriate
measure of real capital ownership (Be´nassy-Que´re´, Coupet and Mayer, 2007, 769). Stocks are hence
applied below.18
FDI, however, is only a proxy for MNE activity. In real life, MNEs have many non-equity arrange-
ments by which they can control production. Turnkey agreements, network cooperation and production
sharing are but a few examples (UNCTAD, 2011b, 133-41). Efforts towards measuring such activities
have not yet been undertaken – FDI is the only consistent measure of MNE activity available. But, mea-
suring FDI stocks is not straightforward either. Most national banks require their MNEs to report in line
with the OECD (2008, 48) benchmark definition of FDI, identifying foreign investments as direct once
MNEs account for ten percent or more of the capital holdings in the investment object. The statistical
calculation of FDI stocks should include all subsequent equity transactions between the MNE and the
subsidiary. The construction of the Norwegian FDI stocks are based on these internationally recognized
accounting procedures. Reporting to SSB are between 750 and 1250 Norwegian MNEs, the number
15For reasons unknown, mining is collapsed into the manufacturing industry category. Had this industry been big it could
have created potential measurement errors. Norwegian foreign mining industry is however a vanishingly small industry, and
as such it is not assumed to blur regression results where manufacturing FDI is the dependent variable. See SSB’s online data
resources: http://statbank.ssb.no/statistikkbanken.
16Some countries, such as Denmark, France, Japan, Span, Singapore, and Thailand do not require their MNEs to report on
reinvested earnings, or do not report these positions in official documents (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, 12-3). As shown by
Lundan (2006), differences in investment flows arising from omitting reinvested earnings might be substantial, and as such
narrow the scope for comparability across borders when it comes to FDI data.
17See users of flows: Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashamova (1998); Asiedu (2002); Harms and Ursprung (2002); Kucera (2002);
Li and Resnick (2003); Bevan, Estrin and Meyer (2004); Busse (2004); Ahlquist (2006); Blanton and Blanton (2007); Busse
and Hefeker (2007); Asiedu, Jin and Nandwa (2009); Ali, Fiess and MacDonald (2010); Robertson and Teitelbaum (2011).
18See users of stocks: Wei (2000); Egger and Winner (2005); Daude and Stein (2007); Knutsen, Rygh and Hveem (2011).
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increasing throughout the time period (Balsvik and Skaldebø, 2010, 12). The stock calculation reads:
stock = affiliate capital stock * (direct + indirect ownership share)+net loan positions (3.1)
where reinvested earnings are captured by the affiliate capital stock. An important question when han-
dling stock data is whether positions are accounted in book values or in constant replacement values (see
e.g. Cantwell, 1992). Book values can be expected to undergo many changes over time. Exchange rate
effects, asset depreciation, and changed accounting standards all contribute to book values underestimat-
ing earlier stocks when using long time-series, limiting over-time comparability as current market value
of the stock should be scaled up (Bellak, 1998, 236-40).19
In the case of Norwegian FDI data, time-series only stretches nine years, reducing complications.
Exchange rate effects and asset depreciation need more time to affect the stocks. The substantial rise
in Norwegian FDI throughout the period is thus more likely to have been a function of Norwegian
investors catching-up, rather than the result of underestimation of early values.20 To correct for skewness
in the FDI variables, a logarithmic transformation is applied. Since net loans are included in the stock
calculation, numbers might take negative values.21 Since numbers below zero have no natural logarithm,




3.2.2 Norwegian FDI: idiosyncrasies and generalization
An important issue when identifying suitable statistical proxies for real life phenomena is their construct
validity, that is, to what extent they measure the latent concept they are supposed to (Jackman, 2008,
122). The Norwegian calculations by and large measure the concept of FDI as benchmarked by OECD
(2008). A more relevant question is whether the Norwegian data inhibit idiosyncratic tendencies that
may affect the basis for infering. The development of Norwegian FDI accelerated fairly late (see e.g.
Balsvik and Skaldebø, 2010). This might be the reason that, save for a few assertions (see e.g. Selfors,
1999; Hveem, Heum and Ruud, 2000; Gru¨nfeld, 2005; Knutsen, Rygh and Hveem, 2011), determinants
of Norwegian FDI has not frequently been assessed. The general trend since the bloom begun has been
one of geographical and sectoral dispersion. Norwegian FDI has traditionally been concentrated in the
OECD countries, accounting for 92 percent of the stock in 1998. At the end of 2005 however, the OECD
concentration was reduced to 75 percent. Over that same period, regions such as Africa (2450 percent)
and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (1350 percent) experienced high growth of Norwegian
19Models of reevaluating historical book values have been developed (Cantwell and Bellak, 1998; Bellak and Cantwell, 1996,
2004), and applied by some (Egger and Winner, 2003, 2005).
20By Hveem, Knutsen and Rygh (2008b) labelled ”latecomer investor” behavior.
21In the Norwegian data there are 55 country-years obtaining a negative value in FDI in resource extraction, 33 for manufac-
turing industries, and 67 for service industries.
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FDI (Hveem, Knutsen and Rygh, 2008a, 6).
Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 portrays the developments in Norwegian FDI over the period 1998-2006,
displaying good sectoral variation. While petroleum activity used to account for the bulk of natural
resource FDI, cash cropping and fish farming increasingly contribute. In services, shipping has been
accompanied by extensive growth in financial and banking services, as well as telecommunications (see
e.g. Hveem, Heum and Ruud, 2000). Throughout the period, manufacturing industries, spanning over a
large set of industries, on the balance account for a little more of total outward FDI than the two other
sectors. But, after 2004 Norwegian FDI in services and extractive industries start catching up in line
with international trends (UNCTAD, 2004, 2007). Norwegian FDI in the period 1998-2006 exhibited
considerable variation within all three sectors. High sectoral variation yields data that is structurally
suited for a disaggregated analysis and in turn analyses should be less plagued by selection effects.
Influential MNEs and influential destinations
Two issues raised concerning Norwegian FDI is that investment behavior in the aggregate might be driven
by certain large corporations, or influential destinations (see Gru¨nfeld, 2005; Hveem, 2009, respectively).
Large corporations might inflate investment figures to certain countries, disproportionately affecting the
analysis. As Norway is a relatively small country with a correspondingly small pool of MNEs, the
problem is exacerbated. Companies like Statoil and Hydro for example account for much of the FDI in
resource extraction, while Telenor is a major player in telecommunications services (see Claes, 2003;
Lie, 2005; From, 2009, respectively). One would assume that small- and medium-sized MNEs are more
uncertainty averse than large corporations. Losses on investment in relatively small holdings portfolios
necessarily impose a relatively bigger economic blow than to large MNEs’ extensive portfolios. Small
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MNEs should therefore be more deterred by high levels of uncertainty than large MNEs, especially
within the two categories associated economic institutions. The impact of large corporations is checked
by excluding the top twenty largest MNEs from the sample.
Hveem (2009) press the potential influence of certain locations attracting disproportionate amounts
of Norwegian FDI. Table 3.2 sums up the developments in the shares of Norwegian FDI gained by
certain countries, the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of country-stocks over time,22 as well as
their average score on two variables measuring broad aspects of civil liberties and political rights (FHI)
and general respect for the rule of law (RLI).23 Out of the countries that at some point between 1998 and
2006 accounted for more than 1 percent of total Norwegian FDI, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Liberia,
Singapore and Venezuela intuitively stand out as potentially influential recipients. Their low scores on at
least one of the two broad institutional measures indicate that one should beware of their effect.
Table 3.2: Potentially influential recipients
% of Norwegian FDI
Country 1998 2002 2006 CAGR# FHI (1-7) RLI (1-5)
Algeria 0.0 0.0 1.7 700.49% 2.5 1.6
Angola 0.0 1.8 2.2 80.19% 2.3 1.1
Azerbaijan 0.0 0.6 2.5 34.55% 2.6 1.6
Liberia 0.2 1.0 0.8 -25.00% 3.1 0.8
Singapore 1.1 2.4 8.1 41.91% 3.2 4.1
Venezuela 0.0 1.4 0.8 -37.96% 4.3 1.4
#Compound annual growth rates are based on the periods 2002-2006 for Algeria, and
1999-2001 periods for Azerbaijan. FHI = Freedom House Index from Freedom House,
and RLI = Rule of Law Index from the World Governance Indicators.
First, consider countries with inflated FDI figures due to petroleum investments. Algeria, exhibiting
the by far largest CAGR of the six nations at 700 percent, had no FDI recorded in 1998, but accounted
for 1.7 percent in 2006. Angola, an extremely capital-poor nation, went from receiving close to no
Norwegian FDI in 1998, to accounting for 2.2 percent of total stocks in 2006 with a noticeable CAGR
of 29.6 percent. At the same time, Angola scores extremely low on general freedom and respect for the
law throughout the entire period.24 Azerbaijan exhibited somewhat the same development, going from
being a minor recipient to accounting for 2.2 percent of Norwegian FDI in 2006 at the same time as
scoring generally low on freedom and law and order indices. Venezuela, accounting for 1.4 percent of
22The compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) is the rate at which something, in this case an FDI stock, grows over a period
of years, taking into account the effect of annual compounding.
23The Freedom House Index (FHI) originally varies from 1 to 7, where 1 connotes maximum freedom. This scale has been
inverted so that a score of 7 implies full freedom, see: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2012/methodology.
The Rule of Law Index varies between approximately -2.5 and 2.5, where the higher the score the more law and order. For
simplicity this scale has been inverted to vary between 1 and 5, where higher values still indicate respect for the rule of law,
see: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp for information on the data sources.
24See le Billon (2001) for a informative account of Angola’s relation to natural resource extractive MNEs.
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FDI in 2002, scoring higher on the FHI than the other three oil nations, also exhibits very low general
respect for law and order. In all these nations, large oil investments developed throughout the time-
period. A different case not depicted in Table 3.2 is that of Belgium, accounting for 5.8 percent of
total FDI in 2006. Dropping resource extractive investments from the sample reduces that share to 2.8
percent, mainly because Statoil has a coordination centre dealing with their financial affairs and overseas
activities in Mechelen near Brussels (Hveem, 2009, 388).25
That Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan and Venezuela, in spite of malfunctioning institutional infrastruc-
tures, receive considerable amounts of natural resource FDI might indicate that the limitations on the
actual location decision and the host-country dependence-driven protection of petroleum enclaves dis-
cussed in Section 2.4.7 are at play. The robustness of natural resource regressions are controlled for the
influence of oil-nations, and Belgium, by removing them from all relevant samples.
Secondly, certain locations might be transshipment platforms for Norwegian FDI or general hubs
of FDI activity. Norwegian data on FDI is collected according to the resident principle, implying that
investments for “mailbox locations”, serving no other purpose than channeling FDI into other markets
again, are sometimes reported (Hveem, Knutsen and Rygh, 2008a, 8). Such investments may give unreal
importance to financial centers and their institutional structure as locational determinants of FDI (see
e.g. Daude and Fratzscher, 2008). In the Norwegian data, Singapore, a minuscule island state, went from
accounting for 1.1 percent of Norwegian FDI in 1998, to attracting 8.1 percent all stocks in 2006. That
amounts to 78 percent of total Norwegian FDI to Asia, and, as Hasli (2009) hints at, probably indicates
that Singapore is a transshipment country for Norwegian FDI to South-East and East Asia.
On a different note, Liberia, by Norwegian shipping investors traditionally considered a ”convenience
flag” (Balsvik et al., 2009, 24), in 2002 accounted for more than 1.0 percent of total Norwegian FDI.
Labelled a tax haven by OECD (2000), Liberia might have above average influence on the services
equations below. Liberia is therefore removed from the services sample to check the robustness of
estimations, while Singapore is removed from all samples.
State ownership, human rights and corruption law
A more general bias might arise from the interplay between the Norwegian political sphere championing
human rights, democracy and anti-corruption. Norwegian business, especially as compared to other
OECD countries (see e.g. Jellum, 2002; OECD, 2005), but also in a Nordic context (see e.g. Bull, 2003;
Engelstad et al., 2003), is heavily influenced by state ownership. Depending on the state’s ownership pol-
icy, this could affect the valuation of L-specific factors when state-owned MNEs conduct FDI. Although
the Norwegian government stresses the need for an active ownership policy, it has been cited as poster-
boy example in separating between regulation and management of state ownership in MNEs (Radon and
Thaler, 2009, 17-8). Aside from stipulating company objectives, centered on maintaining main offices
in Norway, the state is confined to further its interests through channels such as the general assembly or
25See: http://www.statoil.com/en/About/Worldwide/Belgium/Pages/default.aspx.
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the media. In fact, unlike many other OECD countries, Norwegian state-owned MNEs do not even have
state representatives on boards (OECD, 2005, 123). Previous studies have also confirmed the scope for
state intervention in Norwegian state-owned MNEs to be limited (see e.g. Kiær and Jakobsen, 2007).
What has been corroborated to a certain extent is that the effect of state ownership on the loca-
tional decision seems to affect political risk-taking. While Knutsen, Rygh and Hveem (2011) find that
Norwegian state-owned MNEs do not favor democratic host-countries any more than privately owned
corporations, they find that state-owned MNEs are less negatively affected by risky business climates
than privately owned MNEs.26 Estimating the effect of state ownership across sectors is too large a task
to simply control for in this analysis, but it should be kept in mind by future research.
Although Norwegian state-owned MNEs do not seem to be more socially responsible than privately
owned, the case could be made that Norwegian FDI in general has a CSR bias. Gjølberg (2010, 212-
3) indicate that Norwegian business’ responsibleness is a function of Norway’s role as a “humanitarian
superpower”. Having a long-standing role within diplomatic peace negotiations, human rights advocacy,
and promotion of sustainable development, Norwegian authorities often see CSR as directly related to
their foreign policy (see e.g. Ba´tora, 2005). Business is viewed as an important, necessary and even
innate partner in fulfilling foreign policy aspirations (MFA, 2009).27 CSR at the most elementary level
is about voluntary responsibility-taking, driven by business, focused on efforts beyond compliance and
thereby almost by definition precluding a government role. At the global level however, it can be seen
as a tool to address governance vacuums (see e.g. Bendell, 2000). As has been indicated for other
countries’ governments (see e.g. Fox, Ward and Howard, 2002), Norwegian government pushes policies
to promote CSR at the global level (MFA, 2009). CSR is particularly associated with human rights and
labor standards upholding in foreign production (Ruggie, 2003), and as such, the interpretation of the the
personal freedoms aspects below should reflect this potential bias.
A last potential source of bias in the Norwegian data is Norwegian law on corruption. Norwegian
MNEs can, regardless of host-country laws on corruption, be tried and sentenced under Norwegian anti-
corruption laws. Aside from governing by one of the strictest national corruption laws, the Norwegian
judiciary might try Norwegian-based MNEs at the same time as they are being tried abroad. Unlike
for example the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, distinguishing between acts of corruption when the
benefactor of a corrupt practice give something in return (quid pro quo requirement) and those that do not
(see e.g. Perkel, 2003), Norwegian law also define “facilitations payments” illegal. The corruption law
might mitigate Norwegian MNEs’ actions in institutional environments not controlling corruption more
than the average MNE, and should be taken into account when discussing the effects of corruption.28
26As measured by rule of law, protection of property rights, and control of corruption. This might be interpreted as a moral
hazard finding in the sense that the state, through being a powerful owner both economically and diplomatically, reduce the
actual uncertainty for state-owned corporations as they invest abroad. The state-owned MNEs might assume that the state will
aide them should they get into trouble and thus be less risk averse (Knutsen, Rygh and Hveem, 2011).
27Norwegian business always score very high on CSR indices measuring both practice and performance (Gjølberg, 2009).
28See: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/tema/naeringslivssamarbeid samfunnsansvar/n samfunnsansvar/ansvar korrups
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3.2.3 Potential Norwegian FDI biases summed up
The potential biases in Norwegian data are: (1) large, influential corporations taking more risk than
smaller MNEs might distort the significant positive effects of institutions on FDI; (2) certain locations
receiving disproportionate amounts of FDI in spite of malfunctioning institutional infrastructure may
hamper significant, positive relations in especially natural resources equations (through Algeria, Angola,
Azerbaijan and Venezuela), but also in services (through Liberia); (3) Singapore as a transshipment lo-
cation for Norwegian FDI to adjacent markets may have an inappropriately large effect on the estimates,
making them overly positive; (4) the large influx of state ownership in Norwegian business may make
Norwegian MNEs more socially responsible as the state may impose CSR-streamlined ownership pol-
icy on its companies, creating overly significant and positive relations between FDI from all sectors
and rights and democracy issues; (5) substantial state ownership may also make Norwegian MNEs less
hazard averse, especially as regards uncertainty around economic interaction and regulation; and, (6)
Norwegian investors may be more corruption averse as Norwegian anti-corruption laws are particularly
strict. For appropriate measures to check results’ robustness to some of these biases, see Section 4.5.
3.3 Independent variables
To proxy the institutional concepts discussed above, indices from different sources are utilized.29 In
some cases, due to the way the theoretical expectations are constructed, two proxies of one institutional
concept are applied. This way the full breadth of particular outcomes can be measured.
Above it was argued that de facto policy climates are preferred over de jure structures.30 Note that
“formal institutions” (de jure) and “public policies” (de facto) are not the same. The latter are “extremely
prominent constraining features of the political environment” (Pierson, 2000, 259). The perceived op-
portunity space for MNEs should to a larger extent be constituted by the performance of institutions in
the political environment than by their lawfulness. Adding to is the above argument that political risk
assessment and insurance industries are more likely to deliver due diligence analyses focused on actual
institutional environments rather than formally instated institutions.31
However, focusing on de facto policy outcomes makes variables subjective in the sense that scores are
coded according to coders’ perceptions of given situations. Such ratings may in some instances be biased
against relatively poor and small countries, especially risk measured by private risk agencies (see e.g.
Ferri, 2004), and in others be plagued by the “noisy” influence of coder biases (Asiedu, Jin and Nandwa,
jon.html?id=635078
29All variables are summed up in Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics for independent variables and controls to be found in Table
A.2, while data coverage (year 2006) on the independent variables can be fund in Table A.1, the two latter in Appendix A.
30There might be radical differences in what de facto and jure concepts measure statistically. See Feld and Voigt (2003) for
a discussion of measures of constraints on the executive.
31It could be argued that any previous in-house investment experiences are also bound to be de facto. As Norwegian MNEs
are on the rise, more and more such experiences are available to judge from. See a review of research on path-dependency in
the FDI decision in Hutzschenreuter, Pedersen and Volberda (2007), and Hveem, Heum and Ruud (2000); Hveem, Knutsen and
Rygh (2008b); Balsvik and Skaldebø (2010) for the late bloom of Norwegian MNEs.
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2009, 271). Ideally, completely objective measures would have been applied. as uncertainty around what
situation prevail in a country at any given time may create divergent codings of concurrent events. There
are however no either-or constructs that capture the policy outcomes of institutions, potentially affecting
constructs’ validity and the reliability of estimates.
Some studies, to account for possible reciprocal effects, lag independent variables one or more
years.32 I chose to regress FDI on the institutional indices simultaneously to preserve as much use-
ful variation in the data as possible, as some of the indices are constrained when moving back in time.
The fact that institutions are highly inert should make this rather unproblematic (see e.g. Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2006b; North, 2005). Moreover, professional risk analysis is often based on forecasting. A
country’s score on a given parameter at time t thus reflects the forecasted performance on that parameter
in t+1.33 Lags are however used to test the robustness of models.
Personal freedoms: human rights and labor standards protection
Given the amount of political attention and the vagueness of the concepts themselves, operationalizations
of human rights protection and labor standards upholding are bound to be controversial. Human rights
protection at the national level is a conceptually complex function of actors (foreign aggressors or in-
truders, various arms of the government, sub-national groupings or separatist movements) and freedoms
to be upheld. To differ it from the wider definitions of democracy and workers’ rights, human rights
protection is defined as the physical integrity rights of individuals. Focusing solely on governmental
protection of physical integrity allows clear demarcation of human rights as a lone-standing concept.
To capture this aspect of human rights, the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) index of government respect
for physical integrity rights (PHYSINT) is used (see e.g. Cingranelli and Richards, 1999, 2008).34 The
CIRI PHYSINT index systematically assesses government violation of four human rights aspects: tor-
ture; political imprisonment; disappearances; extrajudicial killings.35 Index scores are based on annual
reports provided by Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department on human rights practices
around the world. Using a polychotomous extension of Mokken scaling, scores on the four aspects of
physical integrity rights (varying between 0 and 2) are combined into an aggregate ordinal scale ranging
from 0 to 8. The lowest score indicate complete absence of protection for physical integrity and the
highest is reserved for countries where physical integrity is fully protected.36
32Reciprocity, or endogeneity, is the effect of FDI on institutions. By lagging institutional indices one year, institutional
change that may (or may not) follow from FDI is arguably avoided. Endogeneity is discussed in Section 3.6.3.
33As is the case for ICRG’s risk categories: http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG Methodology.aspx#RiskForecasts.
34The full Cingranelli-Richards dataset is available at: http://ciri.binghamton.edu/index.asp.
35Torture is defined as ”the purposeful infliction of extreme pain [...] by government officials or by private individuals at the
instigation of government officials” (Cingranelli and Richards, 1999, 408) and captures inhuman, degrading and capricious use
of physical or mental force by the police or personnel in detention centers. Political imprisonment is defined as ”incarnation of
people by government officials because of their ideas” (Cingranelli and Richards, 1999, 408). Such ideas might be linked to
speech, religious beliefs or nonviolent opposition to government. Extrajudicial killings are assassinations conducted by arms of
the government or instigation thereof without due judicial processes, and disappearances encompass incidences of politically
motivated abductions or killings where the victims have not been found.
36The PHYSINT index, as opposed to the more frequently applied Political Terror Scale (PTS), empirically demonstrates
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The CIRI project’s index for worker’s rights (WORKER) is applied to capture national labor stan-
dards upholding. Core labor standards stretch across many issues (Kucera, 2002, 39-47), but the CIRI
worker’s rights index covers a broad range of internationally recognized rights: freedom of association
in the workplace; prohibitions against child and forced labor; the right to bargain collectively; generally
acceptable conditions at work. WORKER is a measure of the actual existence of labor standards, an im-
portant point given the frequent differences between labor rights in law and those in practice (Greenhill,
Mosley and Prakash, 2009, 674-5).37 The WORKER index vary form 0 to 2, where 0 represent severe
restriction of workers rights and 2 connotes full protection (Cingranelli and Richards, 2008, 65).38
Political governance: preference aggregation and corruption
The facets to political regimes interesting to this analysis are those determining social instability, gov-
erning politicians’ elbow space, and controlling corruption. Research into the effect of regime type on
FDI frequently use aggregate measures of democracy that cover also the above aspects of human and
worker’s rights. To separate, two indices are used to capture the existence of democratic elections on the
one side and the constraints on the executive on the other.
Democracy as a regime type is a contested concept. Researchers for example disagree on whether the
concept is an ”either-or” phenomenon or whether democracy is a question of degree (see e.g. Przeworski
et al., 2000; Elkins, 2000; Hadenius and Teorell, 2005). In my instance a minimal definition of democracy
well captures the distinct nature of a system characterized by democratic preference aggregation through
elections. Schumpeter (1976, 269) highlights that an alternative to classic minimalist definitions of
democratic regimes is to focus is on the ”institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in
which individuals acquire the the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the peoples
vote.” The notion of Schumpeter that minimalist definitions of democracy encompass more than the
mere existence of elections, coincide well with Przeworski’s (2010, 122-4) idea of multiparty competitive
elections as a mitigator of social discontent. Additionally, a minimalist definition of democracy offers
the potential for stringent empirical measurement of the empirical issue.39
I chose minimalism because it allows me to distinguish rights protection from preference aggregation.
The measure here used to capture democratic elections (DEMOCRACY) is that based on the argument
unidimensionality, thereby also refusing previous claims that government protection for human rights is multidimensional (see
e.g. McCormick and Mitchell, 1997). A unidimensional index, naturally, is more analytically applicable as an empirical proxy
than indices with unexplainable multidimensionality.
37At this point it should be noted that an alternative data source is available through the extensive Collective Labor Rights
Dataset of Mosley (2011), based on the coding methodology of Kucera (2002). The indices in this dataset are, at the time of
writing, unfortunately temporally restricted to 2002, causing a dramatic drop of observations in my dataset. The CIRI index,
aside from arguably being an adequate proxy for labor rights upholding, was thus chosen due to superior its coverage.
38Periods of interregnum and interruption are coded as missing.
39However, the gains in reliability from avoiding subjectivity should be weighted up against the losses in validity from not
including all relevant information in the concept (Knutsen, 2011, 52-3). Both Dahl’s (1971, 3) list of institutional guarantees
and scholars focusing on the ”attributes” of democracy (see e.g. Munck and Verkuilen, 2002) represent moves from minimalism
toward conceptual width. See Knutsen (2011, 53-64) for an in-depth discussion of minimalist versus substantive understandings
of democracy, and the ”attributes” of institutions.
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in Przeworski et al. (2000), found in the Alvarez-Cheibub-Limongi-Przeworski (ACLP) dataset (Alvarez
et al., 1999). 40 A regime is defined as democratic if it passes four rules. First, the chief executive must
be elected. Second, the legislature must be elected. Third, there must exist more than one elective party.
Fourth, given that the three first rules are satisfied, regimes must allow leadership to change.41 Thus, at
least one alternation of government after the initial election must be observed before a polity is coded
as democratic (Przeworski et al., 2000, 15-30). Regimes must meet all four criterions to be coded as
democracies, whilst regimes somehow violating these rules are coded as dictatorships.
One aspect to the functional distribution of power not directly captured by this measure is the degree
to which government officials are constrained in their actions when elected.42 A lack of constraining
structures might allow incumbents to comport themselves opportunistically, whether for political or eco-
nomic purposes. To capture this feature the executive constraints (XCONST) variable from the Polity
IV dataset is applied (see Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2011). XCONST measures whether the executive
power’s freedoms to make decisions is constrained by one or more accountability groups. The proxy
is a seven-fold scale, where the lowest value (1) denotes unlimited authority of the executive, and the
highest value (7) indicates executive parity or subordination where accountability groups have authority
effectively equal to, or greater than, that of the executive power.43
Corruption is a particularly multifarious concept. Some authors have attempted to model various as-
pects associated with corruption of the state separately (see e.g. Lambsdorff, 2003), but using by indices
capturing general indices capturing bureaucratic quality, this approach is admittedly somewhat ad-hoc.
In this analysis a more holistic proxy for corruption is used – the Control of Corruption index (CCI) from
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) offered by the World Bank (see e.g. Kaufmann, Kraay and
Mastruzzi, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2010). The CCI measures “the extent to which public power is exercised
for private gains, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by
elites and private interests” (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007, 4). The World Bank uses a method-
ology consisting of identifying as many sources of data on corruption control as possible, and then uses
a statistical procedure known as “unobserved components modeling” to aggregate an individual mea-
sure of the control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2004, 258-261). Underlying data is
weighted when aggregated, the weights representing the precision of the data source. The index ranges
form approximately -2.5 to 2.5.44 The CCI is not coded for 1999 and 2001, but replacement values are
discussed in Section 3.6.2.45
40The dataset was updated by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010).
41This latter rule is somewhat controversial, but as pointed out by Przeworski et al. (2000, 27-8), this criterion is a necessary
and stringent test of democraticness as undemocratic regimes sometimes are difficult to detect until the incumbent refuses to
leave office after an elective loss.
42Although indirectly it might be so, as democratic elections allow voters to punish elected officials violating their mandate.
43Periods of interregnum and interruption are coded as missing.
44In reality it the lowest score assigned is -1.98 (North Korea, 2003) and the highest is 2.56 (Finland, 2006).
45A word of caution as regards the CCI is that it is normalized with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. As
such, they are not ideal for over-time comparisons. However, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (see e.g. 2006, 9) find no
systematic trends over time in any of the WGIs, indicating that variables such as the CCI can be used in time-series regressions.
58 CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN
Economic interaction: property rights and contracts
Institutions protecting property rights are intimately linked with political preference aggregation on the
one side, and with enforceability of contracts on the other (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005, 950-1). Nev-
ertheless, there are important differences between these concepts. Property rights protection is not only
about protection against government opportunism, but also about protection of physical property against
theft by other citizens. Although contracts may hedge actors against uncertainty in exchange, the infor-
mal contract expounding individuals’ rights to control property needs enforcement.
To capture the protection of private property, the Property Rights index (PRI) from the Heritage
Foundation is utilized.46 The fact that protection of property rights conceptually overlap with other
institutional arrangements of the state is mirrored in the subcomponents aggregated to construct this
index. The PRI is coded on the basis of multiple components: the degree to which national laws protect
private property; the degree to which those laws are enforced; the likelihood that private property will
be expropriated; the independence of the judiciary; the existence of corruption within the judiciary;
the ability of business to enforce contracts. As such, it distinctly measures at least two of my other
theoretical concepts (corruption and contract enforcement). To the best of my knowledge, this however
the most precise measurement of property rights protection freely available. The PRI itself is derived
from a variety of sources,47 and the scores vary between 100 and 0, where the higher the score, the better
protected is private property (Miller, Holmes and Feulner, 2012, 455-6).48
Contract viability as a driver of FDI has two important facets: it defines the relation between seller
and buyer in the marketplace, and it enforces this relation. The former aspect relates to MNEs ability to
repatriate profits in a situation of economic exchange. Where sellers are uncertain of whether buyers will
honor their common agreement, uncertainty premiums are subtracted from value-added calculations.
Next, an independent and trustworthy enforcement entity is necessary for contracts to be enforceable
– this is the latter aspect. Ideal measures of contract viability would capture the costs of contracting
between private citizens, and between private citizens and the state. The latter relation however is well
captured by the XCONST, and is hence left to be discussed in the context of government space for oppor-
tunism. To capture the former, measures of legal formalism – the number of legal procedures necessary
to resolve simple court cases – have been suggested (see e.g. de Silanes et al., 2003; World Bank, 2004).
However, these measures are very limited in their temporal and geographical stretch. Instead the Invest-
ment Profile index (IPI) from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) is applied to capture direct
Interpretation of the coefficients derived from these estimations should be conducted with caution though.
46See: http://www.heritage.org/index/about, for documentation and access to indices from the Heritage Foundation.
47The Economist Intelligence Unit; U.S Department of Commerce; U.S. Department of State; and a hoard of news and
magazine articles textually analyzed.
48More precisely, a score of 100 implies that ”[p]rivate property is guaranteed by the government. The court system enforces
contracts efficiently and quickly. The justice system punishes those who unlawfully confiscate private property. There is no
corruption” (Miller, Holmes and Feulner, 2012, 455), while 0 indicates that ”[p]rivate property is outlawed, and all properties
belong to the state. People do not have the rights to sue others and do not have access to the courts. Corruption is endemic”
(Miller, Holmes and Feulner, 2012, 456).
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contractual uncertainty, whilst the CIRI independence of the judiciary (INJUD) index is applied to proxy
the enforcement climate.
IPI is a forecasting measure of contract enforceability at the national level – it is applied to capture
contracting situation in the marketplace. It is an unweighted aggregation of three underlying components:
contract viability/expropriation; profits repatriation; payment delays.49 The maximum score on each sub-
indicator is 4, and the aggregate indicator varies from 0 to 12. Higher values connote low contract risk
and lower values high risk. The IPI is constructed through ICRG staff collecting information on political,
financial and economic issues, and converting them into risk points based on a consistent pattern of
evaluation. The index thus reflects coders’ subjective analysis of any given country’s contract risk.
The INJUD index is captures “the extent to which the judiciary is independent of control from other
sources, such as another branch of the government or the military” (Cingranelli and Richards, 2008,
95). It is applied to capture legal enforceability of contracts. INJUD addresses whether judges are
safe from removal by peer officials, whether the judicial officials are unencumbered by corruption and
involuntary dragooning, whether court hearings are communal, and whether the outcomes of proceedings
are safeguarded from governmental interference. It ranges from 0 to 2, where 0 indicates low judicial
independence, and 2 connotes high independence.50
Economic regulation: quality of banks and credit markets
The quality of banks and credit markets is assumed to smoothen economic transfers between principals
and subsidiaries, as well as between employers and employees. Excess government interference in bank-
ing issues might debase investor reliance on their services in fear of discriminatory treatment. Moreover,
state ownership of banks and other financial institutions might constrain availability of their services.
To capture the general ability of MNEs to budge money in foreign markets, the Investment Freedom
Index (IFI) from the Heritage Foundation is applied. The IFI is constructed with an ideal score of 100,
where points are deducted on the back of restrictions in countries’ investment regimes. The IFI deducts
scale points if: host-governments favor national companies in regulation; access to foreign exchange is
restricted; restrictions on payments, transfers, and capital transactions are imposed; certain industries
are closed to foreign investors. The IFI essentially measures the amount of regulatory “red tape” host-
countries impose on MNEs’ movement of money (Miller, Holmes and Feulner, 2012, 463-4).51
To account for the quality of banks, that is, their independence from government interference, the
Financial Freedom Index (FFI) from the Heritage Foundation is used. The FFI “is a measure of bank-
ing efficiency as well as a measure of independence from government control and interference in the
49Some might regard this construct as more a measure of property rights than an indicator of contracting environment. In
essence distinctions are thin. It is applied in to capture contracts in this context as all of its subcomponents can be argued
to capture contract viability. Keep in mind also that the IPI measures at least two of the other concepts operationalized here:
property rights protection and the opportunism aspect to political governance.
50Periods of interregnum and interruption are coded as missing.
51The IFI is derived from contextual analysis of annual reports from the the Economist Intelligence Unit; the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative; and the U.S. Department of Commerce (Miller, Holmes and Feulner, 2012, 463-4).
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financial sector” (Miller, Holmes and Feulner, 2012, 464). It has an ideal score of 100 where points are
deducted on the back of violations within five areas of regulation: the extent of government regulation
of banking services; the degree of state intervention in banks and financial institutions through direct or
indirect ownership; the extent of capital and financial market development; government influence on the
allocation of credit; the openness to foreign competition in banking. 100 connotes negligible government
interference, while 0 convey the impression of a financially repressive government.52
3.4 Control variables
Control variables are entered to remove extraneous influences obscuring the true relationship between de-
pendent and independent variable(s), and to avoid omitted variable bias. However, simply controlling for
any factor that might have independent effects on dependent outcomes and independent variables might
be erroneous itself. As noted by more than one political methodologist, parsimony of some sort should
be a guiding star when link-modeling dependent outcomes as a function of independent factors (see e.g.
Achen, 2002, 2005; Ray, 2003, 2005; Oneal and Russett, 2005). The implications for interpretation of
estimates and the closely related issue of multicollinearity are discussed in Section 3.6.1.
The below equations have a distinct modeling structure beginning with the estimation of one uniform
baseline model across all types of FDI, including the total aggregate to provide a benchmark. The
baseline model is parsimonious in that it controls for only the most frequently assumed and proven
independent non-institutional drivers of FDI, controls that theoretically are thought to affect all types
of FDI. Next, to clarify the relationships between the varieties of FDI and the institutional concepts,
sector-specific models are run. These models control for effects that are theoretically assumed to affect
particular sectors only, and thus elaborate on the baseline estimations.
Baseline model controls
The baseline model enters five control variables. Four of these are variations of so-called “gravity fac-
tors”, viz. geographical distance, market size, common language and trade closeness. Traditionally
theories of endowment-driven FDI has assumed that, given mobile factors, competitive owners allocate
their production wherever returns are maximized. The gravity model of trade departs from this simple
notion by stating that “trade between two countries is proportionate to the product of their GNPs [gross
national products] and inversely related to the distance between them, by analogy to the formula for
gravitational attraction between two masses” (Frankel, Stein and Wei, 1995, 68).53
To capture the effect of distance, a bilateral measure of the average distances between source-
host-country dyads is applied (DIST) (Mayer and Zignago, 2006).54 The effect of distance on FDI
52The FFI is based on country reports from the Economist Intelligence Unit; the IMF; the OECD; the U.S. Department of
Commerce; the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative; the U.S. Department of State; the World Bank; as well as various news
and magazine articles (Miller, Holmes and Feulner, 2012, 465).
53Variations of the gravity model has also been widely used to explain FDI (see e.g. Wei, 2000; Stein and Daude, 2002;
Daude, Yeyati and Stein, 2003; Mody, Razin and Sadka, 2003; Be´nassy-Que´re´, Coupet and Mayer, 2007).
54Documentation and access to data from Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Nationales (CEPII) to be found at:
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arguably depends on the type of FDI. For MNEs seeking to supply the host market such as those in
services – the longer the distance the more costly transactions between principal and subsidiary becomes
(Barba Navaretti, Venables and Barry, 2004, 33). The virtual non-tradability of services makes such
difficult to supply abroad in any other way than by producing them on-location. Market-seeking man-
ufacturers on the other hand more often produce goods that are tradable, and therefore the effect of
distance should be the opposite of that on service supplying. The further away a target market is, the
more likely it is that supplying it through on-location production is be cheaper than transporting it there
(see e.g. Brainard, 1997). Distance might also be important for natural resource MNEs as they depend
on access to export hubs to supply crude products to markets or processing facilities. However, such
infrastructure is often supplied by MNEs themselves.55 Distances are logged to correct for skewness.
Market size (MARKET), of which a valid proxy is gross domestic product (GDP), is probably the
most empirically robust predictor of FDI (Chakrabarti, 2001, 96).56 Data from the World Development
Indicators (WDI) on GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) is utilized.57 Market size is ex-
pected to have a positive effect on FDI for both manufacturing and services FDI as the larger the host the
more extensive the market potential. A thriving marketplace allows market-seeking MNEs to capitalize
on economies of scale revenues. Moreover, higher GDP often also implies larger and more diversified
factor markets. For less integrated natural resource FDI the relationship is less clear-cut. However, GDP
captures general aspects of economic development that should affect most investors. Prosperous mar-
kets should for example more often than not have well-functioning institutional systems. The variable is
logged to account for skewness, and lagged to account for potential reciprocal effects.
The gravity factor that is common language captures cultural commonality and similarity in struc-
tures such as legal systems affect FDI allocation (see e.g. Globerman and Shapiro, 2003). Two dummies
are used to capture this commonality. The first indicates whether a country is Nordic (NORDIC), and the
second whether a country is one of the 15 initial European Union (EU) member states (EU15). As regards
NORDIC, although this variable captures two countries with languages incomprehensible to Scandina-
vians (Finnish and Icelandic), it should capture an important aspect of distance’s gravity effect: historical
business ties.58 Two theoretical contributions underpin this claim: “The Uppsala Model” emphasizing
cultural and psychological closeness (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977); and the “Linking-Leverage-Learning”
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
55Additionally, due to the path-dependency of institutional development (see e.g. Levi, 1997; Pierson, 2000), it might be that
the further away from the host-country MNEs venture, the more likely it is that institutional settings have developed differently
to those in the MNE’s home-country. Institutional distance in turn may affect the transfer of intangibles between principal and
subsidiary and potentially reduce profitability of the investment (see e.g. Kostova, 1999; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Kostova
and Roth, 2002). In Norway’s case, it might be that institutional quality deteriorates the further away a host-country is, biasing
investments in countries that are located geographically closer.
56Note that Chakrabarti (2001) uses GDP per capita, but this measure is here applied in sector-specific models to capture
income levels, in line with the modelling of Blanton and Blanton (2009, 482).
57Access all the WDI data at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
58Writings in International Business literature frequently point out how institutional proximity at the level of the firm might
affect both the location of affiliates and the affiliates motivation to operate productively (Kostova, 1999; Kostova and Zaheer,
1999; Kostova and Roth, 2002).
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approach of Mathews (2002). To Norwegian MNEs, relative newcomers to FDI, the commonality of
dealing with Nordic peers is likely to represent a significant uncertainty-decreasing pull factor.
The EU15 dummy is entered to control effects stemming from closeness of trade. Hveem, Knutsen
and Rygh (2008a, 13) argue against controlling for Eastern European newcomers when using time se-
ries from 1998 to 2006 only. Had the assumption been that Norwegian MNEs anticipated these states’
inclusion in the EU anterior to inclusion, a control would have been justified. Assuming they did not,
new EU members are excluded. The dummy is expected to affect all Norwegian FDI positively as EU
is Norway’s main trading partner, and since Norway is a member of the Single Market Act under the
European Economic Community , the promotion of free capital flow between member countries should
pull Norwegian FDI into the European Economic Area.
In addition to the four gravity factors, physical infrastructure (INFRASTR), proxied by the number
of internet users per 100 inhabitants from WDI, is entered in the belief that infrstructure has a facilitating
effect on all business (Chakrabarti, 2001, 101).59 As such, INFRASTR should affect all types of FDI
positively, but perhaps services the most as such is more information intensive than the two other sectors.
The measure is lagged one year to avoid reciprocity problems.
Sector-specific controls
The sector-specific models include controls assumed to affect MNEs in particular sectors. Natural re-
source FDI is assumed to be most constrained in the actual choice of investment location, mainly due
to the basic need for resources to extract (Cohen, 2007, 66). Although natural resources also encompass
non-petroleum related activities such as fish farming and cash cropping, extraction of oil and gas is by far
the dominant activity (see Table 3.1). As advocated by Knutsen, Rygh and Hveem (2011, 18) a variable
measuring resource endowments in kilotons of oil equivalents (ENERGY) from the WDI is entered to
clarify the effect of institutions on natural resource FDI. ENERGY is logged to correct for skewness.
Manufacturing FDI can be thought to vary with income, openness to trade and the level of human
capital, in addition to the baseline controls. Average income (INCOME) is proxied by PPP adjusted
GDP per capita in current US dollars from the WDIs. Higher average income reflect better investment
opportunities as it implies higher consumer demand. On a different note, higher income may imply
higher labor costs. To the degree that manufacturing production is efficiency-seeking and thus hiring
locally, it should care for wage costs to minimize its production expenditures (Dunning and Lundan,
2008, 104-5). INCOME is logged to correct for skewness and lagged to correct for potential reciprocity.
Openness to trade, another a gravity factor, is proxied by exports plus imports as a share of GDP at
constant 1990 prices (OPEN), from the United Nations Statistics Division National Accounts (UNNA).60
59Corroborated by Moosa and Cardak (2006) and Ali, Fiess and MacDonald (2010), although with a different measures of
infrastructure: telephone lines per 1000 inhabitants. Their’s is arguably a more pure measure of infrastructure as it is not biased
by whether the general population is educated enough to use internet. However, it is very constrained in its coverage, so to
maximize utilized variation the described proxy is applied instead.
60Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashamova (1998, 1302) differ between degree of openness to FDI and general openness to capital
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Trade openness is a fairly common control in locational FDI research, and is interpreted as a quantifica-
tion of restrictions on trade.61 The effect of trade openness might run two ways: to the degree that man-
ufacturing FDI is export platform-driven, trade restrictions is a hindrance to profits from re-exportation.
If the manufacturing MNE supplies the host-market, high trade restrictions might facilitate FDI relative
to arms-length trade.62 OPEN is logged to correct for skewness and lagged to avoid reciprocity.
Human capital (HUMCAP) is proxied by entering a variable measuring the average years of educa-
tion for individuals over the age of 25 in populations as a whole, supplied by Institute for Health Metrics
and Evaluation (IHME).63 Human capital is admittedly one of the most important factors of production.
Higher levels of education should affect decisions on where MNEs conduct their foreign production pos-
itively given that local labor is employed. Those most lenient to integrate their production in local labor
markets, that is manufacturing and to a certain degree services, should be more likely to depend on high
local skill levels. Manufacturing production can however be efficiency-seeking and therefore valuing
low labor costs, often associated with production in the developing world (see e.g. Schneider and Frey,
1985), where skills are endemically low, and in turn create lower wage demands.64
FDI in services, in addition to the effect of the baseline controls, and the income and human capi-
tal variables used to explain manufacturing FDI, might be affected by two additional factors. The first,
capital density, should matter, although arguments are indeterminate as to how. Authors such as Solow
(1956) hypothesize that high levels of capital stocks in countries, all else equal, reduces the marginal re-
turns on investment and as such impede FDI. The opposite argument, posed by amongst others Krugman
(1991), is that investments have a multiplicative ”crowding-in” effect on other investments. The idea is
that investments are complementary, whereby capital density facilitate FDI. Capital density (DENISTY)
is proxied by using the ratio of investment to GDP from the Penn World Tables (PWT) (Heston, Summers
and Aten, 2011).65 DENSITY is lagged to account for reciprocal effects.
FDI in services have also been found to accompany their clients abroad, often manufacturing in-
dustries. Although the question of causality is tricky, the logic of the argument is that controlling for
manufacturing FDI may “provide evidence on the progression of the agglomeration process identified
by studies showing that aggregate FDI is positively related to lagged FDI” (Kolstad and Villanger, 2008,
524).66 As such the last sector-specific control entered is simply the Norwegian manufacturing FDI
stock (labelled Manufacturing FDI). This variable should have a positive effect on services FDI, and is
flows when conducting this control. For reasons of parsimony only a single measure is applied here, although restrictions on
currency convertibility such as laws controlling foreign exchange are likely to deter FDI.
61See for example: Asiedu (2002); Blanton and Blanton (2007, 2009); Busse and Hefeker (2007).
62This is what has been labelled the “tariff jumping” hypothesis (see e.g. Bloningen, 2000).
63The variable is computed as the unweighted average of female and male education percentages over 25. Documentation
and access to the data to be found at: http://www.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/. It should be noted that authors controlling
for the effect of human capital on FDI allocation often use data on enrollment rates from the WDI (see e.g. Knutsen, Rygh and
Hveem, 2011). The superior data coverage of the IHME measures is the main reason they were chosen.
64“[A] natural consequence of the abundance of labor will be its low price” (Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youssef, 2001, 1598).
65For data and documentation, see: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php site/pwt index.php.
66See for example: Singh and Jun (1995); Lipsey (1999); Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youssef (2001).
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logsquared as it is when applied as dependent variable to account for skewness, and lagged one year.
3.4.1 Operationalizations summed up
Table 3.3 sums up all operationalizations. The expected signs of the independent and control variables
on the variations of FDI are added.67 To assess whether the ten independent variables actually measure
different underlying dimensions, an exploratory principal component analysis (PCA) was applied.68 The
uniqueness of the variables, that is, the variance they do not share with other variables, is what is of
interest to us. DEMOC and XCONST were the two constructs with the lowest unique variation (0.1455
and 0.1326 respectively), with the CCI and the PRI following (0.2113 and 0.2313 respectively). The
reason probably is that these two sets of variables are the pairs with the highest bivariate correlations
(see Table A.2) This is only logical as they are entered to capture the same institutional categories. The
six other variables had unique variation of 0.3 or more. There thus seems to be large degrees of overlap in
constructs, but it could still be argued that they are capable of yielding substantial individual information
when entered sequentially. Multicollinearity is discussed in Section 3.6.1.
Table 3.3: Concepts, associated variables, and expected effects
Expected effects
Variable type Concept Variable Source NRFDI MFDI SFDI
Independent Human rights protection PHYSINT CIRI + + +
variables Labor standards upholding WORKER CIRI + +
Political pref. aggregation 1 DEMOCRACY ACLP + + +
Political pref. aggregation 2 XCONST Polity IV + + +
Control of Corruption CCI WGI + +
Property rights protection PRI Heritage + + +
Contract enforceability 1 IPI ICRG + +
Contract enforceability 2 INJUD CIRI + +
Movement of money IFI Heritage + +
Credit and bank quality FFI Heritage + +
Baseline Market size MARKET WDI + + +
controls Geographical distance DIST CEPII +/- -
Commonality 1 NORDIC - + + +
Commonality 2 EU15 - + + +
Infrastructure INFRASTR WDI + + +
Sector- Resource endowments ENERGY WDI +
specific Income INCOME WDI +/- +
controls Openness to trade OPEN UNNA +
Human capital HUMCAP IHME +/- +
Capital density DENISTY PWT +
Manufacturing FDI Manufacturing FDI SSB +
NRFDI = natural resource FDI; MFDI = manufacturing FDI; SFDI = services FDI. Expected effects for the institutional
variables are the same as those in Table 2.5. Expectations sometimes depend on sector, and is as such connoted with +/-.
67See Table A.2 for descriptive statistics, and Table A.1 for independent variable coverage (year 2006), both in Appendix A.
68”Principal component analysis (PCA) is a multivariate technique that analyzes a data table in which observations are
described by several inter-correlated quantitative dependent variables. Its goal is to extract the important information from the
table, to represent it as a set of new orthogonal variables called principal components, and to display the pattern of similarity of
the observations and of the variables as points in maps” (Abdi and Williams, 2010, 433).
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3.5 Statistical model: OLS with PCSE
Choosing the statistical model that is most appropriate for the data at hand is paramount when inves-
tigating social problems quantitatively. The nature of the Norwegian FDI data series and the inherent
characteristics of institutions should therefore both affect the choice of regression model. The particular
estimation technique applied is ordinary least squares regression with panel-corrected standard errors
(OLS PCSE) (see e.g. Beck and Katz, 1995).69
Before explaining the nature of OLS PCSE models, note that many political scientist prefer fixed
effects (FE) models when working with panel data. This because estimating country FEs may correct
non-observable, exogenous factors that affect both dependent and independent variables. What FE does
is incorporating dummies for all panel-units, effectively excluding cross-sectoral variation from the equa-
tion. Intra-variable variation is used to predict changes in the dependent outcome. The advantage of FE
estimates is that they are less susceptible to bias due to omitted subject level covariates (Rabe-Hesketh
and Skrondal, 2008, 189). The risk however is that valuable information goes to waste, increasing chance
of committing Type II errors.70 This is especially so when independent variables, like institutional con-
cepts, are inherently inert (see e.g. Beck and Katz, 2001). Using institutions as explanatory variables
leaves little intra-variable variation to explain FDI, a problem exacerbated by the short time series ap-
plied. 1998 to 2006 yields only 9 temporal points of observation. Beck and Katz (1995) highlight that
OLS with PCSE is the appropriate method with relatively many units of observation and relatively few
observation points in time, and is therefore considered the ad rem method of analysis.
As regards the assumptions in the standard OLS model, panel-correcting standard errors correct
some of the violations panel data commit. More precisely, the assumptions that disturbance terms should
have the same variance and be uncorrelated (Kennedy, 2003, 48-9).71 The initial violation of these
assumptions result in the problems of heteroskedastisity and autocorrelation. The former implying that
disturbances do not have the same variances, and the latter that disturbance terms are correlated, meaning
that a country’s FDI stock in year t is positively correlated with its FDI stock in year t +1. The fact that
the same stocks over time are dependent on each other should be evident to most observers.
Simply put, OLS PCSE-models use differences in X and differences in Y to make inferences re-
gardless of whether differences are observed along within-unit dimensions of time or across units in
equal time-points (Knutsen, 2011, 166).72 Aside from methodological reasons, using OLS with PCSE is
69See also: Beck (2001a) and Beck (2001b).
70Type II errors means failing to make true inferences on existent relationships (Skog, 2004, 103).
71The other assumptions are: that the dependent variable is calculable as a linear function of an assemblage of independent
regressors and an error term; that the anticipated value of the error term is zero; that observations on the independent variable can
be considered fixed in repeat samples; and, that there are more observations than regressors and that no exact linear relationship
exist between those regressors (Kennedy, 2003, 41-2).
72Meaning that Indonesia’s low level of corruption control in 1998 and its corresponding low levels of FDI together with
Great Britain’s high control of corruption and high levels of FDI the same year is used to make inferences on corruption control’s
effect on FDI allocation, as is the juxtaposition of information from Indonesia in 1998 and Indonesia in 2006.
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advantageous as estimated coefficients are easier to interpret. The basic econometric link function is:
Yi,t = β0 +β1X1i,t + ...+βnXni,t + εi,t (3.3)
where Y connotes the dependent outcome, the subscripts i and t refer to cross section units (countries),
and to the temporal points (years), β0 is an intercept, and β1−n are the slope coefficients of variables
X1-Xn. ε is the error term capturing unobserved scalar variables. The baseline model becomes:
lnsq(FDI)i,t = β0 +β1INSTi,t +β2ln(DIST )i +β3ln(MARKET )i,t−1 +β4EU15i +
β5NORDICi +β6INFRAST Ri,t−1 + εi,t (3.4)
where lnsq(FDI) is the logsquared FDI measures, INST i,t refers to the institutional outcomes measures,
ln(MARKET)i,t−1 is market size lagged and logged, ln(DIST)i refers to the constant natural logarithm of
bilateral dyadic distances, NORDICi is a dummy indicating Nordicness, and EU15i is a dummy indicat-
ing initial EU membership. The sector-specific models become:
lnsq(NRFDI)i,t = β0 +β1INSTi,t +β2ln(DIST )i +β3ln(MARKET )i,t−1 +β4EU15i +
β5NORDICi +β6INFRAST Ri,t +β7ln(ENERGY )i,t + εi,t (3.5)
lnsq(MFDI)i,t = β0 +β1INSTi,t +β2ln(DIST )i +β3ln(MARKET )i,t−1 +β4EU15i +
β5NORDICi +β6INFRAST Ri,t +β6ln(INCOME)i,t−1 +β7HUMCAPi,t−1 +
β8ln(OPEN)i,t−1 + εi,t (3.6)
lnsq(SFDI)i,t = β0 +β1INSTi,t +β2ln(DIST )i +β3ln(MARKET )i,t−1 +β4EU15i +
β5NORDICi +β6INFRAST Ri,t +β6ln(INCOME)i,t−1 +β7HUMCAPi,t−1 +
β8ln(DENSITY )i,t−1 +β9lnsq(MFDI)i,t + εi,t (3.7)
where NRFDI, MRFD, and SFDI captures the sectoral FDI stocks. ln(ENERGY)i,t in Equation 3.5
is natural resource endowments as gauged by kilotons of oil equivalents logged. The two variables
ln(INCOME)i,t−1 and HUMCAPi,t in Equations 3.6 and 3.7 are the lagged and logged measures of av-
erage income and human capital, respectively. ln(OPEN)i,t−1 in Equation 3.6 is the lagged and logged
measure trade openness, while ln(DENSITY)i,t−1 and lnsq(MFDI)i,t in Equation 3.7 are capital density
lagged and logged, and Norwegian manufacturing FDI lagged and logsquared, respectively.
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3.6 Statistical issues
Before discussing the results from the empirical analysis some key statistical issues are touched upon:
multicollinearity and interpretation of estimated effects; missing values; bi-directional causality.
3.6.1 Multicolinearity and interpretation of effects
When investigating effects of multiple institutional concepts, the inherent overlapping nature of such
should be dealt with. The reason this problem needs attention is methodological, but the problem is
highly substantial. The deep-rooted complementarity of institutional evolution (see e.g. North, 1990;
Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006b) might lead to high statistical
correlation between pairs of institutional constructs. The problem arising if a dependent variable is re-
gressed upon multiple highly correlated constructs simultaneously is that of multicollinearity, a condition
of approximate linear relationships between two or more of the explanatory variables.73 It might lead to
inflated standard errors and in turn changing slope coefficients of identical constructs between models
because estimation procedures cannot detect enough independent variation in the regressors to estimate
nonaligned effects on the regressand (Kennedy, 2003, 193). The problem is exacerbated by the fact that
exact and definite metrics of institutions separating between sub-construct are scarce.
Another issue complicating the interpretation of results are the complex and unsettled relationships
between independent and dependent variables. Linear models like the OLS PCSE use what is known as
a “link function” to connect independent variables to a dependent outcome, where “explanatory factors
are postulated to exert their influence through one or more parameters” (Achen, 2005, 328). Without
estimating multi-equation systems with defined causal hierarchies (see e.g. Ray, 2003), the slope coef-
ficients from link-based techniques can only be interpreted as direct effects, regardless of whether the
variable of interest might affect the dependent variable through some other variable in the model.
The correlation table (Table A.3) in Appendix A lists the bivariate correlations between my ten
institutional constructs. Given a fairly lenient criterion of maximum bivariate correlations of 0.7 (Skog,
2004, 288), there are few constructs that correlate problematically.74 Entering more than maximum three
of these in the same model would however prove difficult.75 What is more, throwing everything but the
kitchen sink in equations might control away important effects, not simply reduce omitted variable bias.76
The main effort of this thesis being to explore The Varieties of FDI expectations, and thus the relative
importance of institutions is assessed through sequential modeling. This approach yields information
on the effect of the desired set of institutional concepts one-by-one, and arguably circumvents potential
problems associated with mutlicollinearity at the same time. However, it is a simplified way of assessing
73Multicollinearity is a frequent source of indeterminate research design (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, 122-3).
74Bolded in Table A.3.
75Preliminary analysis revealed that both standard errors and slope coefficients in almost all models presented below were
highly sensitive to multiple-institutions specifications.
76See for example Clarke (2005) for a thorough discussion of omitted variable biases.
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the relative importance of institutions, and as such should be elaborated on in future research.
3.6.2 Missing values
It is quite common that social sciences data miss values on certain observations. Missing values might
in some instance be ignorable in the sense that they do not affect the efficiency of the estimation. When
observing panel data on the other hand important efficiency losses are frequently incurred due to the
normal way of dealing with it. A missing on one observation in a row of data points is usually tackled
by listwise deleting that entire row from the sample – in effect eliminating non-missing information.
Many indices of institutional concepts are indeed limited in their coverage, and if the missing structure is
systematic this might become problematic. For example, large and relatively prosperous countries tend
to be more transparent as to the well-function of their state, in turn yielding more information to base
index scores on.77 Moreover, developed countries also tend to have more stringent reporting procedures,
another potential source to bias in favor of such countries.
There are multiple ways in which replacement values can be constructed, and in general little is
known about the properties of estimators based on predicted values made to fill in data gaps (Greene,
2003, 59). As regards the independent variables, my first endeavor to mitigate missing biases was to
search for those constructs with the broadest possible coverage, while still capturing relevant latent con-
cepts.78 As regards the remaining missing values, one specific replacement method advised by Honaker
and King (2010) and Honaker, King and Blackwell (2011), the Amelia II imputation program is, use a
multiple imputation method based on all systematic variation in ones dataset to construct replacement
values where missing. For the Amelia II imputation method to function, the algorithm needs a certain
degree of over-time systematic variation to converge. When running various specifications of the time-
series imputative procedure on my dataset, Amelia II repeatedly failed to converge, probably due to a
problem of too many degrees of freedom stemming from the short time-series.
I therefore resorted to using basic linear interpolation on the one independent variable that seriously
constrained my sample when entered: the CCI. Up until 2002 WGI only coded CCI bi-annualy, which
mean that for relevant equations, all information from the years 1999 and 2001 would have been listwise




for the cases where missing values actually have both preceding and succeeding values.80 All other
77E.g. XCONST, only scored for the 162 most populous contemporary countries (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2011, 4).
78As can bee seen throughout the operationalizations, frequently used measures were discarded due to poor data coverage.
79The un-interpolated CCI exhibits a within-country variation of at most -0.93 to 1.08, with a standard deviation of only 0.20,
as measured by using the command xtsum wbgi cce, i(countries id) in STATA (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008, 181-2), an
indication the the inert nature of institutions creates little over-time variation and makes linear interpolation more feasible.
80Had the interpolated dataset yielded radically different results from thew the original set, one would have had to discuss
the actual gain in inferring upon constructed data. However, testing of the below models of corruption control and FDI with
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missing cases are treated by listwise deletion, and therefore N varies somewhat across models estimated.
There are also normally missing problems in FDI data (Dunning and Lundan, 2008, 12-5). SSB
however codes missing at the affiliate level as if there were no FDI in these affiliates (Hveem, Knutsen
and Rygh, 2008c, 33). Country-years where data is missing is thus reported as zero-positions in the
dataset.81 In some cases this might of course be factual. Certain countries probably had no Norwegian
FDI in certain country-years. SSB claims to alleviate the missing problem of non-reported equity by
filling in information from alternative sources like companies’ annual reports, but it is possible that some
of the zero-denoted country-years indeed had FDI Norwegian FDI not reported to SSB. As there is little
the author can do about this, analysis proceeds without inquiring further into the problem.
3.6.3 Endogeneity
The possibility of bi-directional causality in the institutions-FDI relationship has led to an increased ap-
plication of alternative regression methods accounting for reciprocity.82 The idea is that once MNEs sink
equity into a host-country, they might become constituents demanding institutional upgrading, creating
a feedback effect from increased investment on institutional performance.83 Moreover, a potential sub-
jectivity bias might arise from experts reporting better scores on institutions where high levels of FDI
is observed – after all, should the notion of institutions as drivers of FDI hold, high levels of FDI is
necessarily a good indicator of sound institutions.
One of the advantages of using data from one single source-country is that the FDI-to-host-country-
GDP-ratios becomes moderate. Even in cases such as Angola and Azerbaijan where Norwegian FDI is
modestly high relative to GDP, the endogenous effect is probably small due to substitution options for
the hosts. Both Angola’s and Azerbaijan’s Exchequers are heavily dependent on realization of petroleum
rents, and it is not far-fetched to assume that other petroleum MNEs had offered their expertise had
not Norwegian MNEs (Hveem, Knutsen and Rygh, 2008a, 5). Endogeneity in the institutions-FDI rela-
tionship is therefore assumed to not be a very large problem in the empirical analysis. As the possible
reciprocity of FDI on independent variables was discussed in Section 3.3, and control variables though
to affect policy climates were lagged when neccesary, no further discussion is conducted here.
both the interpolated and un-interpolated versions of CCI revealed that results were the close to the same across all models
regardless of variable application. The interpolated measure does thus not create conclusions based on constructed data, while
including substantively more real data in the CCI regressions.
81There are in fact quite a few country years in each sector with no FDI reported. For total FDI, there are 745 occurrences
of zero in 2255 country-years, in natural resources FDI there are 1314 occurrences, there are 1066 zero country-years in
manufacturing FDI, and 844 occurrences in services FDI.
82See for example: Letnes (2002) for the effect of FDI on human rights, and Robertson and Teitelbaum (2011) for the effect of
FDI on labor protest and regime type. The econometric method most frequently used to address these endogenous relationships
is “instrumental variable analysis”, see: Blanton and Blanton (2007); Daude and Stein (2007) for applied examples.
83Consider for example the “resource curse”-assumption that realization of resource rents gives autocrats the sufficient funds
to successfully hold on to its power (see e.g. Ross, 1999). As autocrats rarely are in possession of the necessary technologies
to extract their sub-ground dwellings, MNEs might effectively contribute to autocrats retaining their political power through
realizing the his or her resource rents. In the case of Angola for example, le Billon (2001) goes far in concluding that MNEs
extracting oil and diamonds have affected the legitimacy of government and economy.
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3.7 Summary
This section has set the premises for the empirical analysis in Chapter 4. After arguing that quantitative
analysis is the proper approach to assess the issue-area, the dependent variables were discussed at length.
Standard measurement issues in FDI data and potential biases in the Norwegian FDI data were touched
upon. Next, the institutional concepts presented in Chapter 2 were operationalized. Some concepts were
argued to be best captured with two indicators. The appropriateness of each indicator was discussed in
light of existing theoretical understandings of the latent concepts, and it was highlighted how measures
capturing de facto policy climates are favored. Control variables were discussed in turn, again based on
theory linking each concept to both FDI and institutional performance. A set of baseline controls were
presented to be assessed in all regressions, and certain controls were restricted to one or two sectors
only. It was argued that OLS with PCSE is the econometric model best fitted to assess the data at hand,
before solutions to statistical issues such as multicollinearity, interpretation of effects, missing values,
and endogenous relationships were touched upon.
Chapter 4
Empirical results
To see the whole elephant in front of you is a necessary but not sufficient means to achieve
an adequate understanding of the full range of characteristics and behavior of an entity that
exists in multiple forms.
– Stephen D. Cohen, Multinational Corporations and Foreign Direct Investment, (2007,
16-17)
Truly among man’s innovations, the use of organization to accomplish his ends is among
both his greatest and his earliest.
– Kenneth J. Arrow, Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing (1971, 224)
This chapter presents the results from analyzing The Varieties of FDI expectations presented in chapter 2,
based on the research design outlined in chapter 3. It is an attempt to see the whole elephant that is FDI.
It starts off by explaining the logic of the empirical analysis, before discussing some bivariate relations,
the comparable baseline model, and the sector-specific models. Before reporting the results from a set
of robustness checks, it substantiates the findings from the sector-specific models. At last, the various
effects found of man’s organization of society found on the varieties of investor behavior is summarized.
4.1 The logic of the empirical analysis
Since this exercise is an inquiry into the variations of investor behavior, focus in the analysis is on
whether differing empirical relationships across sectors exist. Exploring the actual existence of divergent
relationships thus precedes in-depth quest for explanatory power at this level of analysis. The assump-
tions developed within The Variety of FDI framework will be discarded or confirmed, and where plausible
explanations for divergence from expectations can be identified, these are discussed.
Three steps of analysis is presented. First, as an introduction, the results from bivariate regressions
of the institutional concepts and the varieties of FDI is accounted for, using OLS PCSE models. Next,
the three sectoral stocks of FDI and the total FDI aggregate is regressed upon the baseline model, with
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institutional concepts entered sequentially. This to investigate the varieties of relationships in a compara-
ble environment. The sensitivity of estimates across sectors and for total FDI numbers are also assessed
here. Since the purpose of the baseline discussion is to shed light on whether there are any differences
across sectors, benchmarking effects of the same variables across types of FDI is the focus when inter-
preting. Finally, effects are clarified through applying sector-specific controls in models regressing the
three varieties of FDI. Here, the estimated relationships are discussed in light of the arguments at base in
The Varieties of FDI framework. To substantiate effects, the estimated maximum effects are presented.
4.2 Bivariate relationships
The bivariate relationships in Table 4.1 indicate that there seems to be something about the institutional
concepts that affect all types of FDI. Results are uniformly positive with high levels of significance for
all indicators of political governance, economic interaction, and economic regulation.
Table 4.1: Bivariate models – Institutional concepts and FDI across sectors
Personal freedoms Political governance Economic interaction Economic regulation
PHYSINT WORKER DEMOC XCONST CCI PRI IPI INJUD FFI IFI
TFDI 0.0632 0.235 2.717∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 2.926∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗ 1.071∗∗∗ 0.0603∗∗∗ 0.0667∗∗∗
(0.0815) (0.213) (0.514) (0.126) (0.189) (0.0119) (0.113) (0.268) (0.0115) (0.0129)
NRFDI 0.188∗ 0.438∗ 1.894∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 2.484∗∗∗ 0.0812∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗ 0.0439∗∗∗ 0.0434∗∗
(0.0844) (0.217) (0.540) (0.126) (0.200) (0.0118) (0.121) (0.264) (0.0109) (0.0132)
MFDI 0.103 0.554∗∗∗ 2.228∗∗∗ 0.937∗∗∗ 3.379∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 1.370∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗ 0.0818∗∗∗
(0.0704) (0.162) (0.517) (0.113) (0.171) (0.0113) (0.109) (0.233) (0.0105) (0.0109)
SFDI 0.189∗ 0.404∗ 2.121∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 2.579∗∗∗ 0.0977∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗ 1.064∗∗∗ 0.0642∗∗∗ 0.0562∗∗∗
(0.0768) (0.193) (0.476) (0.123) (0.200) (0.0118) (0.111) (0.239) (0.0104) (0.0129)
Observations 1552 1555 1677 1369 1312 1380 1196 1679 1380 1380
Countries 190 190 190 160 190 161 136 190 161 161
Cell values are slope coefficients of institutional concepts connoted in the top row, with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are
lnsq(FDI stock) in all models. TFDI = total FDI, NRFDI = natural resources, MFDI = manufacturing, and SFDI = services. Coefficient represents bivariate relation-
ships. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
The only category of variables displaying ambiguity is personal freedoms. While rises in neither
human rights protection nor labor standards upholding seems to be accompanied by increases in total
FDI, the disaggregated numbers show a more detailed picture. The politico-economic climate related
to human rights protection has positive effects on natural resource FDI and FDI in services at 5 percent
levels, coefficients estimated to be a little under 0.2, implying that a one point upwards change on the
PHYSINT scale is associated with 0.2 percent increase in lnsq(NRFDI) and lnsq(SFDI). Host-country
contexts associated with well-protected worker’s rights affect all varieties of FDI positively, although
predicted both stronger and more significant in the case of manufacturing (0.554, at the 1 percent level)
than for natural resource FDI and services FDI (0.438 and 0.404 respectively, both at 5 percent levels).
Given the assumption that manufacturers employ more locally this makes sense.
4.3. BASELINE DISCUSSION 73
What this basic level of analysis tells us is twofold. First of all, and related to this thesis’ motivation,
the estimates from the personal freedom components indicate that aggregate numbers of FDI might
blur the real effects that are at play when FDI is conducted. The mere fact that neither of the two
freedoms components exhibit any significant relation to total FDI, but in different forms show relations
to the disaggregates is intriguing. Second, estimates indicate that there is something about the contextual
outcomes associated with sound institutions that attract FDI. The task of the hereinafter analysis is to
clarify whether these relationships hold when taking non-institutional factors into account.
4.3 Baseline discussion
Table 4.2 presents the results from regressing the aggregate total of Norwegian FDI on the baseline-model
specified in Section 3.5.1 This is the level of data normally assessed and, depending on specification and
choice of model, some variation of these relationships is what conclusions would have been drawn upon.
Consider first the baseline controls. On the balance, all controls except the dyadic distances measure
are significant, regardless of institutional concept applied. Having a large home market, being Nordic,
being one of the initial 15 EU countries, and having developed well-functioning infrastructure should
significantly increase the chances of garnering FDI. Why then does distance exhibit ambiguity? One
explanation, as discussed in Section 3.4, is that while services should be negatively affected by distance as
transaction costs increase, distance for manufacturers, to the extent that they are seeking markets, might
increase the chance of production internationalization through in-market supply of goods. Exporting
goods across long distances is expensive. Given that the two separate effects of distance pull in different
directions, estimation based on collapsed numbers might create a mutual countervailing of effects.
Moving on to the institutional variables, there are four significant relationships confirmed, (bolded
in the table). First, the point estimate of the political governance component DEMOC is significant
at the 5 percent level. Having an electoral system that choses its leaders democratically increases the
general chances of inbound FDI. The corruption component CCI is also significant at the 5 percent level.
Corruption then, on the balance, seems to work more as a “grabbing” than as a “helping hand” for MNEs
(remember the two stands of Leff (1964), and Nye (1967) respectively). A coefficient estimated at 0.906
implies that a move from the level of corruption observed in Bangladesh in the year 2000 (≈ −1.0 on
the CCI scale) to that of Canada in the same year (≈ 2.0), all else equal between the two countries,
is estimated to be associated with a 2.7 percent upwards change in inbound lnsq(TFDI).2 None of the
personal freedoms components are significant at any levels, neither are the FFI and IFI components of
economic regulation. Two of the variables related to the facilitation of economic interaction are however
1In the total FDI aggregate stock the miscellaneous industry from Table 3.1 is also included.
2Estimated in this manner: 0.906∗3 = 2.718. The change estimated to be incurred by full-scale transitions for all the sector-
level models are reported and discussed in Table 4.8 in Section 4.4.4. Due to the extensiveness of this analysis, the logsquares
are not anti-logged to estimate the summed FDI gain predicted from independent variables. Moreover, it could be argued that
such simulations are rather semantic endeavors.
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Table 4.2: Baseline models – Total FDI and institutional concepts





















ln(DIST) -0.224 -0.274 -0.225 -0.140 -0.244 -0.209 -0.333 -0.308 -0.131 -0.145
(0.436) (0.438) (0.440) (0.468) (0.450) (0.466) (0.513) (0.446) (0.470) (0.465)
ln(MARKET)t−1 1.790∗∗∗ 1.746∗∗∗ 1.765∗∗∗ 1.933∗∗∗ 1.749∗∗∗ 1.859∗∗∗ 1.798∗∗∗ 1.799∗∗∗ 1.908∗∗∗ 1.909∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.110) (0.111) (0.154) (0.116) (0.152) (0.181) (0.110) (0.145) (0.143)
NORDIC 2.385∗∗∗ 2.314∗∗∗ 2.519∗∗∗ 2.766∗∗∗ 2.119∗∗ 2.524∗∗∗ 2.766∗∗∗ 2.535∗∗∗ 2.724∗∗∗ 2.654∗∗∗
(0.692) (0.702) (0.690) (0.744) (0.724) (0.727) (0.764) (0.685) (0.736) (0.743)
EU15 2.768∗∗ 3.103∗∗∗ 2.689∗∗ 2.253∗ 2.001+ 1.986∗ 2.570∗ 2.462∗ 2.695∗∗ 2.713∗∗
(0.929) (0.912) (0.934) (1.014) (1.060) (0.994) (1.025) (0.968) (0.961) (0.971)
INFRASTRt−1 0.0508∗∗∗ 0.0537∗∗∗ 0.0467∗∗ 0.0507∗∗ 0.0324∗ 0.0431∗∗ 0.0393∗ 0.0449∗∗ 0.0495∗∗ 0.0538∗∗∗
(0.0153) (0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0167) (0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0167) (0.0150) (0.0157) (0.0160)
Constant -35.33∗∗∗ -33.24∗∗∗ -34.81∗∗∗ -39.38∗∗∗ -33.37∗∗∗ -38.10∗∗∗ -34.87∗∗∗ -34.93∗∗∗ -39.17∗∗∗ -38.72∗∗∗
(4.569) (4.516) (4.555) (4.782) (4.793) (4.771) (5.384) (4.547) (4.744) (4.779)
Observations 1338 1341 1415 1223 1413 1243 1084 1415 1243 1243
Countries 172 172 172 150 172 152 128 172 152 152
R2 0.214 0.212 0.224 0.211 0.217 0.215 0.178 0.223 0.211 0.213
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. OLS PCSE and dependent variable lnsq(FDI Stock) in all models. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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significant, both at the 5 percent level. On average, both property rights protection, and contract viability
as measured by judiciary independence, seem to attract FDI.
This then, all else equal, could have been the general conclusion of a standard empirical assessment
assuming FDI to be a homogenous enterprise. Not controversial at all. Maybe would a discussion of why
it is that MNEs from the “humanitarian superpower” Norway (Gjølberg, 2010, 212-3) seem impervious
to human rights protection and labor standards upholding have been added. And of course, the standard
juxtaposition of some similar study concluding differently than one’s own. End of the empirical story?
Normally yes, but since the SSB data allows me to break the numbers down into sectoral subcategories,
let us take a step down the ladder and see what the picture looks like at the sector-level.
Table 4.3: Baseline models – Institutional concepts and FDI across sectors
Personal freedoms Political governance Economic interaction Economic regulation
PHYSINT WORKER DEMOC XCONST CCI PRI IPI INJUD FFI IFI
TFDI 0.112 -0.0937 1.157∗ 0.0778 0.906∗ 0.0322∗ 0.131 0.638∗ 0.0132 0.00509
(0.0875) (0.207) (0.522) (0.138) (0.374) (0.0144) (0.127) (0.289) (0.0132) (0.0144)
NRFDI 0.115 0.00680 0.345 -0.0329 0.767∗ 0.0162 0.168 0.317 -0.00255 -0.0129
(0.0947) (0.232) (0.551) (0.138) (0.389) (0.0155) (0.144) (0.315) (0.0121) (0.0152)
MFDI 0.194∗∗ 0.271+ 1.531∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 1.765∗∗∗ 0.0477∗∗∗ 0.00370 1.111∗∗∗ 0.0315∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗
(0.0735) (0.154) (0.468) (0.116) (0.311) (0.0129) (0.119) (0.242) (0.0106) (0.0117)
SFDI 0.201∗ 0.0899 0.620 -0.0138 0.886∗ 0.0322∗ 0.176 0.524∗ 0.0195+ 0.00469
(0.0865) (0.190) (0.483) (0.131) (0.355) (0.0129) (0.130) (0.246) (0.0116) (0.0133)
Observations 1338 1341 1415 1223 1413 1243 1084 1415 1243 1243
Countries 172 172 172 150 172 152 128 172 152 152
Cell values are slope coefficients of institutional concepts connoted in the top row, with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are
lnsq(FDI stock). Control variables, constants and explained variance estimates are omitted and can be found in Tables B.1-B.3 in Appendix B. TFDI = total FDI,
NRFDI = natural resources, MFDI = manufacturing, and SFDI = services. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.3 portrays the slope coefficients for institutional variables after regressing the varieties of FDI
on baseline models. Each cell in Table 4.3 therefore represents one full baseline model. The results from
the total FDI models in Table 4.2 are carried on to provide benchmarks. The low bivariate correlations
between the sectors of FDI presented in Table 2.2 in Section 2.4.4 indicated that MNEs from different
sectors vary widely in allocation of FDI. Natural resource FDI exhibited 0.540 and 0.322 correlations
with services FDI and manufacturing FDI respectively, and the two latter were correlated at no more than
0.411. This then begs the question: Do they also differ in their valuation of host-country policy climates?
The overall picture when assessing effects across sectors confirm the general suspicion in The Vari-
eties of FDI framework: relationships between institutional outcomes and varieties of FDI seem to differ
according to investment type. No sectoral set of estimates embody the same relational matrix as the total
FDI estimates in the topmost row. First, the complete lack of significant effects from the two personal
freedoms components on total FDI is differentiated. While FDI in natural resources seems indifferent to
variations in freedoms protection, countries where physical integrity rights are protected are more suc-
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cessful in obtaining manufacturing FDI, significant at the 1 percent level. The same effect is apparent
on services FDI, although only significant at the 5 percent level. The effect is estimated to be marginally
stronger for services FDI than manufacturing FDI. Only given a lenient definition of significance (10
percent level), protection of worker’s rights is predicted to increase the chances of inbound manufactur-
ing FDI. WORKER shows no significant relation to FDI in natural resources, nor services. Again, given
the assumption that manufacturers hire more locally this makes sense.
Also as regards the indicators of political governance structures, heterogeneity across sectors is
found. While the total FDI model found the democratization of political power delegation to affect
FDI positively, it seems that in real life it is only the manufacturing investors that value this institutional
trait. For the same investors, safeguard against government opportunism as measured by the effective
constraints on incumbents also seems of impact. Neither the DEMOC nor the XCONST variables are
significant at any levels for FDI in natural resource extraction or in services.
The last indicator of sound political governance, control of corruption, holds a positive significant
effect across all types of FDI. Examining the magnitude and level of significance still tells of FDI’s mot-
ley nature. While the significance of CCI on natural resource FDI and manufacturing FDI is significant
at the 5 percent level, the positive effect is somewhat weaker than for the totality of FDI. The effect on
manufacturing FDI however is significant at all levels, and almost double in strength of what the coef-
ficient for total FDI was. Considering the same scenario as depicted above, a change from the level of
corruption in Bangladesh in the year 2000 (≈−1.0) to that of Canada the same year (≈ 2.0) is estimated
to lead to a 2.3 percent rise in lnsq(NRFDI), a 5.3 rise in lnsq(MFDI), and 2.7 percent rise in lnsq(SFDI).
Corruption, it seems, throbs all investors, but manufacturers the most. More interestingly, although the
FDI finding is reproduced in all sectors, both the magnitudes and certitudes of effects diverge.
Moving on to the variables capturing how host countries facilitate economic interaction, neither the
effect of property rights protection nor the impact of judiciary independence found for the totality of FDI,
hold for natural resource regressions. For services industries, the results from the total FDI regressions
are almost reproduced, both effects and significance levels are close to the same. For manufacturing
MNEs, the positive effect is again stronger, especially for the viability of contracts as measured by
independence of the courts, while results are significant at all levels for both PRI and INJUD. Contracting
environment as measured by manufacturing MNEs’ ability to repatriate profits, payment delays and their
safeguard against expropriation seems unimportant for all investors, regardless of type.3
At last there are the two economic regulation variables capturing the ease with which money is
moved in society, and the quality of banks and credit. Still portraying significant disparity across sectors,
higher scores on both the FFI and the IFI is positively associated with higher levels of manufacturing
FDI, significant at 1 percent level and all levels respectively. The effect is marginally strongest for IFI,
predicating that a ten point scale leap should lead to 0.39 percent in lnsq(MFDI), the prediction for FFI
3On the balance, the IPI component of contracting performs badly throughout all regressions. The geographical stretch of
this variables is the most restricted of those used, and might have a bearing upon its poor performance.
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being a 0.31 percent rise given the same leap. The FFI measure of the ease with which money is moved
in society, is significant only at the 10 percent level for service MNEs, while the IFI measure of banking
and credit quality is predicted to be statistically unimportant. This is rather peculiar, given that around
65 percent of all services FDI was in either financial services, insurance, business services or property in
2006 (see Table 3.1). For natural resource investors, as was estimated for the totality of FDI, neither of
the economic regulation proxies seem to have bearings upon investment decisions. Generally as regards
indicators of economic regulation, the estimated effects on total FDI seems to be driven by idiosyncrasies
in foreign extraction of natural resources and service supplying.
4.3.1 Heterogeneity uncovered?
The notion of divergent effects for varieties of FDI indicated by the bivariate relationships is strongly
corroborated when controlling for basic macroeconomic and geographical gravity factors. Only two
concepts associated with sound host-country institutions retains its effect across all sectors as predicted
by total FDI models – the positive effect of the CCI measure of corruption control and the non-finding of
effects from the IPI measure of contracting environment.4 The four positive relationships found for the
totality of FDI, varied markedly across sectors. Moreover, baseline models estimated for sector-specified
FDI stocks uncovered eight relationships not predicted by the total FDI models.
There is another way in which this heterogeneity may be assessed. The diversity inherent to aggregate
FDI stocks, as was discussed for the distance control, may create countervailing of effects. As such the
total FDI estimates should be more sensitive to changes in model specifications than those estimated
by the sector-specific models. I therefore conduct a simple form of sensitivity analysis examining how
significance levels of point estimates develop as the baseline model is sequentially expanded.5 Table
4.4 depicts how the significance of estimates for the ten institutional outcome variables develops when
entering the controls one-by-one in the total FDI model, added to the bivariate estimate recognizable from
Table 4.1.6 The five baseline controls were first entered in a sequence reflecting assumptions as to the
relative importance of them. Market size was added to the bivariate model first, followed by geographical
distance, infrastructure, initial EU membership, and Nordicness. Two of the controls applied in some of
the below sector-specific models were also included, the trade openness variable and the average income
level parameter, to further check the control sensitivity of the total FDI aggregates.
The general picture is that institutional concepts are discarded in an unstructured manner as models
are expanded on the total FDI aggregate. XCONST and IFI lose significance after controlling for ge-
ographic distance. The effects of corruption control, property rights protection, and contract viability
4It was noted that the endemic lack of effects from IPI might have something to do with its coverage.
5The sensitivity of an estimate concerns its ability to capture true positives and false negatives, i.e. the model’s ability to
capture real relationships (Skog, 2004, 91). In for example the empirical literature on economic growth, some of the most used
predictors of growth have proved highly sensitive to control variable specification (Sala-I-Martin, 1997).
6All the significant coefficients are positive regardless of model.
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Table 4.4: Sensitivity analysis – Institutional concepts and total FDI
Sequential entering of controls
Bivariate ln(MARKET)t−1 ln(DISTANCE) INFRASTRt−1 EU15 NORDIC ln(OPEN)t−1 ln(INCOME)t−1
PHYSINT ∗∗∗ ∗∗
WORKER
DEMOC ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
XCONST ∗∗∗ ∗
CCE ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗
PRI ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
IPI ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
INJUD ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗
FFI ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
IFI ∗∗∗ ∗
Cell values connote the significance level of the corresponding institutional concept in the leftmost column. Dependent variables are lnsq(FDI stock). All estimates are
positive. Institutional concepts are connoted in the leftmost column. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
as measured by INJUD lose significance when controlling for openness to trade. The other aspect to
contracts however, IPI, together with the FFI, retains a level of significance only until the infrastructure
control is entered. PHYSINT, the human rights measure, had no effect in the bivariate estimation, but be-
came significant when market size taken into account, and then loses significance when infrastructure is
controlled for. DEMOC is significant the longest, but only until average income levels are controlled for.
On a general note, once more than six controls are entered, regardless of which, all relationships are dis-
carded. Moreover, when controls were entered in sequences not based on assumed relative importance,
significance levels fluctuated even more.
It should emphasized that significance is not the holy grail of statistics. However, when assessing
the sensitivity of total FDI estimates, they seem to be uncoordinatedly sensitive to different control spec-
ifications. Many assessments of the FDI-institutions relationship also enter more controls than I have
done, and one would accordingly expect the conclusions researchers are left with to diverge, depend-
ing on model specification. This of course, I have already demonstrated that they do. Table B.4-B.6
in Appendix B show that for the sector-specified models the picture is somewhat more comprehensible.
In the natural resource models, there are close to no changes in the significance of the one retained ex-
planatory variable, the CCI, after market size, distance and infrastructure is controlled for. Only the two
personal freedoms components appear unstable in the manufacturing regressions, while the other inde-
pendent variables retain much the same results after the first three controls are entered. The sensitivity
of estimates in services models seem more prone to control fluctuation then natural resources and man-
ufacturing estimates. Perhaps services inhibit more intra-sectoral heterogeneity than the two varieties of
FDI. Still however, the picture seems much defined after the entering of the infrastructure control. In
general, sector-divided models seem less sensitive to model specifications than total FDI models.
The main takeaway from the baseline estimations is that there seems to be plenty of unaccounted
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for heterogeneity in aggregate FDI figures. It is beyond my reach to determine whether these dispari-
ties directly create the lack of a coherent empirical link in the FDI-institutions literature, but evidence
presented here indicate that operating with general FDI numbers in the Norwegian case blur the relation
between FDI and policy climates associated with institutions more than it clarifies it.
4.4 Sector-specific discussions
In the following subsections, the effects from the sector-specific models are discussed. Since estimates
across sectors from hereon are based on different model specifications they are not comparatively inter-
preted. Instead, the expectations formulated under in The Varieties of FDI framework are scrutinized.
Interesting effects are substantiated in Section 4.4.4.
4.4.1 Natural resources FDI
The expectations in The Varieties of FDI framework were that, a priori, human rights protection, polit-
ical preference aggregation and property rights protection should matter for natural resource MNEs in
conducting FDI. However, the expectations were moderated by underlining how natural resource MNEs
face a more constrained choice when investing than other MNEs. Moreover, the potential for host-
governments constructing artificially protected extraction enclaves as a result of their dependence on
extractive MNEs realizing their resource rents was mentioned.
Table 4.5 presents the results from regressing natural resources FDI on the natural resource sector-
specific models. Note first that entering the energy control limits the sample in these models. In the
natural resource baseline regressions observations varied between 1243 and 1415, while this sample at
most consider 1072 country-years. The WDI measure of oil equivalent is to the best of my knowledge the
most adequate proxy for natural resource endowments available, and will have to do. The energy control
is essential as it allows interpretation of estimated effects as the relationship given actual presence of
resources to extract. In essence then, controlling for resource endowments may be a way to limit the
choice-constraint problem of in the investment decision of extractive investors (Cohen, 2007, 66).
The estimates of the six controls in Table 4.5 yield interesting information. Distance is invariably
negative and significant, while market size seems to capture some latent aspect(s) important to extractive
MNEs, being consistently positive and significant. Nordicness does not seem to have any structural effect
on Norwegian natural resource FDI, most likely because there are few unextricated natural resource
endowments in the Nordic region to invest in. Being one of the initial 15 EU member states however
has a firm, positive, and significant effect on inbound FDI.7 The infrastructure measure exhibits almost
the same tendency, being significant and positive in nine out of ten models. Natural resource MNEs
thus seem to value access to communication with intermediate processing markets, and well-developed
7These results are found robust to removing Belgium from the sample. Statoil remember, has a coordination center in
Mechelen, near Brussels, that could have affected the estimations (Hveem, 2009, 388).
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Table 4.5: Natural resource FDI and institutional concepts





















ln(DIST) -1.145∗ -1.217∗ -1.215∗ -0.962+ -1.218∗ -1.307∗ -1.178∗ -1.230∗ -1.259∗ -1.255∗
(0.510) (0.533) (0.538) (0.560) (0.539) (0.534) (0.574) (0.548) (0.536) (0.547)
ln(MARKET)t−1 1.047∗∗∗ 1.030∗∗∗ 0.979∗∗ 0.809∗ 0.794∗ 0.908∗∗ 0.913∗∗ 0.990∗∗ 1.007∗∗ 1.089∗∗
(0.296) (0.310) (0.340) (0.355) (0.336) (0.337) (0.333) (0.325) (0.319) (0.339)
NORDIC -0.263 -0.338 -0.373 1.441 -1.007 -0.615 0.0719 -0.326 -0.341 -0.332
(1.723) (1.805) (1.828) (1.898) (1.820) (1.776) (1.838) (1.846) (1.783) (1.812)
EU15 4.089∗∗ 4.249∗∗ 4.260∗∗ 5.521∗∗ 3.391∗ 3.763∗ 4.045∗ 4.149∗ 4.151∗∗ 4.296∗∗
(1.496) (1.576) (1.584) (1.715) (1.700) (1.603) (1.620) (1.639) (1.553) (1.590)
INFRASTRt−1 0.0490∗ 0.0527∗∗ 0.0517∗ 0.0670∗∗ 0.0321 0.0467∗ 0.0375+ 0.0497∗ 0.0499∗ 0.0555∗∗
(0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0201) (0.0217) (0.0212) (0.0203) (0.0212) (0.0203) (0.0209) (0.0208)
ln(ENERGY) 0.317 0.297 0.329 0.303 0.442+ 0.372 0.402 0.326 0.335 0.246
(0.229) (0.243) (0.258) (0.283) (0.241) (0.244) (0.256) (0.248) (0.245) (0.267)
Constant -17.16∗ -15.45+ -14.60+ -12.30 -10.49 -13.29 -15.95+ -14.78+ -15.37+ -15.58+
(7.722) (8.014) (8.459) (8.557) (8.726) (8.323) (8.878) (8.378) (8.084) (8.309)
Observations 1069 1071 1072 1024 1072 1039 967 1072 1039 1039
Countries 126 126 126 122 126 123 123 123 113 126
R2 0.138 0.126 0.123 0.133 0.125 0.132 0.121 0.120 0.130 0.126
OLS PCSE, standard errors in parentheses, and dependent variable lnsq(FDI stock) in all models. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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transport infrastructure to shift extracted resources. Hosts supplying such facilities should increase the
chance of enticing multinational resource extractors.
Lastly as regards the controls, and somewhat enigmatically, the energy measure is not significant in
any of the models estimated, save for in the CCI regression.8 This finding is counterintuitive in that it
means having natural resource endowments, as measured by estimated oil equivalents, has no statistically
structured effect on the allocation of extractive investments. However, removing FDI in agriculture
and fisheries from the natural resource sample clarifies the picture. Although these investments only
accounted for a fraction of the total natural resource sector (see Table 3.1), the energy measure becomes
positively significant at the 5 percent level or better in all but one model sequestering petroleum-related
activity. Natural resources FDI not in petroleum are kept in the sample though, as removing them has
little bearing upon the effects estimated by the institutional variables. Moreover, they constitute an
integral part of this sector theoretically. This disparity is however a sign of intra-sectoral heterogeneity.
The entering of the energy control has two effects on independent variable effects as estimated in the
baseline models. Controlling corruption is still positively and significantly related to FDI in natural re-
sources, but more so than before controlling for energy endowments. Secondly, contracting environment
as measured by IPI now exhibits a marginally positive effect on investment, significant at the 10 percent
level. The changes in effects themselves are not overly interesting. What is notable is that the energy
control effectively induced changes in estimates. As regards the expectations developed in The Varieties
of FDI framework, none of the three predicted relations were found.
What is nice about an explorative inquiry like this is that both discarding a priori expectations and
discovering unexpected relationships are equally interesting. The non-finding of relations between ex-
tractive FDI and human rights protection, political preference aggregation, and property rights protection
in essence support the idea that FDI in natural resources is different. The fact that the instability effect
of the former two is not found might be a function of resource investors’ low urban presence. Societal
upheaval and riots may simply not reach close enough to extractive installments to pose any real danger
to MNEs. It may also be a sign that resource investors, due to dependence on their produce, is given
extra protection by host governments (Cohen, 2007, 78).
Another explanation, more related to the non-finding of property rights protection as a driver of FDI,
is that the high marginal gains from extractive activity compensates losses on investment quicker than
in other industries. Higher profit margins should make investment less vulnerable to production halts
or asset losses (see e.g. Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio, 2005). The extreme case of partial or full-
fledged uncompensated expropriation of MNE properties is often particularly acute in resource-based
sectors as the idea of natural resources as a good that belongs to the people is proliferating in many
transition economies. Hogan, Sturzenegger and Tai (2010, 5-6) for example, reported of 22 cases of
planned, confirmed, or in-progress expropriations of oil, gas and/or mining investments in 2007, while
8That is still given only given a 10 percent level of significance.
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Hajzler (2010a) find that the average share of resources in total FDI is three times higher in expropriating
countries than in non-expropriating ones. Previous research actually shows that even in countries with
high expropriation rates, extractive FDI tends to flourish and re-flourish cyclically (see e.g. Hajzler,
2010b). For some reason, natural resource MNEs re-invest time and time again in markets with high risk
of public commandeering of MNE property. A potential supportive explanation is that resource-gains-
dependent host-governments offer favorable deals to expropriated MNEs after taking their assets to coax
them back in,9 perhaps through offering low royalty rates so that the expropriated investor can re-realize
the losses on the expropriated investment (see e.g. Hajzler, 2010a).
It should be duly noted however that the IPI variable, as mentioned when operationalized, also cap-
ture important aspects of public violations of MNEs’ property rights. The marginal finding of a relation-
ship between IPI and extractive FDI could be interpreted as yielding some support to the assumption that
protection of property rights is not only important for economic progress in general, but also for private
investment in particular (see e.g. North, 1990, 1991; Knack and Keefer, 1995). More relevant, it indicates
that the possibilities of positive repatriation of profits and avoidance of payment delays might motivate
resource investors to choose one investment location over another. This is only logical – accumulated
profits is of no value if systems facilitating payments are not in place.
At last, the predicted positive effect corruption control on resource investments give support to Nye’s
(1967) and Rose-Ackerman’s (1975) ”grabbing hand”-type notions of corruption. Bardhan’s (1997) idea
of corruption not only being an economic facet to institutional err, but also a potential tool for achieving
political gains, is intriguing in this context. Natural resource extraction is at the most basic level driven
by public licensing of extractive activity. The distribution of these licenses to natural resource MNEs
is an interface where public officials potentially hold power to decide who extracts what, and at what
price. Given that the MNEs prefer sound and transparent tendering, the results for the CCI may indicate
that those governments susceptible to utilize instances of public offerings to increase their own economic
leverage, and pari passu their de facto political power, are punished by natural resource MNEs.10
The fact that, as seen below, control of corruption is the only stable predictor of FDI regardless of
sector or specification might also indicate that there is something about Norwegian MNEs that enhance
the focus on corruption. Both the substantial state ownership and national law on corruption may play
a role in this concern. Moreover, the largest player in Norwegian overseas petroleum activity, Statoil,
actually require employees venturing abroad to undergo a crash course in how to avoid becoming com-
plicit in corruption.11 Additionally, general threats to inference such as omitted variable bias should not
be discarded. However, when running preliminary composite models, regardless of sector, the control of
corruption finding seemed to hold pretty well when entering the institutional concepts significant in the
9See for example the various essays in Hogan and Sturzenegger (2010).
10Remember Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson’s (2005) argument defining the interdependency and complementarity of
politically and economically induced economic power
11See: http://www.statoil.com/en/About/EthicsValues/Pages/default.aspx.
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sector at hand.12 The uniform effect of corruption is elaborated on in Section 4.6 below.
4.4.2 Manufacturing FDI
In The Varieties of FDI framework, expectation were developed predicting manufacturing FDI to be
affected by all institutional concepts operationalized. Table 4.6 shows the regressing of manufacturing
FDI on sector-specific manufacturing models. In addition to the five baseline controls, average income
levels, human capital, and trade openness is entered.
Note first that the geographic distances control, unlike in natural resource equations, affect manufac-
turing significantly positive in all but one model. This indicate that manufacturing FDI may be driven
by both market-seeking and streamlining of operations (reduction of transport costs). The longer away
the market the manufacturer wishes to supply, the more economically sound does producing the good
there instead of trading it there become (see e.g. Brainard, 1997). The fact that market size has a strongly
significant and positive effect on manufacturing investment adds to the argument, as a larger market may
create more demand. The two country-group dummies are strong, significant, and positive predictors of
manufacturing FDI across all models – market commonalities and similar legal structures represented by
these variables may make it easier to both produce and sell goods. Moreover, historically close trade re-
lations may have contributed to building up close business ties. In general, Johanson and Vahlne’s (1977)
theoretic underlining of the importance of cultural and psychological closeness is supported for manu-
facturing, as is Hveem, Knutsen and Rygh’s (2008b) notion of Norwegian FDI as relative newcomers to
the global investment field utilizing the business channels already available to them to catch up.13
Infrastructure on the other hand seems to affect manufacturers little, the same does average income
levels. The latter finding is in partial opposition to the dependency theorists claim of a global “race to the
bottom” (see e.g. Cardoso and Faletto, 1969; dos Santos, 1970), an allegation perhaps especially directed
towards manufacturing industries, as discussed in Section 2.4.7. The expectation that higher average in-
come levels would lead to higher demand is not supported at first glance either, but removing market size
from the regressions makes the income measure strongly positive and significant at all levels, regardless
of institutional concept assessed. It seems that the market size proxy captures the income effect. The
human capital component shows little relation to manufacturing FDI also, perhaps indicating that most
manufacturing FDI is in low-skill production. But again, when removing one of the other controls, this
time the average income measure, human capital becomes significant and positive at the 5 percent level or
better in five of the ten models.14 The variable capturing trade openness shows straight-forward positive
and significant relations to manufacturing FDI in all models, indicating instead that efficiency-seeking
export-platform production prevails in manufacturing, complementing the positve effect of distance. It
12It is however difficult to estimate models with more than two of these indicators in the same regression due to the multi-
collinearity issues discussed in Section 3.6.1.
13See also Mathews (2002).
14In the models examining PHYSINT, WORKER, IPI, INJUD, and IFI.
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Table 4.6: Manufacturing FDI and institutional concepts





















ln(DIST) 1.065∗ 1.052∗ 1.007∗ 0.707 0.965∗ 0.865+ 1.026+ 0.891+ 1.004∗ 1.006∗
(0.433) (0.443) (0.464) (0.510) (0.454) (0.503) (0.565) (0.456) (0.477) (0.469)
ln(MARKET)t−1 1.796∗∗∗ 1.758∗∗∗ 1.744∗∗∗ 1.885∗∗∗ 1.845∗∗∗ 1.954∗∗∗ 1.926∗∗∗ 1.813∗∗∗ 1.958∗∗∗ 1.959∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.145) (0.152) (0.202) (0.144) (0.178) (0.229) (0.147) (0.177) (0.173)
NORDIC 3.406∗∗∗ 3.400∗∗∗ 3.551∗∗∗ 3.642∗∗∗ 2.482∗∗ 3.525∗∗∗ 3.650∗∗∗ 3.429∗∗∗ 3.804∗∗∗ 3.847∗∗∗
(0.718) (0.728) (0.740) (0.797) (0.800) (0.762) (0.815) (0.727) (0.731) (0.723)
EU15 4.553∗∗∗ 4.509∗∗∗ 4.470∗∗∗ 3.680∗∗∗ 3.378∗∗∗ 3.666∗∗∗ 4.427∗∗∗ 4.184∗∗∗ 4.204∗∗∗ 3.924∗∗∗
(0.858) (0.888) (0.935) (0.974) (0.975) (0.990) (1.022) (0.922) (0.910) (0.911)
INFRASTRt−1 0.0302+ 0.0289+ 0.0256 0.0282 0.01000 0.0188 0.0147 0.0266+ 0.0185 0.0195
(0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0164) (0.0172) (0.0157) (0.0164) (0.0186) (0.0162) (0.0165) (0.0166)
ln(INCOME)t−1 0.310 0.405 0.358 0.314 -0.492 0.203 0.123 0.183 0.409 0.389
(0.392) (0.397) (0.413) (0.438) (0.439) (0.436) (0.479) (0.402) (0.417) (0.404)
HUMCAPt−1 0.152+ 0.148 0.107 0.0193 0.178+ 0.115 0.296∗ 0.118 0.113 0.122
(0.0920) (0.0941) (0.103) (0.115) (0.0938) (0.103) (0.149) (0.0954) (0.101) (0.0990)
ln(OPEN)t−1 1.277∗∗ 1.281∗∗ 1.371∗∗ 1.464∗∗ 1.502∗∗∗ 1.527∗∗∗ 1.981∗∗∗ 1.366∗∗∗ 1.517∗∗∗ 1.514∗∗∗
(0.406) (0.414) (0.427) (0.453) (0.407) (0.442) (0.542) (0.406) (0.441) (0.430)
Constant -57.86∗∗∗ -57.38∗∗∗ -56.74∗∗∗ -58.14∗∗∗ -51.73∗∗∗ -61.13∗∗∗ -61.99∗∗∗ -56.19∗∗∗ -63.53∗∗∗ -63.95∗∗∗
(5.855) (5.994) (6.248) (6.497) (6.564) (6.524) (7.501) (6.063) (6.188) (6.080)
Observations 1283 1285 1337 1211 1335 1219 1051 1337 1219 1219
Countries 162 162 162 148 162 149 124 162 149 149
R2 0.292 0.284 0.275 0.275 0.294 0.287 0.252 0.289 0.289 0.298
OLS PCSE, standard errors in parentheses, and dependent variable lnsq(FDI stock) in all models. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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seems that manufacturing on the balance both supply host-markets through on-location production, but
also supply other (perhaps adjacent) markets.
The entering of the additional controls to some extent moderates the baseline effects of the insti-
tutional concepts on manufacturing FDI, and renders two relationships insignificant at all levels. All
concepts but contracts were positive and significant in the manufacturing baseline models. The two
aspects lapsing into insignificancy in the sector-specific models are human rights protection and labor
standards upholding. This is contrary to The Varieties of FDI expectations. Thus, Spar’s (1998) ”spot-
light regime” does not seem to be at play as regards either concepts. In interpreting this evanescence of
effects, remember the fact that the linear link-function predicting them are only interpretable as direct
effects of the independent constructs on FDI (Achen, 2005). Labor standards upholding were for ex-
ample expected to matter for manufacturers through increased productivity in the local labor stock, but
it was also discussed that labor standard protection could impede efficiency-seeking FDI because of the
potential effect on production costs. When controlling for macro-economic outcomes such as market size
and average wage levels, as well as general education levels; the productivity gains from stronger labor
standards may be covered altogether. The direct effect of labor standards may thus already be captured.15
The effects from the other institutional concepts, as theoretically expected, remain intact however.
Both of the political preference aggregation measures, DEMOC at the 5 percent level and XCONST
at the 1 percent level, increase the chances of obtaining manufacturing FDI. The strongest effect was
found for XCONST. The relatively high fixed costs in all setting up overseas production thus seem
to make manufacturers attentive to democratic institutions such as elections and executive constraints.
The fact that manufacturers often produce close to the margin contributes to the argument. In the face of
instability more resources are diverted to non-productive activity Olson (1982, 165) holds. This diversion
for manufacturers is likely to make an FDI unprofitable faster than for other MNEs.
Control of corruption, as expected theoretically, also pulls manufacturing FDI. The same does well-
protected property rights, and reliable contracting environments as measured by judiciary independence,
all relationships expected within The Varieties of FDI framework. Corruption was discussed to have
an cost premium-effect through the need for bribes or side-payments (see e.g. Bardhan, 1997), making
manufacturers likely to favor more transparent hosts. This expectation seems to hold. Property rights
protection, a pivotal incentive for both production and innovation (see e.g North, 1990, 1991; Gwartney,
Lawson and Hall, 2011), is estimated to affect manufacturing FDI positively (5 percent level), implying
that a 10 point leap on the PRI scale is expected to increase lnsq(Manufacturing FDI) by≈ 0.5 percent.16
15Indeed, the adding of INCOME only to the manufacturing baseline equation is what renders both PHYSINT and WORKER
insignificant. However, when regressing manufacturing FDI on the two regional dummies, the infrastructure measure, and
WORKER, the latter still remains insignificantly linked to the investment decision.
16What could be added is that, had there existed broad-covering measures of such, examining the effect of intellectual
property rights protection could have clarified relations further (see e.g. Javorcik, 2004a). Efforts to quantify the protection
of intellectual property rights are underway however (Dedigama, 2008). See information on the International Property Rights
Index here: www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org.
86 CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
That contract enforceability as measured by INJUD is positively related to manufacturing FDI, but
show no significant relation as measured by IPI, might indicate that manufacturers value unbiased dis-
pute settlement mechanisms more than the perceived space for profits repatriation. The effect of INJUD
also in support of the interpretation of the market size effect as an indicator of market-seeking man-
ufacturing. The more complex and multifarious the seller-customer ties, the more important contract
viability becomes. The importance of judiciary indpendence may also be a sign of manufacturing MNEs
working with independent in-market suppliers when investing abroad, because in such relations, given a
certain distance in perceptions of business norms, one cannot expect even informal contracts to enforce
themselves, never mind written agreements (see e.g. Ahlquist and Prakash, 2010).
At last, both measures of economic regulation retain positive and significant effects in the sector-
specific manufacturing models. Again, this may be interpreted as a sign of manufacturers on the balance
being well-integrated in the host-economies, both through the deployment of local labor, but also in
using local channels to procure intermediate goods. These results were expected on the basis of multiple
arguments in The Varieties of FDI framework, and it is impossible to determine who are at play. Some
interpretations could however be: producing on the margin seems to make functioning money-moving
channels important; using local labor seems to make functioning payment systems important; to the
degree that manufacturers seek new markets, the availability of credit seems to create a more vibrant
local demand; and, to the degree that manufacturers conduct in-house in-market assembly operations or
participate in inter-firm coordinated assembly, the complexity of interactions up and down value chain
relations seem to underline a need for functioning financial infrastructure.
4.4.3 Services FDI
The Varieties of FDI framework also developed arguments as to why all of the institutional concpets
could be drivers of services FDI. The baseline regressions gave a first indication that effects varied more
than expected. Adding the four sector-specific controls moderate the picture further. Consider first
the controls, Table 4.7 shows that distance is significantly negative in all service sector models. The
non-tradable services FDI thus suffer the further away from the principal’s they are conducted (see e.g.
Kolstad and Villanger, 2008). Market size is significantly and positively associated with service FDI in
all models, but being Nordic or one of the 15 initial EU-states show no signs of being related to FDI in
services.17 A potential explanation is that since services are almost exclusively market-seeking they are
viable to go where there are unfulfilled market potentials. Internal markets in the Nordic countries and
the EU however are very saturated after decades of economic prosperity and investment. They might
therefore offer less profit potential than emerging markets in other parts of the world.
Infrastructure remains an important determinant of FDI in services, but again average income levels
are insignificance in all models. As was the case with the manufacturing models, this is because the
17Table B.3 in Appendix B show that this was the case also before the sector-specific controls were entered.
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Table 4.7: Services FDI and institutional concepts





















ln(DIST) -0.922∗ -0.957∗ -0.932∗ -1.065∗ -0.984∗ -1.136∗∗ -1.027∗ -0.987∗ -1.018∗ -0.999∗
(0.386) (0.384) (0.397) (0.431) (0.390) (0.419) (0.470) (0.396) (0.422) (0.424)
ln(MARKET)t−1 1.228∗∗∗ 1.119∗∗∗ 1.125∗∗∗ 1.213∗∗∗ 1.168∗∗∗ 1.216∗∗∗ 1.107∗∗∗ 1.146∗∗∗ 1.214∗∗∗ 1.186∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.150) (0.151) (0.195) (0.152) (0.178) (0.214) (0.152) (0.179) (0.183)
NORDIC 2.416+ 2.350 2.389 2.803+ 1.899 2.293 2.367+ 2.379 2.515+ 2.476+
(1.433) (1.431) (1.493) (1.566) (1.534) (1.454) (1.410) (1.484) (1.450) (1.444)
EU15 0.741 0.912 1.019 0.361 0.370 0.210 0.770 0.842 0.668 0.760
(1.322) (1.329) (1.390) (1.440) (1.328) (1.286) (1.325) (1.374) (1.345) (1.328)
INFRASTRt−1 0.0600∗∗ 0.0622∗∗ 0.0614∗∗ 0.0637∗∗ 0.0521∗∗ 0.0572∗∗ 0.0515∗ 0.0610∗∗ 0.0574∗∗ 0.0606∗∗
(0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0195) (0.0201) (0.0198) (0.0195) (0.0205) (0.0195) (0.0199) (0.0195)
ln(INCOME)t−1 0.00129 0.190 0.204 0.181 -0.186 0.183 -0.157 0.152 0.363 0.449
(0.351) (0.336) (0.352) (0.367) (0.421) (0.378) (0.417) (0.356) (0.373) (0.370)
HUMCAPt−1 -0.0380 -0.0302 -0.0234 -0.0431 -0.00968 -0.0555 0.106 -0.0356 -0.0544 -0.0445
(0.0932) (0.0932) (0.0978) (0.107) (0.0982) (0.101) (0.133) (0.0961) (0.103) (0.102)
ln(DENSITY)t−1 0.00772 0.00954 0.00917 0.0198 0.00777 0.00302 0.00487 0.00873 0.00415 0.00402
(0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0152) (0.0211) (0.0150) (0.0172) (0.0198) (0.0150) (0.0173) (0.0175)
lnsq(MFDI)t−1 0.1000∗ 0.102∗ 0.0934∗ 0.0932∗ 0.0866∗ 0.0721+ 0.0923∗ 0.0926∗ 0.0727+ 0.0761+
(0.0413) (0.0412) (0.0417) (0.0423) (0.0417) (0.0420) (0.0424) (0.0416) (0.0417) (0.0421)
Constant -18.23∗∗ -16.05∗∗ -16.52∗∗ -16.89∗∗ -13.60∗ -17.54∗∗ -13.91∗ -16.23∗∗ -19.44∗∗ -18.95∗∗
(5.871) (5.764) (5.847) (5.905) (5.878) (5.907) (6.406) (5.830) (5.926) (6.009)
Observations 1282 1284 1336 1210 1334 1219 1051 1336 1219 1219
Countries 161 161 161 147 161 149 124 161 149 149
R2 0.196 0.194 0.194 0.183 0.197 0.199 0.170 0.195 0.194 0.194
Standard errors in parentheses
OLS with PCSE, dependent variable lnsq(Services FDI stock).
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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market size control captures much of the same effect as income.18 The two next sector-specific controls,
HUMCAP and DENSITY, seem to lack direct relation to services FDI at first glance. Human capital
however becomes significant at the 1 percent level or better in nine out of ten models when removing
MARKET, INCOME, and INFRA, structures that potentially capture some of the educational effect.
The consistent lack of effect from the capital density proxy however is less comprehensible. It seems
as neither Solow’s (1956) ”crowding-out” argument, nor Krugman’s (1991) ”crowding-in” contentions
dominate. The variable remains insignificant even without market size in the models, which could have
captured some of the market vibrancy Krugman focuses on. It is however possible that the effects coun-
teract each other in the regressions. At last, the manufacturing FDI stock in a country at time t−1 seems
to positively affect the stock of service FDI at time t in that same country, as also indicated by Kolstad
and Villanger (2008) as a sign that agglomeration effects being at play.
As regards the explanatory variables of interest, PHYSINT remains significantly associated with
more service FDI, so does the CCI and the PRI, although the latter marginally at best (10 per cent).
The relations found for the contracting measure INJUD and marginally for FFI evaporate. Perhaps
most interestingly, the effect of INJUD remains significant when entering all controls but the HUMCAP.
Higher average education levels it seems, explains some of the presence of true Montesquieuean judiciary
independence, capturing the effect of INJUD on services FDI.
Government protection of human physical integrity remains positively associated with services FDI
in both baseline and sector-specific models, signaling that Spar’s (1998) ”spotlight effect” is at play as
regards general human rights. The worker’s rights regression corroborates no relations. For consumers
to be able to sanction human rights violating MNEs there needs to be an interface where the demander
meets the purveyor of goods. In The Varieties of FDI framework, it was noted how service MNEs meet
their demanders in host-country markets exclusively, while manufacturers are also exposed to global
markets.19 As the PHYSINT-FDI relationship was not found in manufacturing models, it might seem
as if local consumers are the ones sanctioning violators. An alternative (and supportive) explanation is
that service MNEs, depending on local demand, will suffer more if gross human rights violations lead to
societal instability. Demand, one would assume, is not thriving when in the state of turmoil.
The perceived pervasiveness of corruption hold also for the services models, again disfavoring the
once conventional ”helping hand”-assumptions of Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968). The chances for
complicity in corruption increase the more MNEs have to interact with public officials and the govern-
ment apparatus. Supplying postal services, telecommunications channels, transportation infrastructure,
health services, credit, insurance and so on is in many countries something that governments traditionally
have taken care of. When such services are privatized, public processes of tendering usually define who
gets to supply what. The widespread liberalization of services in the 1990s, better externally supplied
18Removing the former from all regressions makes average income levels positively significant at the 1 percent level or better
in eight out of ten models.
19With the proviso that services are becoming more tradable (UNCTAD, 2004, 148-149).
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through FDI than trade, might have created a climate where service MNEs have to interact more with
host governments.20 A natural consequence is of course the wish transparent and fair processes.
Property rights as a driver of services FDI is estimated to be positive but marginal (at the 10 percent
level). It does however yield some signification to North’s (1990) claim that protecting property is
the most important role of governments wishing to prosper economically, at least as regards FDI in
services. The non-findings in these models more than anything imply that FDI in services differ more
from FDI in manufacturing than assumed in The Varieties of FDI framework. The lack of an effect from
any of the two political preference aggregation variables contradict assumptions that hosts politicizing
conflict is important for urbanely present service suppliers. In the same manner, the evidence from trade
theory of how the salience of contracts increase with the complexity of operations (see e.g. Nicolini,
2007), does not hold in the context of services. At last, and perhaps most surprisingly, well-functioning
financial infrastructure has no structural bearing upon the allocation of service FDI in the analyses. In
the theoretical framework stable availability of sound credit was assumed to be important as it may raise
local demand for services, while channels facilitating payment systems would reduce the costs associated
with transferring goods from supplier to demander, and payment vice versa (see e.g. Bevan, Estrin and
Meyer, 2004). Neither assumptions hold up when tested against the data.
4.4.4 Substantiation of findings
To substantiate findings across all sectors, Table 4.8 provides the maximum effects of the relationships
predicted at 10 percent levels of significance or better. Cell values connote the magnitude with which
lnsq(FDI stock) change when shifting from the lowest level on the relevant independent variable to the
highest.21 Obviously these drastic changes are not realistic in that single countries are likely to make
full-scale leaps in one year, but they might be illustrative as regards the magnitudes of effects.22
Control of corruption is estimates to have the largest effect on all varieties of FDI. In the sector-
specific natural resource models, moving from a corruption score of -2.5 to 2.5, would imply an increase
in natural resource FDI of more than 5 percent.23 The corresponding maximum effects for manufacturing
FDI is between 8 and 9 percent increase in lnsq(Manufacturing FDI), while for services a full-scale leap
is estimated to increase lnsq(Services FDI) by a little over 4 percent.
As p-values indicate, the effects of corruption control, aside from being on balance the strongest, is
also predicted with the least uncertainty for manufacturing industries. Figure 4.1 offers a visual illus-
tration of both the magnitude and certitude of CCI findings across sector-specific models.24 The shaded
20See for example Konan and Maskus (2006) as regards worldwide liberalization of services, and Markusen, Rutherford and
Tarr (2005) for how services arguably are better supplied externally through FDI than trade.
21Effects are estimated by multiplying the range of independent variables with regression estimates, p-values in parentheses.
22It should be noted that comparison between sectors is technically only feasible as regards the baseline models, as control
specifications vary across sector-specific analyses.
23That is to say, a move of five standard deviations. The CCI remember, is normalized with a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1 (see e.g. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2006).
24The models predict with the least amount of certainty around 0 on the CCI both because this is where there is the most
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Table 4.8: Estimated effects of significant results from baseline and sector-specific models
Regression estimate * Scale = Maximum effect
Natural resources FDI Manufacturing FDI Services FDI
Baseline Sector Baseline Sector Baseline Sector
PHYSINT - - 1.55% - 1.61% 1.62%
p < (.01) (.05) (.05)
WORKER - - 0.54% - - -
p < (.10)
DEMOC - - 1.53% 1.06% - -
p < (.001) (.05)
XCONST - - 2.64% 2.01% - -
p < (.001) (.01)
CCI 3.85% 5.23% 8.85% 8.66% 4.41% 4.27%
p < (.05) (.05) (.001) (.001) (.05) (.05)
PRI - - 4.72% 3.22% 3.19% 2.57%
p < (.001) (.05) (.05) (.10)
IPI - 3.41% - - - -
p < (.10)
INJUD - - 2.22% 1.52% 1.05% -
p < (.001) (.01) (.05)
FFI - - 3.12% 1.92% 1.93% -
p < (.01) (.01) (.10)
IFI - - 3.80% 2.83% - -
p < (.001) (.001)
confidence interval in plot (b), depicting confidence interval of the predicted marginal effect of corruption
control on manufacturing FDI along values on the CCI, is accordingly the narrowest of the three.
For natural resources moreover, the maximum effect of IPI is in the sector-specific model estimated
to induce a 3.4 percent increase in lnsq(natural resource FDI). In sector-specific services models, moving
from no protection to full human rights protection is associated with a 1.6 percent increase in inbound
lnsq(services FDI); while a full-scale transition on the PRI predicts a little over 2.5 percent upswing.
As regards manufacturing production, moving from autocracy to democracy as defined by Przeworski
et al. (2000, 15-30), is predicted to increase lnsq(manufacturing FDI) by a little over 1 percent. A full-
scale leap on the XCONST variable is estimated to prompt a 2 percent increase in lnsq(manufacturing
FDI). The economic interaction indicators PRI and INJUD predict maximum effects of a little over 3
and 1.5 percent increases in lnsq(manufacturing FDI) respectively. At last, the two indicators of eco-
nomic regulation, FFI and IFI, predict a little under 2 and almost 3 percent maximum increases in
lnsq(manufacturing FDI) each. Before evaluating the empirical findings up against the expectations
developed in The Varieties of FDI framework, consider some robustness checks.
data, but also because of the way the CCI is constructed with a mean of 0 (see e.g. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2006).
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Figure 4.1: Marginal effects of CCI across sectors of FDI
4.5 Robustness tests
In order to test the robustness of the results discussed in the previous section, nine robustness checks
are conducted.25 Statistics is sometimes treated as an exact science in that estimates have their defined
levels of uncertainty and so forth. The virtue of checking results’ robustnesses is that one cannot rely
on just one specification of a model, one single conceptualization of a theoretical concept, or one sole
econometric method when drawing inferences upon the assumption or theory under scrutiny. In the
words of Knutsen: ”There is limited knowledge of what a ”correct specification” looks like, and results
could be driven by the particular specification chosen” (2011, 315-318).
Alternative econometric models: fixed effects and random effects
In Section 3.5 it was argued that OLS with PCSE is the appropriate econometric method when estimating
short time-series with institutional concepts as independent variables, as compared to standard OLS and
FE-models (see e.g. Beck and Katz, 2001). First, as suspected, running FE-models with standard errors
clustered on countries yielded statistically confirmed relations. An alternative to country FE models,
is to apply random effects (RE) regression. Country FE models assume specific intercepts for each
25Where tables are not reported in the Appendices, regressions results are available from the author upon request. Please us
the following e-mail address: taraldberge@hotmail.com
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panel-unit.26 RE models moderate this assumption, although each panel-unit still gets its own intercept.
The difference lies in the interpretation of these unit-specific intercepts. The RE procedure “views the
different intercepts as having been drawn from a bowl of possible intercepts, so they may be interpreted
as random [...] and treated as though they were part of the error term” (Kennedy, 2003, 304). Given that
the assumption of randomly selected intercepts hold (i.e. that no correlation with independent variables
exists), RE-models might be more efficient as compared to FE models – while still controlling for some
of the potential impacts from unobserved differences between panel units.
Running baseline models across sectoral FDI and total FDI with RE and standard errors clustered on
countries support the FDI heterogeneity-claim.27 The sector-specific models run with RE differs more
from the OLS PCSE models.28 Corruption retains a significant, positive effect on natural resource FDI
and manufacturing, but not services. In general, no independent constructs are significant in services
models. Moreover, only two relations are confirmed for manufacturing FDI. The entering of sector-
specific controls constrains samples somewhat, and it may be possible that too little variation accounts
for the loss of effects. On the other side it may be that there actually are unobserved factors that affect
both dependent and independent variables. Future studies on these data should endeavor constructing
longer time-series to investigate these issues with more intra-country variation to infer upon.
Lagging independent variables
Although the case has been made that MNEs are susceptible to act upon contemporary policy climates
when conducting FDI, perceptions may be influenced by history also. Some might even argue this is a
more proper cause-effect scenario. All independent variables are in that vein entered with a one-year
lag in all baseline and sector-specific models. The baseline models again support FDI heterogeneity.29
In the sector-specific models findings for natural resource FDI vanish.30 Corruption control remains
remarkably robust in both manufacturing and services equations. The manufacturing FDI results robust
to lags were the economic interaction variables PRI and INJUD, and the economic interaction variables
FFI and IFI. For services, the relation found for PRI was retained.
Alternative measure of corruption control
The concept with the on average most robust and consistent effect across all sectors and specifications is
the control of corruption index. As has been discussed, the construction of the CCI may be problematic in
over-time comparison as it is normalized with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Although
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006, 9) claim there are no trends in the CCI, baseline and sector-
specific models using the CCI are tested using an alternative measure of corruption control: the freedom
26Time FE effects models can also be used, as demonstrated below.
27See Table B.7 in Appendix B.
28See Table B.8 in Appendix B.
29See Table B.9 in Appendix B.
30See Table B.10 in Appendix B.
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from corruption index (FCI) from the Heritage Foundation.31
In the baseline models with OLS PCSE, significant, positive effects of FCI were found for total FDI
and manufacturing and services FDI. The sector-specific models only found a relationship for manu-
facturing FDI. Using an alternative measure of corruption control thus moderates the steadfast effect of
non-corrupt policy environments on FDI. Most strikingly, the effect for manufacturing FDI remained
positive and significant throughout all regressions.
Regional and time-trend dummies
Although there seems to be too little over-time variation in the FDI and institutions data to run FE-models,
it might be that unobserved intra-group homogeneity at the regional level can be accounted for. As such,
a regional dummy is entered in the baseline and sector-specific models to manually create a regional type
fixed effects. Instead of using purely geographical regions, a tenfold politico-geographic classification
from Teorell and Hadenius (2005) is applied to classify world regions.32 Baseline regressions with
regional dummies more or less mirrored the results from the original baseline models, confirming the
heterogeneity of FDI determinants.33 There were but a few minor changes in magnitude and certitude of
the sector-specific point-estimates also.34 Results seem robust to regional fixed effects.
As for controlling for temporal trends, the OLS PCSE model corrects for first-order autocorrelation
(AR1) only when it comes to serial correlation of errors. Time trend controls or year dummies are the
only ways to guard against omitted variable bias from trends. Therefore, all baseline and sector-specific
models were run entering a linear time-trend variable. Mirroring the models with regional dummies,
there were but a few changes in strength that separated the de-trended models from the original ones.35
Results were robust to time-trends.
Theoretically influential cases and outliers
In Section 3.2.2 it was discussed how certain recipients of Norwegian FDI could affect estimations
disproportionately.36 Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Venezuela, as well as Belgium in natural resource
31See: http://www.heritage.org/index/about, for documentation and access to the FCI. The scores for the FCI is derived
primarily from the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International, measuring corruption levels in 178 coun-
tries. For those countries not covered by the CPI, qualitative sources are used to fill in missing values. The following nine
countries are not covered by the CPI: Belize, the Bahamas, Fiji, Micronesia, Myanmar, North Korea, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and
the Grenadines, and Suriname. The CPI rages from 0 to 100, where a score of 0 connotes indicates highly corrupt governments,
and a score of 100 indicates little corruption (Miller, Holmes and Feulner, 2012, 456).
32The variable is based on a concoction of two considerations: geographical proximity and area-specialists on democratiza-
tion contributing with their expertise (Teorell and Hadenius, 2005).The ten categories are: (1) Eastern Europe and post-Soviet
Union (including Central Asia); (2) Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic); (3) North Africa
and the Middle East (including Israel, Turkey, and Cyprus); (4) Sub-Saharan Africa; (5) Western Europa and North America
(including Australia and New Zealand); (6) East Asia (including Japan and Mongolia); (7) South-East Asia; (8) South Asia; (9)
The Pacific; and (10) The Caribbean (including Belize, Guyana, and Suriname).
33See Table B.13 in Appendix B.
34See Table B.16 in Appendix B.
35See Table B.15 and Table B.14 in Appendix B.
36Such influential cases have great impacts on regression results through extreme values on independent variables, or function
as outliers with unexpected values on dependent variables given their values on independent variables (Menard, 2010, 135).
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FDI; Liberia in services FDI; and Singapore for all regressions were the countries discussed. They were
therefore excluded from relevant analyses to assess their independent effect on estimations. First out,
the five natural resource extractors were ostracized from baseline and sector-specific natural resource
models; first with one-by-one, and then in tandem. The one-by-one exclusions rendered no substantial
changes in estimations. The tandem removing of all five countries yielded on the balance somewhat
stronger effects. Liberia was next removed from the baseline and sector-specific services regressions.
No substantial change occurred in estimations here either.
Lastly, Singapore was removed from all regressions. In the baseline regressions the only notice-
able change was that corruption control no longer having an effect on natural resource FDI. The same
happened in the sector-specific model. All other results hold when excluding Singapore. The signifi-
cance lapse of corruption control in natural resources indicate that Singapore, scoring an average 2.37
on the CCI throughout the period, might drives this somewhat surprising relation. Hasli’s (2009) sug-
gestion that Singapore is a transshipment location for Norwegian FDI to the adjacent regions makes the
finding more interesting. There are obviously few investments into direct resource extraction in natu-
ral endowment-poor Singapore. But, as large natural resource investments meant for other countries in
the region are recorded recorded in Singapore, her low levels of corruption may seem to affect the CCI
estimate substantially.37
Statistically identified outliers
Cases that affect results disproportionately are sometimes also the result of data error (Greene, 2012,
141). For that reason, and to capture outliers not theoretically presumed, a statistical check of such was
conducted. Outliers were categorized as panel-units that have standardized residuals of greater than 2 or
smaller than -2.38 Between 25 and 75 observations were deleted when applying the threshold, depend-
ing on the model. The tendency however was the same, both baseline and sector-specific regressions
seem robust to outliers. Rather, they have a moderating effect, observed as significance levels of the
institutional constructs increased in most models after the removal of problematic cases.
Influential MNEs
In Section 3.2.2 the possibility that large MNEs might have affect estimations incommensurately was
discussed (see e.g. Gru¨nfeld, 2005). Being relatively large, it was argued that these corporations might
not be as vulnerable to especially economic uncertainty as smaller MNEs. To assess these firms’ relative
effect on the estimates, the largest 20 MNEs in the Norwegian data were removed from all samples,
37The unextricated energy resources as measured by WDI’s oil equivalents measure in Singapore lies around 20-25 kilo-
tons, as compared to the global average of 75 000-85 000 kilotons. See the WDI data at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators.
38These thresholds are arguably arbitrary, but nevertheless suggested by Menard (2010, 134-7). Since I have not been able to
identify a code creating standardized residuals for the xtpcse regression command, they were created manually. First, observed
values were subtracted from predicted values to generate the residuals. The residuals in turn were divided by their standard
deviations to form standardized residuals.
4.5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 95
and baseline and sector-specific models were run.39 The new country-years exhibited relatively low
correlation with the old natural resource FDI (0.376), medium correlation in manufacturing (0.702),
whilst services FDI is seems have very few of the top 20 MNEs (before and after exclusion correlated
0.963). One would therefore expect more divergent findings the two former sectors than for the latter.
Results from the baseline estimations exhibited an interesting tendency. In manufacturing, excluding
the larger companies reduced the certitude in all point estimates, an indication that larger manufactur-
ers in fact are more observant of institutional structures than smaller ones. For the natural resource and
services regressions few changes was incurred. Results generally differed substantially across sectors
however, and FDI heterogeneity is still supported. When running the sector-specific models, the ten-
dency in manufacturing was exacerbated. Only CCI, PRI, and INJUD retained significant estimates.
One potential explanation for this large MNE-inclination towards more sound policy climates lies in the
prolongation of Spar’s (1998) spotlight argument. It might be that large corporations get more attention
if they are caught violating the ideals of rights protection, anti-corruption and pro-democracy abroad.
This is arguably even more relevant given the FDI data applied. The Norwegian government pushes
democracy, CSR and anti-corruption unwaveringly, as discussed in Section 3.2.2.
Tax havens and financial centers
A generally problematic issue when examining the determinants of FDI is that of tax havens. Much
equity is funneled into such states where taxes are levied at low rates or sometimes not levied at all,
whilst offering low rates of corruption and high levels of law and order.40 Moreover, tax havens may
also be used as transshipment platforms. To address the effect of tax havens on estimations, a dummy
indicating whether a country is classified as a tax haven by the OECD or not is entered in all models.41
There are no large changes in independent variable effects in any regressions when entering the tax
haven dummy.42 More interestingly, the dummy shows a robust, significant effects in all services models,
at all levels. Services FDI it seems is the category most likely to be enticed by low-levied taxes and good
governance. In one sense this is only normal seeing as industries such as shipping, financial services,
and real estate are part of services.All in all, estimations are robust to the influence of tax havens.
Old OECD countries
The last operation conducted was to check whether the traditional concentration of Norwegian FDI in
the OECD countries drives the results. As such, a dummy connoting Western Europe or North America,
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand was entered in all regressions. Neither did the dummy alter the point
39Large as measured by total sales.
40See especially: Dharmapala and Hines Jr. (2009) and Hines Jr. (2010).
41The OECD list of countries can be found here: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/14/42497950.pdf. The countries that are
both listed by the OECD and exists in my sample are, randomly ordered: Mauritius, Malta, Panama, Cyprus, Bahrain, Belize,
St. Lucia, Barbados, Andorra, Maldives, Samoa, St. Kitts and Nevis, Liberia, Grenada, Dominica, San Marino, Vanuatu,
Liechtenstein, Seychelles, Nauru, Marshall Islands, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
42See Tables B.17 and B.18 in Appendix B.
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estimates of institutional constructs, nor was it significant in any models itself. Being one of the old
OECD nations does not increase the chances of obtaining Norwegian FDI. It seems like the sectoral
dispersion discussed by Hveem, Knutsen and Rygh (2008b) has manifested itself in practice.
4.6 Summary of findings and evaluation of expectations
This analysis was conducted in four steps. First a set of bivariate relationships were assessed, revealing
that there seemed to be something about the contextual outcomes of sound institutional set-ups that entice
MNEs from all sectors. However, already at this stage a certain degree of ambiguity was found for the
personal freedoms indicators across sectors, and as compared to the total FDI bivariates.
A proper investigation of this apparent disparateness came next. In four sets of baseline regressions,
the ten institutional concepts were assessed for total FDI and sectoral FDI. The underlying assumption
in The Varieties of FDI framework, that effects are likely to vary between sectors and that using total
FDI figures conceal effects, was corroborated by the data. Table 4.3 showed that the only effect that
retained significance across all the types of FDI stocks was the positive effect of corruption control. The
effect of DEMOC on total FDI only remained significant in the manufacturing regressions, while the
effects from PRI and INJUD were significant in both manufacturing and services models. However,
magnitudes and certitudes of estimates differed with manufacturing regressions on the balance seeming
more vulnerable to sound institutional contexts than what was estimated for services and the totality
of FDI. A further test of the claim that totality of FDI figures are problematic was reported in Table
4.4. Testing the sensitivity estimates to model specifications revealed that the effects for total FDI were
more volatile to control specifications than effects in sector-divided models. This was discussed as a
sign effects countervailing each other, underlining the need to disaggregate FDI to understand better the
relationship between institutions and FDI.
The third step was a more proper investigation of the determinants themselves. Estimating sector-
specific models allowed me to control for idiosyncratic factors, refining the estimates from the baseline
models. These models were in turn discussed up against the specific expectations developed in The
Varieties of FDI framework. Table 4.9 juxtapose the expectations from Table 2.5 with the results from
the baseline models presented in Table 4.3, and the sector-specific models presented in Tables 4.5-4.7.
The various effects found in the sector-specific models were discussed elaborately above, so let me focus
on how the findings correspond with the theoretical expectations.
Consider first the two personal freedoms components. The protection of human rights was expected
to be of importance to FDI from all three sectors. Effects were found for manufacturing and services FDI
in the baseline regressions, but only for services FDI in the sector-specific regression. PHYSINT’s effect
on services FDI did not hold in neither RE regression, nor when applying a one year lag-structure, but all
in all, it proved pretty robust. As for labor standards, such were expected to matter for manufacturers and
service suppliers. The only effect found was a marginal relation for manufacturing FDI in the baseline
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Table 4.9: Evaluation of expected relationships between FDI across sectors and institutional concepts
Personal freedoms Political governance Economic interaction Economic reg.
Human rights Labor standards Political pref. Control of Prop. rights Contract Quality
protection upholding aggregation corruption protection enforceab. of credit
Exp Bas Sec Exp Bas Sec Exp Bas Sec Exp Bas Sec Exp Bas Sec Exp Bas Sec Exp Bas Sec
NRFDI + + + + + (+)
MFDI + + + (+) + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
SFDI + + + + + + + + + + (+) + + + (+)
Theoretical expectations from Table 2.5 in columns connoted by ”Exp”, results from baseline models in Table 4.3 in columns connoted with ”Bas”, and results from the sector-
specific models in Tables 4.5-4.7 in columns connoted with ”Sec”. Relationships marked with (+) are only significant at the 10 percent level.
model. This result however was very sensitive to robustness checks.
The two political governance components yielded more relations. Arguments were set forth in The
Varieties of FDI framework as to why political preference aggregation should matter for all varieties
of FDI. The only relation found was for manufacturing investments, a very robust effect at that. Both
indicators, DEMOC and XCONST, were very strongly significant in all baseline and sector-specific
manufacturing regressions. They were not robust to RE in the sector-specific models, to a one-year
lag-structure, or removal of large MNEs. To most other specifications both measures were quite robust.
Control of corruption exhibited a strong and pretty robust relation to FDI in manufacturing and
services, as expected in the The Varieties of FDI framework, but also to a certain extent as regards FDI
in natural respurces. There could be many reasons why this effect is so unwavering. The construction of
the CCI, incorporating enormous amounts of data and being normalized is one. Applying the alternative
corruption control measure however yielded positive and significant effects of corruption control on
FDI in manufacturing in both baseline and sector-specific models, while only in the baseline model for
services. No relations were found for natural resource FDI. Some of the strength in effects may thus be
an artifact to the indicator itself. When using the CCI however, estimates were found most robust for
manufacturing and services FDI, but quite robust also for natural resources FDI. An interesting () was
that when removing Singapore from the sample corruption no longer had a significant effect on natural
resource FDI. Moreover, anti-corruption laws and public policy in Norway has been discussed as one
potential explanation for the effect of corruption control throughout regressions. It should also be noted
that corruption overlaps heavily with other institutional categories, being detrimental to rights upholding,
economic interaction, property rights protection as well as the regulation of the financial sector. High
levels of corruption, as emphasized by Rothstein and Uslaner (2005, 44), deteriorates trust in society.
Trust in turn is vital in all economic interaction.
The components facilitating economic interaction, property rights protection and contract enforce-
ability, seemed important throughout. Property rights protection was expected to matter to all types of
FDI, but the PRI models corroborated relations for manufacturing and services FDI only. This finding
was not robust to RE-estimation, but to most other checks. The main tenet of North’s (1990) NIE thus
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receives support as regards manufacturers and service suppliers; investors on the balance care highly for
the protection of their property. Remember also that it is possible natural resource MNEs value property
right more than the model predicts, host-governments in countries with low general levels of protection
may create property rights-enclaves with artificially high levels of protection (Cohen, 2007, 78).43
Contract enforceability as measured by INJUD was expected to matter for manufacturing and service
FDI in The Varieties of FDI framework.44 It did so for manufacturing consistently, and services only in
baseline regressions. Results were robust to most checks, even RE-estimation in the case of manufac-
turing. Property rights theory holds that the salience of contracts is increases the more complex goods
are produced (Nicolini, 2007, 1). Manufacturing it seems, with assembly complexity and procurement
channels to tend to, value this trait the most. Moreover, natural resource investors are found to value
contract viability as measured by the IPI in the sector-specific model. The fact that this effect appeared
after energy endowments were controlled for indicate that contracts matter in the subset of countries
where there actually are resources to extract.
At last, the indicators of economic interaction were expected to matter for manufacturing and ser-
vices. The estimations indicate that the quality of banking and credit mattered only for manufacturing,
save for a marginal effect in services baseline models. The manufacturing results were robust, apart from
RE-estimations and the exclusion of the 20 largest MNEs. Size in terms of total sales it seems, increases
the importance of money-moving channels and credit.
One last consideration is in place. The notion that natural resources FDI differ more from manufac-
turing and services than the two latter differ from each other is expanded on. In Table 2.2, manufacturing
and services FDI were found to correlate low. This property was also manifested in their respective insti-
tutional determinants. Manufacturing retained the most relationships with institutional concepts, robust
estimates found for the indicators of economic interaction and economic regulation, while relations were
both fewer and less robust in services equations. I can think of at least one possible explanations of this
difference in valuation of policy climates: Henisz (2000, 334) posits that “[p]artnering with host-country
firms that possess a comparative advantage in interactions with the host-country government can safe-
guard against [...] hazard.” Supplying services abroad, inherently a market-seeking exercise, might on
the balance include more local partnering than manufacturers production of simple goods. Knowledge on
market mores et cetera is vital for success when supplying host-markets only. With more local partners,
access to knowledge on how to tackle rampant policy climates might be available, and as such, service
suppliers may dare venture into more precarious markets than manufacturers.
With that said, this analysis has come to an end. The concluding remarks collects some of the treads
that has run through this thesis, and discusses where to go from here. The general notion as regards The
Varieties of FDI framework is: the complexity of FDI is not an aspect that should be disregarded.
43Note the effect of IPI in the sector-specific natural resource model may be in partial support of the idea that property rights
matter for natural resource investors – this measure captures expropriation risk in addition to contract viability aspects.
44The consistently lacking effect of the IPI might be due to its missing structure. See Table A.1 in Appendix A.
Chapter 5
Concluding remarks
I Just Ran Two Million Regressions
– Xavier X. Sala-I-Martin, I Just Ran Two Million Regressions, (1997, 178)
It takes a mix of knowledge, means, and need to turn discovery into opportunity
– David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some
So Poor, (1999, 68)
I may not have run as many regressions as Sala-I-Martin, but I have run quite a few. The question is
what have they taught us? This section sums up the main findings in the thesis. I do not wish to blatantly
conclude upon the sector-specific results at this point – rather the other sources to variation in FDI are
touched upon. Both as regards a further disaggregation of the sectoral categories into industries, but also
along other cleavages that may disperse FDI systematically. It does take a mix of knowledge, means, and
need to turn findings into opportunity – let’s see where we can go from here.
5.1 Summary of findings and discussion
In building The Varieties of FDI framework I highlighted that the level of data aggregation may be
one reason for the lack of coherent findings in the empirical literature on the determinants of FDI. The
baseline models estimated for all sectors revealed that the results when using sector-divided FDI data
never reproduce the total FDI estimations. Instead, results to a large extent diverged from the total FDI
benchmark. As a further inquiry into what total FDI models actually investigate, a sensitivity analysis
was conducted. With un-modeled heterogeneity, internal countervailing of effects should make total FDI
models more sensitive to models specification than sector-divided models. Indeed, the estimates from the
total FDI regressions were found to fluctuate more with different control specifications. It is difficult to
say whether the unaccounted for heterogeneity is the only reason why researchers continuously conclude
differently when assessing the institutional determinants of FDI, but it may well be one very important
reason. As most studies apply more controls than I do in the baseline model it would be natural to think
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their results diverged accordingly.
In the sector-specific models, the expectations developed in The Varieties of FDI framework were
assessed. Natural resource FDI expected to be affected by human rights climates, systems of political
preference aggregation and property rights systems in host-countries. The only noticeable effect found
was for control of corruption however. The relation was not overly robust as it evaporated when applying
an alternative measure of corruption control, and when removing Singapore from the country-sample.
In essence, the view of natural resource extraction as “different” was corroborated. Properties such as
the sector’s high value added and the world and host-country dependence on resource extraction was
discussed as potential reasons. Moreover, the assumption that natural resource MNEs are likely to be the
investors most constrained in their locational choice when venturing abroad should be examined further.
If it is the case that they have only a subset of countries in which they actually can invest, it might be
interesting to examine effects within country strata rather than for the full sample of countries globally.
Manufacturing FDI was the variation found most attentive to host-country policy climates – robust
relations found for indicators of political governance, economic interaction and economic regulation.
Less robust were the findings for the personal freedoms components, but all in all the expectations devel-
oped for manufacturing FDI were well corroborated. The general high levels of attentiveness to policy
climates amongst manufacturers is however something that should be explored more in-depth. Identify-
ing alternative traits within The Varieties of FDI framework could clarify relations. As could the further
disaggregating of sectors into industries, as discussed below.
The findings for services FDI was less aligned with theoretical expectations. Arguments were devel-
oped as to why all institutional concepts should matter for service MNEs in conducting FDI. However,
only human rights protection and control of corruption were found to be robust predictors of services
FDI. One potential explanation that will need further elaboration is the effect of entry mode, as discussed
in the context of Henisz’s (2000) assertion on ties with local businesses. If it is the case that service
MNEs more often than other MNEs enter host markets through mergers and acquisitions, they might
gain more access to local knowledge on how to navigate in unsound policy climates.
As the only effect found fairly consistent across sectors and total FDI was for corruption control, this
would also need elaborating on. It might be an artifact of Norwegian law and public stance on anti-policy,
and as such should be investigated for FDI from other countries, as mentioned below. Moreover, in what
ways corruption actually affect investors – either through cost-premiums, stifling of productivity growth,
through creating instability or other ways – would be interesting to find out.
5.2 Where to go from here?
In many ways this study is only a preliminary step in direction of embracing the complexity of FDI.
There are expansions and nuances to be developed both outside and within The Varieties of FDI frame-
work. Within the framework, analyses of FDI data from other source countries would prove valuable
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robustness tests of the results found for Norwegian FDI. I highlight the value of using data from single
source-countries only as it allows more thorough modeling of idiosyncrasies and makes it is easier to
discuss potential biases in the data. Personally I have been in contact with national banks and statistical
agencies in a number of European countries, and data should be obtainable from the following countries
at least: Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Holland.1 Second, getting access to industry-level data would
allow controlling for company-specific factors such as: size; governance method; ownership structure;
mode of entry; geographical footprint. Third, The Varieties of FDI framework itself could be expanded.
With more data, sectors could be disaggregated further into industries. There should for example be
important intra-sectoral differences between industries such as: petroleum extraction and cash-cropping;
low-skilled and high-skilled manufacturing; financial services and retail. Moreover, estimating the ef-
fects of more disaggregated indicators of the institutional concepts could yield more information on what
it is about these measures that drive FDI. Fourth, comparative case studies at the company level could
prove insightful as regards how political factors are actually considered in firms from different sectors
(and industries). Such would also allow examining to what degree firms engaged in different forms of
FDI are constrained in the locational decision. Fifth, case studies of national policy processes could help
explain how different tipping points in restructuring facilitate the entry of different types of MNEs. For
example, observing the developments in Myanmar as they happen would be an interesting endeavor.
Outside the The Varieties of FDI framework other sources to heterogeneity should be explored. One
such factor is type of owner. Previous explorations into the effect of state ownership on FDI have found
important differences between state-owned and privately owned firms in their locational decisions (see
e.g. Knutsen, Rygh and Hveem, 2011). Second, there is a cleavage between MNEs engaged with multiple
subsidiaries and those with only one overseas affiliate (Cohen, 2007, 86-7). In this vein, there might also
be important differences stemming from the size of the principal. Larger MNEs might be less averse to
risk than small MNEs. Third, Cohen (2007, 74-5) also highlight that the extent of foreign ownership
might be important. It is not axiomatic that a ten percent allows as active a management structure as a
majority share would. At last, there might be diametrical differences between firms investing in different
regions. Bloningen and Wang (2005) for example find it inappropriate to wealthy and poor host-countries
in empirical studies of FDI.
However, the main message of this exercise is that examining what drives an entity that does not exist
in the form that is assumed might be futile. Nursing the complexity of foreign production should be the
guiding star of future research into determinants of such. If anything, both the theoretical underpinnings
of The Varieties of FDI framework and the empirical analysis of expectations developed therein have
shown that heterogeneity does indeed prevail.
1In Sweden the organization to contact is Statistiska Centralbyra˚n, in Denmark data is obtainable from Danmarks Nation-
albank, for Finnish data Suomen Pankki should be contacted, while De Nederlandsche Bank possesses the Dutch data.
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Appendix A
Additional tables
Table A.1: Full country sample and coverage on independent variables
Country FDI PHY WOR DEM XCO CCI PRI IPI INJ FFI IFI
Afghanistan X X X X - X - - X - X-
Albania X X X X X X X X X X X
Algeria X X X X X X X X X X X
Andorra X X X X - X - - X - -
Angola X X X X X X X X X X X
Antigua and Barbuda X X X X - X - - X - -
Argentina X X X X X X X X X X X
Armenia X X X X X X X X X X X
Australia X X X X X X X X X X X
Austria X X X X X X X X X X X
Azerbaijan X X X X X X X X X X X
Bahamas X X X X - X X X X X X
Bahrain X X X X X X X X X X X
Bangladesh X X X X X X X X X X X
Barbados X X X X X X X - X X X
Belarus X X X X X X X X X X X
Belgium X X X X X X X X X X X
Belize X X X X - X X - X X X
Benin X X X X X X X - X X X
Bhutan X X X X X X - - X - -
Bolivia X X X X X X X X X X X
Bosnia and Herzegovina X X X X - X X - X X X
Botswana X X X X X X X X X X X
Brazil X X X X X X X X X X X
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – Continued from previous page
Country FDI PHY WOR DEM XCO CCI PRI IPI INJ FFI IFI
Brunei X X X X - X - X X - -
Bulgaria X X X X X X X X X X X
Burkina Faso X X X X X X X X X X X
Burundi X X X X X X X - X X X
Cambodia X X X X X X X - X X X
Cameroon X X X X X X X X X X X
Canada X X X X X X X X X X X
Cape Verde X X X X X X X - X X X
Central African Republic X X X X X X X - X X X
Chad X X X X X X X - X X X
Chile X X X X X X X X X X X
China X X X X X X X X X X X
Colombia X X X X X X X X X X X
Comoros X X X X X X - - X - -
Congo X X X X X X X X X X X
Congo, Dem. Rep. X X X X X X - X X - X
Costa Rica X X X X X X X X X X X
Cote d’Ivoire X X X X - X X X X X X
Croatia X X X X X X X X X X X
Cuba X X X X X X X X X X X
Cyprus X X X X X X X X X X X
Czech Republic X X X X X X X X X X X
Denmark X X X X X X X X X X X
Djibouti X X X X X X X - X X X
Dominica X X X X - X - - X - -
Dominican Republic X X X X X X X X X X X
Ecuador X X X X X X X X X X X
Egypt X X X X X X X X X X X
El Salvador X X X X X X X X X X X
Equatorial Guinea X X X X X X X - X X X
Eritrea X X X X X X - - X - -
Estonia X X X X X X X X X X X
Ethiopia X X X X X X X X X X X
Fiji X X X X X X X X X X X
Finland X X X X X X X X X X X
France X X X X X X X X X X X
Gabon X X X X X X X X X X X
Gambia X X X X X X X X X X X
Continued on next page
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Country FDI PHY WOR DEM XCO CCI PRI IPI INJ FFI IFI
Georgia X X X X X X X - X X X
Germany X X X X X X X X X X X
Ghana X X X X X X X X X X X
Greece X X X X X X X X X X X
Grenada X X X X - X - X X - -
Guatemala X X X X X X X X X X X
Guinea X X X X X X X X X X X
Guinea-Bissau X X X X X X X X X X X
Guyana X X X X X X X X X X X
Haiti X X X X X X X X X X X
Honduras X X X X X X X X X X X
Hungary X X X X X X X X X X X
Iceland X X X X - X X X X X X
India X X X X X X X X X X X
Indonesia X X X X X X X X X X X
Iran X - X X X X X X X X X
Iraq X X X X - X - X X - -
Ireland X X X X X X X X X X X
Israel X X X X X X X X X X X
Italy X X X X X X X X X X X
Jamaica X X X X X X X X X X X
Japan X X X X X X X X X X X
Jordan X X X X X X X X X X X
Kazakhstan X X X X X X X - X X X
Kenya X X X X X X X X X X X
Kiribati X X X X - X - - X - -
Korea, North X X X X X X X X X X X
Korea, South X X X X X X X X X X X
Kuwait X X X X X X X X X X X
Kyrgyzstan X X X X X X X - X X X
Laos X X X X X X X - X X X
Latvia X X X X X X X X X X X
Lebanon X X X X X X X X X X X
Lesotho X X X X X X X - X X X
Liberia X X X X X X - X X - -
Libya X X X X X X X X X X X
Liechtenstein X X X X - X - - X - -
Lithuania X X X X X X X X X X X
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – Continued from previous page
Country FDI PHY WOR DEM XCO CCI PRI IPI INJ FFI IFI
Luxembourg X X X X - X X X X X X
Macedonia X X X X X X X - X X X
Madagascar X X X X X X X X X X X
Malawi X X X X X X X X X X X
Malaysia X X X X X X X X X X X
Maldives X X X X - X - - X - -
Mali X X X X X X X X X X X
Malta X X X X - X X X X X X
Marshall Islands X X X X - X - - X - -
Mauritania X X X X X X X - X X X
Mauritius X X X X X X X - X X X
Mexico X X X X X X X X X X X
Micronesia X X X X - X - - X - -
Moldova X X X X X X X X X X X
Mongolia X X X X X X X X X X X
Montenegro X X X X X X - - X - -
Morocco X X X X X X X X X X X
Mozambique X X X X X X X X X X X
Myanmar X X X X X X X X X X X
Namibia X X X X X X X X X X X
Nauru X X X X - - - - X - -
Nepal X X X X X X X - X X X
Netherlands X X X X X X X X X X X
New Zealand X X X X X X X X X X X
Nicaragua X X X X X X X X X X X
Niger X X X X X X X X X X X
Nigeria X X X X X X X X X X X
Oman X X X X X X X X X X X
Pakistan X X X X X X X X X X X
Palau X X X X - X - X X - -
Panama X X X X X X X X X X X
Papua New Guinea X X X X X X - X X - X
Paraguay X X X X X X X X X X X
Peru X X X X X X X X X X X
Philippines X X X X X X X X X X X
Poland X X X X X X X X X X X
Portugal X X X X X X X X X X X
Qatar X X X X X X X X X X X
Continued on next page
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Country FDI PHY WOR DEM XCO CCI PRI IPI INJ FFI IFI
Romania X X X X X X X X X X X
Russia X X X X X X X X X X X
Rwanda X X X X X X X - X X X
Samoa X X X X - X - - X - -
San Marino X X X X - - - - X - -
Sao Tome and Principe X X X X - X - X X - -
Saudi Arabia X X X X X X X X X X X
Senegal X X X X X X X X X X X
Serbia X X X X X X - X X - X
Seychelles X X X X - X - - X - -
Sierra Leone X X X X X X X X X X X
Singapore X X X X X X X X X X X
Slovakia X X X X X X X X X X X
Slovenia X X X X X X X X X X X
Solomon Islands X X X X X X - - X - -
South Africa X X X X X X X X X X X
Spain X X X X X X X X X X X
Sri Lanka X X X X X X X X X X X
St. Kitts and Nevis X X X X - X - - X - -
St. Lucia X X X X - X - - X - -
St. Vin. and the Gren. X X X X - X - - X - -
Sudan X X X X X X - X X - -
Suriname X X X X - X X X X X X
Swaziland X X X X X X X - X X X
Sweden X X X X X X X X X X X
Switzerland X X X X X X X X X X X
Syria X X X X X X X X X X X
Taiwan X X X X X X X X X X X
Tajikistan X X X X X X X - X X X
Tanzania X X X X X X X X X X X
Thailand X X X X X X X X X X X
Timor-Leste X X X X X X - - X - -
Togo X X X X X X X X X X X
Tonga X X X X - X - X X - -
Trinidad and Tobago X X X X X X X X X X X
Tunisia X X X X X X X X X X X
Turkey X X X X X X X X X X X
Turkmenistan X X X X X X X X X X X
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – Continued from previous page
Country FDI PHY WOR DEM XCO CCI PRI IPI INJ FFI IFI
Tuvalu X X X X - X - X X - -
Uganda X X X X X X X X X X X
Ukraine X X X X X X X X X X X
United Arab Emirates X X X X X X X X X X X
United Kingdom X X X X X X X X X X X
United States X X X X X X X X X X X
Uruguay X X X X X X X X X X X
Uzbekistan X X X X X X X - X X X
Vanuatu X X X X - X - - X - -
Venezuela X X X X X X X X X X X
Vietnam X X X X X X X X X X X
Yemen X X X X X X X X X X X
Zambia X X X X X X X X X X X
Zimbabwe X X X X X X X X X X X
Data coverage on independent variables is connoted as of 2006. PHY = PHYSINT, WOR = WORKER, DEM = DEMOC, XCO = XCONST, and INJ = INJUD.
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics for dependent, independent, and control variables
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std.dev Skewness Kurtosis
Dependent variables
Total FDI TFDI -1864232 1.58e+08 2607865 1.04e+07 6.677 61.016
Natural resource FDI NRFDI -1836311 5.10e+07 729833.6 3164174 7.033 71.508
Manufacturing FDI MFDI -3351069 4.56e+07 1050391 4553100 6.293 47.059
Services FDI SFDI -1655490 1.21e+08 818513 5456028 13.426 223.709
Independent variables
Physical integrity index PHYSINT 0 8 4.973 2.265 -0.533 2.317
Worker’s rights index WORKER 0 2 0.948 0.737 0.082 1.843
Democracy DEMOC 0 1 0.581 0.493 -0.330 1.109
Executive constraints XCONST 1 7 4.788 2.102 -0.398 1.680
Control of corruption index CCI -1.981 2.560 -0.042 0.985 0.702 2.733
Property rights index PRI 10 90 49.638 23.618 0.304 2.167
Investment profile index IPI 1.083 12 8.522 2.307 -0.410 2.646
Independence of the judiciary INJUD 0 2 1.117 0.764 -0.200 1.736
Financial freedom index FFI 10 90 50.630 20.910 -0.080 2.474
Investment freedom index IFI 10 90 52.783 19.051 -0.144 2.573
Control variables
Geographic distances DIST 502.690 17455.910 6411.592 3687.791 0.414 2.742
GDP, PPP MARKET 1.63e+08 1.27e+13 2.88e+11 1.03e+12 8.288 85.827
Nordicness NORDIC 0 1 0.0226 0.149 6.420 42.218
Initial 15 EU membership EU15 0 1 0.0949 0.293 2.764 8.641
Internet users per 100 inhabs. INFRASTR 0 87.566 12.433 18.068 1.897 5.978
Kilotons of oil equivalents ENERGY 14.424 1728257 78842.87 216699.6 5.406 35.393
GDP per capita, PPP INCOME 185.299 71463.68 10205.69 12158.64 1.826 6.419
Avg. years of educ. over 25 HUMCAP 0.6 14 7.041 3.407 -0.0345 1.815
Tot. trade as share of GDP OPEN 3.109 1406.288 110.769 108.999 6.737 66.508
Investment-to-GDP ratio DENSITY 0.880 93.598 22.210 13.772 1.337 6.216
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Table A.3: Bivariate correlations between the institutional concepts




DEMOC 0.406 0.467 1.000
(1551) (1554)
XCONST 0.465 0.522 0.827 1.000
(1344) (1346) (1369)
CCI 0.619 0.455 0.393 0.482 1.000
(1534) (1537) (1646) (1369)
FFI 0.510 0.422 0.439 0.578 0.584 1.000
(1343) (1345) (1378) (1284) (1376)
IFI 0.476 0.477 0.484 0.592 0.567 0.678 1.000
(1343) (1345) (1378) (1284) (1376) (1380)
PRI 0.572 0.522 0.467 0.542 0.850 0.638 0.642 1.000
(1343) (1345) (1378) (1284) (1376) (1380) (1380)
IPI 0.588 0.330 0.315 0.434 0.685 0.569 0.531 0.627 1.000
(1178) (1180) (1196) (1114) (1195) (1149) (1149) (1149)
INJUD 0.592 0.517 0.571 0.677 0.647 0.540 0.563 0.716 0.587 1.000
(1552) (1555) (1677) (1369) (1646) (1378) (1378) (1378) (1196)
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Table B.1: Baseline models – Resource extractive FDI and institutional concepts





















ln(DIST) -0.786 -0.827 -0.820 -0.838 -0.827 -1.048∗ -1.052+ -1.075∗ -1.061+ -0.856
(0.486) (0.520) (0.543) (0.555) (0.531) (0.534) (0.540) (0.537) (0.565) (0.540)
ln(MARKET)t−1 0.955∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗ 1.091∗∗∗ 1.094∗∗∗ 1.066∗∗∗ 1.155∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.149) (0.156) (0.197) (0.155) (0.186) (0.187) (0.191) (0.203) (0.153)
NORDIC -0.290 -0.395 -0.324 1.792 -0.595 -0.160 -0.234 -0.174 0.320 -0.299
(1.820) (1.933) (2.013) (2.015) (1.956) (1.901) (1.920) (1.894) (1.850) (1.974)
EU15 4.555∗∗ 4.841∗∗ 4.801∗∗ 5.653∗∗ 3.996∗ 4.330∗∗ 4.508∗∗ 3.911∗ 3.936∗ 4.607∗∗
(1.539) (1.641) (1.727) (1.798) (1.782) (1.640) (1.662) (1.697) (1.647) (1.723)
INFRASTRt−1 0.0533∗∗ 0.0568∗∗ 0.0531∗∗ 0.0646∗∗ 0.0380+ 0.0543∗∗ 0.0564∗∗ 0.0468∗ 0.0423∗ 0.0514∗∗
(0.0186) (0.0189) (0.0197) (0.0219) (0.0205) (0.0207) (0.0208) (0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0195)
Constant -14.74∗ -12.56+ -12.31+ -13.89+ -11.39+ -15.28∗ -14.79∗ -15.24∗ -18.19∗ -12.49+
(6.150) (6.555) (6.863) (7.188) (6.812) (6.862) (6.967) (6.988) (7.254) (6.697)
Observations 1338 1341 1415 1223 1413 1243 1243 1243 1084 1415
Countries 172 172 172 150 172 152 128 172 152 152
R2 0.138 0.121 0.114 0.133 0.121 0.126 0.125 0.127 0.122 0.118
Standard errors in parentheses
OLS with PCSE, dependent variable lnsq(FDI Stock).
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.2: Baseline models – Manufacturing FDI and institutional concepts





















ln(DIST) 0.637 0.585 0.579 0.311 0.552 0.481 0.464 0.352 0.0593 0.439
(0.396) (0.410) (0.422) (0.460) (0.424) (0.436) (0.439) (0.453) (0.503) (0.410)
ln(MARKET)t−1 1.713∗∗∗ 1.651∗∗∗ 1.624∗∗∗ 1.802∗∗∗ 1.586∗∗∗ 1.927∗∗∗ 1.925∗∗∗ 1.858∗∗∗ 1.898∗∗∗ 1.681∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.104) (0.105) (0.142) (0.106) (0.127) (0.127) (0.133) (0.164) (0.103)
NORDIC 2.693∗∗∗ 2.537∗∗∗ 2.800∗∗∗ 2.725∗∗∗ 2.058∗∗ 3.367∗∗∗ 3.431∗∗∗ 3.018∗∗∗ 3.051∗∗∗ 2.824∗∗∗
(0.711) (0.737) (0.727) (0.803) (0.705) (0.766) (0.756) (0.729) (0.835) (0.699)
EU15 4.784∗∗∗ 5.013∗∗∗ 4.833∗∗∗ 3.747∗∗∗ 3.218∗∗∗ 4.456∗∗∗ 4.110∗∗∗ 3.545∗∗∗ 4.301∗∗∗ 4.213∗∗∗
(0.776) (0.788) (0.814) (0.890) (0.955) (0.814) (0.845) (0.929) (0.929) (0.832)
INFRASTRt−1 0.0614∗∗∗ 0.0652∗∗∗ 0.0548∗∗∗ 0.0497∗∗ 0.0250+ 0.0464∗∗ 0.0488∗∗ 0.0401∗∗ 0.0492∗∗ 0.0517∗∗∗
(0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0141) (0.0162) (0.0142) (0.0147) (0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0166) (0.0138)
Constant -43.64∗∗∗ -41.03∗∗∗ -40.85∗∗∗ -44.16∗∗∗ -38.29∗∗∗ -48.24∗∗∗ -48.53∗∗∗ -46.06∗∗∗ -42.22∗∗∗ -41.27∗∗∗
(4.590) (4.674) (4.799) (5.200) (4.904) (4.809) (4.833) (4.891) (5.637) (4.612)
Observations 1338 1341 1415 1223 1413 1243 1243 1243 1084 1415
Countries 172 172 172 150 172 152 128 172 152 152
R2 0.286 0.273 0.272 0.261 0.279 0.283 0.282 0.276 0.232 0.291
Standard errors in parentheses
OLS with PCSE, dependent variable lnsq(FDI Stock).
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.3: Baseline models – Services FDI and institutional concepts





















ln(DIST) -1.086∗∗ -1.163∗∗ -1.136∗∗ -1.026∗ -1.148∗∗ -1.086∗∗ -1.108∗∗ -1.174∗∗ -1.471∗∗∗ -1.200∗∗
(0.393) (0.393) (0.395) (0.412) (0.399) (0.410) (0.413) (0.401) (0.437) (0.396)
ln(MARKET)t−1 1.361∗∗∗ 1.301∗∗∗ 1.305∗∗∗ 1.431∗∗∗ 1.287∗∗∗ 1.448∗∗∗ 1.453∗∗∗ 1.401∗∗∗ 1.391∗∗∗ 1.332∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.130) (0.129) (0.167) (0.131) (0.160) (0.161) (0.159) (0.195) (0.131)
NORDIC -0.257 -0.415 -0.295 2.902+ -0.639 -0.0558 -0.169 -0.292 0.0183 -0.242
(2.270) (2.264) (2.306) (1.714) (2.347) (2.216) (2.240) (2.203) (2.164) (2.300)
EU15 1.135 1.438 1.361 0.948 0.528 1.032 1.125 0.365 0.611 1.067
(1.407) (1.403) (1.435) (1.540) (1.444) (1.391) (1.401) (1.340) (1.390) (1.433)
INFRASTRt−1 0.0644∗∗∗ 0.0701∗∗∗ 0.0663∗∗∗ 0.0709∗∗∗ 0.0499∗ 0.0668∗∗∗ 0.0731∗∗∗ 0.0629∗∗ 0.0565∗∗ 0.0631∗∗∗
(0.0184) (0.0181) (0.0186) (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0197) (0.0192) (0.0194) (0.0201) (0.0186)
Constant -19.72∗∗∗ -16.76∗∗ -17.34∗∗∗ -20.98∗∗∗ -16.17∗∗ -21.93∗∗∗ -21.19∗∗∗ -20.52∗∗∗ -17.49∗∗ -17.59∗∗∗
(5.460) (5.218) (5.214) (5.603) (5.218) (5.366) (5.496) (5.256) (6.030) (5.223)
Observations 1338 1341 1415 1223 1413 1243 1243 1243 1084 1415
Countries 172 172 172 150 172 152 128 172 152 152
R2 0.161 0.158 0.163 0.157 0.162 0.162 0.157 0.168 0.138 0.164
Standard errors in parentheses
OLS with PCSE, dependent variable lnsq(FDI Stock).
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.4: Sensitivity analysis – Institutional concepts and natural resource FDI
Sequential entering of controls
Bivariate ln(MARKET)t−1 ln(DISTANCE) INFRASTRt−1 EU15 NORDIC ln(OPEN)t−1 ln(INCOME)t−1
PHYSINT ∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
WORKER ∗ ∗
DEMOC ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
XCONST ∗∗∗ ∗
CCE ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
PRI ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗
IPI ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
INJUD ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
FFI ∗∗∗ ∗
IFI ∗∗
Cell values connote the significance level of the corresponding institutional concept in the leftmost column. Dependent variables are lnsq(FDI stock). All estimates are
positive. Institutional concepts are connoted in the leftmost column. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.5: Sensitivity analysis – Institutional concepts and manufacturing FDI
Sequential entering of controls
Bivariate ln(MARKET)t−1 ln(DISTANCE) INFRASTRt−1 EU15 NORDIC ln(OPEN)t−1 ln(INCOME)t−1
PHYSINT ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗∗
WORKER ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗
DEMOC ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
XCONST ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
CCE ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
PRI ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
IPI ∗∗∗ ∗∗
INJUD ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
FFI ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
IFI ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
Cell values connote the significance level of the corresponding institutional concept in the leftmost column. Dependent variables are lnsq(FDI stock). All estimates are
positive. Institutional concepts are connoted in the leftmost column. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.6: Sensitivity analysis – Institutional concepts and services FDI
Sequential entering of controls
Bivariate ln(MARKET)t−1 ln(DISTANCE) INFRASTRt−1 EU15 NORDIC ln(OPEN)t−1 ln(INCOME)t−1
PHYSINT ∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
WORKER ∗ ∗
DEMOC ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗
XCONST ∗∗∗ ∗
CCE ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗
PRI ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
IPI ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗
INJUD ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
FFI ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
IFI ∗∗∗ ∗
Cell values connote the significance level of the corresponding institutional concept in the leftmost column. Dependent variables are lnsq(FDI stock). All estimates are
positive. Institutional concepts are connoted in the leftmost column. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.7: Robustness – Baseline models with random effects regression
Personal freedoms Political governance Economic interaction Economic regulation
PHYSINT WORKER DEMOC XCONST CCI PRI IPI INJUD FFI IFI
TFDI 0.105 -0.506+ 1.172 0.0974 1.038∗∗ 0.00239 0.187 0.839∗ -0.00717 -0.00496
(0.0890) (0.290) (0.818) (0.256) (0.388) (0.0158) (0.118) (0.413) (0.0165) (0.0182)
NRFDI 0.238∗ -0.121 0.568 -0.00633 0.914∗ 0.00238 0.236+ 0.631+ -0.00900 -0.0154
(0.0974) (0.299) (0.569) (0.173) (0.418) (0.0162) (0.126) (0.375) (0.0130) (0.0174)
MFDI 0.158+ 0.0453 1.471∗ 0.469∗ 1.620∗∗∗ 0.0242∗ 0.186 0.872∗∗ 0.0131 0.0203∗
(0.0917) (0.156) (0.593) (0.216) (0.306) (0.0106) (0.118) (0.305) (0.0137) (0.0100)
SFDI 0.0800 -0.141 0.849 0.0459 0.884∗ 0.0143 0.0488 0.481+ 0.00896 -0.00985
(0.0833) (0.215) (0.899) (0.255) (0.378) (0.0147) (0.108) (0.277) (0.0124) (0.0142)
Observations 1338 1341 1415 1223 1413 1243 1084 1415 1243 1243
Countries 172 172 172 150 172 152 128 172 152 152
Cell values are slope coefficients of institutional concepts connoted in the top row, with standard errors clustered on panel-units (countries) in parentheses.
Dependent variables are lnsq(FDI stock). Control variables in all models are ln(DISTANCE), ln(MARKET)t−1, NORDIC, EU15 and INFRASTRt−1.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.8: Robustness – Sector-specific models with random effects regression
Personal freedoms Political governance Economic interaction Economic regulation
PHYSINT WORKER DEMOC XCONST CCI PRI IPI INJUD FFI IFI
NRFDI 0.239∗ -0.140 0.745 0.0507 1.197∗ -0.00133 0.296∗ 0.750 -0.00129 -0.0186
(0.119) (0.367) (0.918) (0.254) (0.549) (0.0191) (0.133) (0.504) (0.0163) (0.0217)
Observations 1069 1071 1072 1024 1072 1039 967 1072 1039 1039
Countries 126 126 126 122 126 123 113 126 123 123
MFDI 0.0556 0.00926 0.934 0.340 1.385∗∗∗ 0.0109 0.152 0.573+ 0.00410 0.0136
(0.0897) (0.161) (0.582) (0.227) (0.337) 0.0110) (0.116) (0.338) (0.0143) (0.0104)
Observations 1283 1285 1337 1211 1335 1219 1051 1337 1219 1219
Countries 162 162 162 148 162 149 124 162 149 149
SFDI 0.0570 -0.203 0.296 -0.0746 0.535 0.00328 0.0239 0.234 -0.0000719 -0.0131
(0.0845) (0.219) (0.922) (0.273) (0.451) (0.0156) (0.109) (0.301) (0.0125) (0.0142)
Observations 1282 1284 1336 1210 1334 1219 1051 1336 1219 1219
Countries 161 161 161 147 161 149 124 161 149 149
Cell values in shaded rows are slope coefficients of institutional concepts connoted in the top row, with standard errors clustered on panel-units (countries)
in parentheses. Dependent variables are lnsq(FDI stock). Baseline control variables in all models are ln(DISTANCE), ln(MARKET)t−1, NORDIC, EU15
and INFRASTRt−1. Sector-specific controls are ln(ENERGY) in NRFDI models, ln(INCOME)t−1, HUMCAPt−1, ln(OPEN)t−1 in MFDI models,
and ln(INCOME)t−1, HUMCAPt−1, ln(DENSITY)t−1, lnsq(MFDI)t−1 in SFDI models. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Table B.9: Robustness – Baseline models with one year lag-structure
Personal freedoms Political governance Economic interaction Economic regulation
PHYSINTt−1 WORKERt−1 DEMOCt−1 XCONSTt−1 CCIt−1 PRIt−1 IPIt−1 INJUDt−1 FFIt−1 IFIt−1
TFDI -0.0130 0.0843 -0.133 -0.0178 0.916∗ 0.0225 -0.0130 0.604+ 0.0160 0.0129
(0.0358) (0.126) (0.164) (0.0499) (0.394) (0.0143) (0.118) (0.313) (0.0123) (0.0144)
NRFDI -0.0362 -0.0240 -0.248 -0.0384 0.563 0.00816 0.0317 0.286 -0.000837 -0.00222
(0.0453) (0.147) (0.195) (0.0554) (0.402) (0.0151) (0.132) (0.342) (0.0126) (0.0153)
MFDI 0.00701 0.156 0.00991 -0.0612 1.709∗∗∗ 0.0432∗∗∗ 0.110 1.097∗∗∗ 0.0340∗∗ 0.0450∗∗∗
(0.0317) (0.110) (0.140) (0.0398) (0.326) (0.0127) (0.107) (0.267) (0.0112) (0.0117)
SFDI -0.00115 0.176 0.0569 0.0979∗ 1.042∗∗ 0.0358∗∗ -0.228+ 0.703∗ 0.0244∗ 0.00564
(0.0358) (0.112) (0.161) (0.0450) (0.364) (0.0129) (0.119) (0.286) (0.0122) (0.0137)
Observations 1267 1289 1397 1150 1387 1238 1075 1415 1238 1238
Countries 172 172 172 172 172 152 129 172 152 152
Cell values are slope coefficients of institutional concepts connoted in the top row, with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variables are lnsq(FDI stock). Control variables in all models are ln(DISTANCE), ln(MARKET)t−1, NORDIC, EU15 and INFRASTRt−1.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.10: Robustness – Sector-specific models with one year lag-structure
Personal freedoms Political governance Economic interaction Economic regulation
PHYSINTt−1 WORKERt−1 DEMOCt−1 XCONSTt−1 CCIt−1 PRIt−1 IPIt−1 INJUDt−1 FFIt−1 IFIt−1
NRFDI -0.0437 -0.0590 -0.344 -0.0464 0.804 0.0110 0.124 0.243 0.0105 0.00514
(0.0627) (0.188) (0.255) (0.0741) (0.501) (0.0176) (0.143) (0.462) (0.0148) (0.0192)
Observations 964 980 1060 863 1070 1035 958 1072 1035 1035
Countries 126 126 126 126 126 123 114 126 123 123
MFDI 0.00694 0.142 -0.0151 -0.0733+ 1.637∗∗∗ 0.0274+ 0.0646 0.657∗ 0.0216+ 0.0326∗∗
(0.0324) (0.112) (0.146) (0.0416) (0.393) (0.0146) (0.108) (0.300) (0.0117) (0.0117)
Observations 1196 1216 1319 1078 1313 1214 1042 1337 1214 1214
Countries 162 162 162 162 162 149 125 162 149 149
SFDI 0.0201 0.215+ 0.0523 0.120∗ 0.997∗ 0.0266∗ -0.243∗ 0.386 0.0169 -0.00413
(0.0370) (0.118) (0.170) (0.0466) (0.434) (0.0133) (0.119) (0.297) (0.0121) (0.0140)
Observations 1195 1215 1318 1077 1312 1214 1042 1336 1214 1214
Countries 161 161 161 161 161 149 125 161 149 149
Cell values in shaded rows are slope coefficients of institutional concepts connoted in the top row, with panel-corrected standard errors
in parentheses. Dependent variables are lnsq(FDI stock). Baseline control variables in all models are ln(DISTANCE), ln(MARKET)t−1, NORDIC, EU15
and INFRASTRt−1. Sector-specific controls are ln(ENERGY) in NRFDI models, ln(INCOME)t−1, HUMCAPt−1, ln(OPEN)t−1 in MFDI models,
and ln(INCOME)t−1, HUMCAPt−1, ln(DENSITY)t−1, lnsq(MFDI)t−1 in SFDI models. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Table B.11: Robustness – Baseline models with regional dummies
Personal freedoms Political governance Economic interaction Economic regulation
PHYSINT WORKER DEMOC XCONST CCI PRI IPI INJUD FFI IFI
TFDI 0.110 -0.108 1.128∗ 0.0813 0.872∗ 0.0309∗ 0.130 0.602∗ 0.0136 0.00506
(0.0874) (0.206) (0.523) (0.138) (0.379) (0.0143) (0.128) (0.296) (0.0120) (0.0144)
NRFDI 0.115 -0.0128 0.273 -0.0296 0.677+ 0.0144 0.176 0.234 -0.00149 -0.0128
(0.0946) (0.232) (0.544) (0.139) (0.403) (0.0154) (0.145) (0.325) (0.0121) (0.0151)
MFDI 0.196∗∗ 0.255+ 1.484∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 1.747∗∗∗ 0.0475∗∗∗ 0.00352 1.072∗∗∗ 0.0319∗∗ 0.0401∗∗∗
(0.0736) (0.153) (0.472) (0.117) (0.306) (0.0126) (0.120) (0.247) (0.0106) (0.0116)
SFDI 0.200∗ 0.0724 0.559 -0.00787 0.793∗ 0.0297∗ 0.181 0.449+ 0.0208+ 0.00476
(0.0866) (0.191) (0.487) (0.130) (0.370) (0.0133) (0.130) (0.260) (0.0115) (0.0132)
Observations 1338 1341 1415 1223 1413 1243 1084 1415 1243 1243
Countries 172 172 172 150 172 152 128 172 152 152
Cell values are slope coefficients of institutional concepts connoted in the top row, with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variables are lnsq(FDI stock). Control variables in all models are ln(DISTANCE), ln(MARKET)t−1, NORDIC, EU15, INFRASTRt−1,
and REGION. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.12: Robustness – Sector-specific models with regional dummies
Personal freedoms Political governance Economic interaction Economic regulation
PHYSINT WORKER DEMOC XCONST CCI PRI IPI INJUD FFI IFI
NRFDI 0.142 0.0743 0.407 0.0281 1.033∗ 0.0221 0.289+ 0.277 0.0121 -0.00926
(0.122) (0.302) (0.793) (0.185) (0.499) (0.0182) (0.152) (0.434) (0.0143) (0.0189)
Observations 1069 1071 1072 1024 1072 1039 967 1072 1039 1039
Countries 126 126 126 122 126 123 113 126 123 123
MFDI 0.0942 0.209 1.043∗ 0.327∗∗ 1.713∗∗∗ 0.0310∗ -0.0632 0.731∗∗ 0.0202+ 0.0283∗
(0.0779) (0.157) (0.506) (0.123) (0.376) (0.0146) (0.119) (0.274) (0.0110) (0.0116)
Observations 1283 1285 1337 1211 1335 1219 1051 1337 1219 1219
Countries 162 162 162 148 162 149 124 162 149 149
SFDI 0.206∗ 0.0340 0.0485 -0.105 0.790+ 0.0226 0.160 0.194 0.0127 -0.00376
(0.0943) (0.193) (0.494) (0.134) (0.423) (0.0138) (0.129) (0.265) (0.0116) (0.0136)
Observations 1282 1284 1336 1210 1334 1219 1051 1336 1219 1219
Countries 161 161 161 147 161 149 124 161 149 149
Cell values in shaded rows are slope coefficients of institutional concepts connoted in the top row, with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variables are lnsq(FDI stock). Baseline control variables in all models are ln(DISTANCE), ln(MARKET)t−1, NORDIC, EU15,
INFRASTRt−1, and REGION. Sector-specific controls are ln(ENERGY) in NRFDI models, ln(INCOME)t−1, HUMCAPt−1, ln(OPEN)t−1 in MFDI models,
and ln(INCOME)t−1, HUMCAPt−1, ln(DENSITY)t−1, lnsq(MFDI)t−1 in SFDI models. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
118 APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL RESULTS
Table B.13: Robustness – Baseline models with time-trend dummies
Personal freedoms Political governance Economic interaction Economic regulation
PHYSINT WORKER DEMOC XCONST CCI PRI IPI INJUD FFI IFI
TFDI 0.165∗ 0.0345 0.405 -0.0271 1.212∗∗∗ 0.0307∗∗ 0.106 0.598∗ 0.0198∗ 0.00785
(0.0770) (0.187) (0.452) (0.125) (0.348) (0.0119) (0.120) (0.255) (0.0100) (0.0126)
NRFDI 0.0699 0.0765 0.0174 -0.0188 0.664∗ 0.0120 0.0620 0.345 -0.00433 -0.00455
(0.0606) (0.145) (0.440) (0.0905) (0.289) (0.0113) (0.104) (0.216) (0.00909) (0.0110)
MFDI 0.0996∗ 0.101 0.427 0.0886 1.214∗∗∗ 0.0299∗∗∗ 0.0253 0.618∗∗∗ 0.0108+ 0.0149∗
(0.0426) (0.104) (0.311) (0.0804) (0.222) (0.00761) (0.0598) (0.136) (0.00633) (0.00702)
SFDI 0.165∗ 0.0345 0.405 -0.0271 1.212∗∗∗ 0.0307∗∗ 0.106 0.598∗ 0.0198∗ 0.00785
(0.0770) (0.187) (0.452) (0.125) (0.348) (0.0119) (0.120) (0.255) (0.0100) (0.0126)
Observations 1338 1341 1415 1223 1413 1243 1084 1415 1243 1243
Countries 172 172 172 150 172 152 128 172 152 152
Cell values are slope coefficients of institutional concepts connoted in the top row, with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variables are lnsq(FDI stock). Control variables in all models are ln(DISTANCE), ln(MARKET)t−1, NORDIC, EU15, INFRASTRt−1,
and TIME. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.14: Robustness – Sector-specific models with time-trend dummies
Personal freedoms Political governance Economic interaction Economic regulation
PHYSINT WORKER DEMOC XCONST CCI PRI IPI INJUD FFI IFI
NRFDI 0.133 0.0693 0.368 0.0144 1.180∗ 0.0267 0.285+ 0.290 0.0120 -0.00999
(0.119) (0.317) (0.781) (0.181) (0.526) (0.0197) (0.151) (0.460) (0.0144) (0.0190)
Observations 1069 1071 1072 1024 1072 1039 967 1072 1039 1039
Countries 126 126 126 122 126 123 113 126 123 123
MFDI 0.0811 0.163 1.034∗ 0.329∗∗ 1.708∗∗∗ 0.0307∗ -0.0556 0.707∗ 0.0186+ 0.0266∗
(0.0777) (0.161) (0.515) (0.124) (0.385) (0.0156) (0.119) (0.277) (0.0111) (0.0117)
Observations 1283 1285 1337 1211 1335 1219 1051 1337 1219 1219
Countries 162 162 162 148 162 149 124 162 149 149
SFDI 0.215∗ 0.149 0.0828 -0.0912 1.103∗ 0.0379∗∗ 0.147 0.342 0.0131 -0.000749
(0.0938) (0.198) (0.495) (0.133) (0.432) (0.0144) (0.130) (0.261) (0.0116) (0.0139)
Observations 1282 1284 1336 1210 1334 1219 1051 1336 1219 1219
Countries 161 161 161 147 161 149 124 161 149 149
Cell values in shaded rows are slope coefficients of institutional concepts connoted in the top row, with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variables are lnsq(FDI stock). Baseline control variables in all models are ln(DISTANCE), ln(MARKET)t−1, NORDIC, EU15,
INFRASTRt−1, and TIME. Sector-specific controls are ln(ENERGY) in NRFDI models, ln(INCOME)t−1, HUMCAPt−1, ln(OPEN)t−1 in MFDI models,
and ln(INCOME)t−1, HUMCAPt−1, ln(DENSITY)t−1, lnsq(MFDI)t−1 in SFDI models. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Table B.15: Robustness – Baseline models excluding top 20 largest MNEs
Personal freedoms Political governance Economic interaction Economic regulation
PHYSINT WORKER DEMOC XCONST CCI PRI IPI INJUD FFI IFI
TFDI 0.165∗ 0.0345 0.405 -0.0271 1.212∗∗∗ 0.0307∗∗ 0.106 0.598∗ 0.0198∗ 0.00785
(0.0770) (0.187) (0.452) (0.125) (0.348) (0.0119) (0.120) (0.255) (0.0100) (0.0126)
NRFDI 0.0699 0.0765 0.0174 -0.0188 0.664∗ 0.0120 0.0620 0.345 -0.00433 -0.00455
(0.0606) (0.145) (0.440) (0.0905) (0.289) (0.0113) (0.104) (0.216) (0.00909) (0.0110)
MFDI 0.0996∗ 0.101 0.427 0.0886 1.214∗∗∗ 0.0299∗∗∗ 0.0253 0.618∗∗∗ 0.0108+ 0.0149∗
(0.0426) (0.104) (0.311) (0.0804) (0.222) (0.00761) (0.0598) (0.136) (0.00633) (0.00702)
SFDI 0.228∗∗ 0.158 0.464 -0.0239 1.188∗∗∗ 0.0406∗∗ 0.197 0.582∗ 0.0283∗∗ 0.0104
(0.0854) (0.190) (0.474) (0.124) (0.336) (0.0124) (0.129) (0.245) 0.0109) (0.0127)
Observations 1338 1341 1415 1223 1413 1243 1084 1415 1243 1243
Countries 172 172 172 150 172 152 128 172 152 152
Cell values are slope coefficients of institutional concepts connoted in the top row, with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variables are lnsq(FDI stock) excluding top 20 MNEs’ FDIs. Control variables in all models are ln(DISTANCE), ln(MARKET)t−1, NORDIC, EU15, .
and INFRASTRt−1. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.16: Robustness – Sector-specific models excluding top 20 largest MNEs
Personal freedoms Political governance Economic interaction Economic regulation
PHYSINT WORKER DEMOC XCONST CCI PRI IPI INJUD FFI IFI
NRFDI 0.0550 0.0418 -0.507 -0.132 0.561 0.00548 0.0957 0.229 -0.00143 -0.0161
(0.0751) (0.187) (0.649) (0.114) (0.349) (0.0127) (0.105) (0.287) (0.0106) (0.0136)
Observations 1069 1071 1072 1024 1072 1039 967 1072 1039 1039
Countries 126 126 126 122 126 123 113 126 123 123
MFDI 0.0544 0.0921 0.0929 0.0684 1.202∗∗∗ 0.0285∗∗∗ -0.00839 0.411∗∗ 0.00573 0.0103
(0.0436) (0.107) (0.313) (0.0786) (0.265) (0.00812) (0.0614) (0.146) (0.00641) (0.00700)
Observations 1283 1285 1337 1211 1335 1219 1051 1337 1219 1219
Countries 162 162 162 148 162 149 124 162 149 149
SFDI 0.207∗ 0.106 -0.165 -0.139 1.101∗∗ 0.0305∗ 0.147 0.221 0.0184+ 0.00000116
(0.0923) (0.192) (0.484) (0.128) (0.400) (0.0130) (0.128) (0.260) (0.0111) (0.0129)
Observations 1282 1284 1336 1210 1334 1219 1051 1336 1219 1219
Countries 161 161 161 147 161 149 124 161 149 149
Cell values in shaded rows are slope coefficients of institutional concepts connoted in the top row, with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variables are lnsq(FDI stock). Baseline control variables in all models are ln(DISTANCE), ln(MARKET)t−1, NORDIC,
EU15, INFRASTRt−1, and TAXHAV. Sector-specific controls are ln(ENERGY) in NRFDI models, ln(INCOME)t−1, HUMCAPt−1, ln(OPEN)t−1 in MFDI models,
and ln(INCOME)t−1, HUMCAPt−1, ln(DENSITY)t−1, lnsq(MFDI)t−1 in SFDI models. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Table B.17: Robustness – Baseline models with tax haven dummy
Personal freedoms Political governance Economic interaction Economic regulation
PHYSINT WORKER DEMOC XCONST CCI PRI IPI INJUD FFI IFI
TFDI 0.0827 -0.148 0.958+ 0.0590 0.653+ 0.0271+ 0.104 0.511+ 0.00931 0.00338
(0.0871) (0.208) (0.527) (0.137) (0.388) (0.0144) (0.125) (0.289) (0.0121) (0.0144)
NRFDI 0.101 -0.0185 0.242 -0.0362 0.680+ 0.0144 0.157 0.260 -0.00431 -0.0136
(0.0953) (0.233) (0.550) (0.136) (0.412) (0.0158) (0.144) (0.318) (0.0122) (0.0151)
MFDI 0.173∗ 0.235 1.393∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 1.654∗∗∗ 0.0462∗∗∗ -0.00905 1.027∗∗∗ 0.0299∗∗ 0.0386∗∗∗
(0.0726) (0.155) (0.468) (0.115) (0.330) (0.0133) (0.118) (0.248) (0.0104) (0.0116)
SFDI 0.172∗ 0.0365 0.388 -0.0334 0.605 0.0261∗ 0.139 0.388 0.0147 0.00278
(0.0862) (0.190) (0.481) (0.130) (0.368) (0.0131) (0.128) (0.245) (0.0118) (0.0132)
Observations 1338 1341 1415 1223 1413 1243 1084 1415 1243 1243
Countries 172 172 172 150 172 152 128 172 152 152
Cell values are slope coefficients of institutional concepts connoted in the top row, with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variables are lnsq(FDI stock). Control variables in all models are ln(DISTANCE), ln(MARKET)t−1, NORDIC, EU15, .
INFRASTRt−1, and TAXHAV. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.18: Robustness – Sector-specific models with tax haven dummy
Personal freedoms Political governance Economic interaction Economic regulation
PHYSINT WORKER DEMOC XCONST CCI PRI IPI INJUD FFI IFI
NRFDI 0.127 0.0925 0.349 0.0247 1.010∗ 0.0218 0.271+ 0.296 0.0100 -0.00859
(0.119) (0.302) (0.764) (0.180) (0.504) (0.0183) (0.153) (0.434) (0.0146) (0.0188)
Observations 1069 1071 1072 1024 1072 1039 967 1072 1039 1039
Countries 126 126 126 122 126 123 113 126 123 123
MFDI 0.173∗ 0.235 1.393∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 1.654∗∗∗ 0.0462∗∗∗ -0.00905 1.027∗∗∗ 0.0299∗∗ 0.0386∗∗∗
(0.0726) (0.155) (0.468) (0.115) (0.330) (0.0133) (0.118) (0.248) (0.0104) (0.0116)
Observations 1338 1341 1415 1223 1413 1243 1084 1415 1243 1243
Countries 162 162 162 148 162 149 124 162 149 149
SFDI 0.215∗ 0.0411 0.0374 -0.0816 0.860∗ 0.0261+ 0.151 0.307 0.0103 -0.00326
(0.0931) (0.193) (0.491) (0.130) (0.419) (0.0134) (0.127) (0.255) (0.0115) (0.0135)
Observations 1282 1284 1336 1210 1334 1219 1051 1336 1219 1219
Countries 161 161 161 147 161 149 124 161 149 149
Cell values in shaded rows are slope coefficients of institutional concepts connoted in the top row, with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variables are lnsq(FDI stock). Baseline control variables in all models are ln(DISTANCE), ln(MARKET)t−1, NORDIC,
EU15, INFRASTRt−1, and TAXHAV. Sector-specific controls are ln(ENERGY) in NRFDI models, ln(INCOME)t−1, HUMCAPt−1, ln(OPEN)t−1 in MFDI models,
and ln(INCOME)t−1, HUMCAPt−1, ln(DENSITY)t−1, lnsq(MFDI)t−1 in SFDI models. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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